Active inference is a Bayesian framework for understanding biological intelligence. The underlying theory brings together perception and action under one single imperative: minimizing free energy. However, despite its theoretical utility in explaining intelligence, computational implementations have been restricted to low-dimensional and idealized situations. In this paper, we present a neural architecture for building deep active inference agents operating in complex, continuous state-spaces using multiple forms of Monte-Carlo (MC) sampling. For this, we introduce a number of techniques, novel to active inference.

Active inference proposes expected free energy as an objective for planning and decision-making to adequately balance exploitative and explorative drives in learning agents. The exploitative drive, or what an agent wants to achieve, is formalised as the Kullback-Leibler divergence between a variational probability distribution, updated at each inference step, and a preference probability distribution that indicates what states or observations are more likely for the agent, hence determining the agent's goal in a certain environment. In the literature, the questions of how the preference distribution should be specified and of how a certain specification impacts inference and learning in an active inference agent have been given hardly any attention. In this work, we consider four possible ways of defining the preference distribution, either providing the agents with hard or soft goals and either involving or not goal shaping (i.e., intermediate goals). We compare the performances of four agents, each given one of the possible preference distributions, in a grid world navigation task. Our results show that goal shaping enables the best performance overall (i.e., it promotes exploitation) while sacrificing learning about the environment's transition dynamics (i.e., it hampers exploration).

Active inference is a formal approach to study cognition based on the notion that adaptive agents can be seen as engaging in a process of approximate Bayesian inference, via the minimisation of variational and expected free energies. Minimising the former provides an account of perceptual processes and learning as evidence accumulation, while minimising the latter describes how agents select their actions over time. In this way, adaptive agents are able to maximise the likelihood of preferred observations or states, given a generative model of the environment. In the literature, however, different strategies have been proposed to describe how agents can plan their future actions. While they all share the notion that some kind of expected free energy offers an appropriate way to score policies, sequences of actions, in terms of their desirability, there are different ways to consider the contribution of past motor experience to the agent's future behaviour. In some approaches, agents are assumed to know their own actions, and use such knowledge to better plan for the future. In other approaches, agents are unaware of their actions, and must infer their motor behaviour from recent observations in order to plan for the future. This difference reflects a standard point of departure in two leading frameworks in motor control based on the presence, or not, of an efference copy signal representing knowledge about an agent's own actions. In this work we compare the performances of action-aware and action-unaware agents in two navigations tasks, showing how action-unaware agents can achieve performances comparable to action-aware ones while at a severe disadvantage.

With recent and rapid advancements in artificial intelligence (AI), understanding the foundation of purposeful behaviour in autonomous agents is crucial for developing safe and efficient systems. While artificial neural networks have dominated the path to AI, recent studies are exploring the potential of biologically based systems, such as networks of living biological neuronal networks. Along with promises of high power and data efficiency, these systems may also inform more explainable and biologically plausible models. In this work, we propose a framework rooted in active inference, a general theory of behaviour, to model decision-making in embodied agents. Using experiment-informed generative models, we simulate decision-making processes in a simulated game-play environment, mirroring experimental setups that use biological neurons. Our results demonstrate learning in these agents, providing insights into the role of memory-based learning and predictive planning in intelligent decision-making. This work contributes to the growing field of explainable AI by offering a biologically grounded and scalable approach to understanding purposeful behaviour in agents.

We propose an active inference agent to identify and control a mechanical system with multiple bodies connected by joints. This agent is constructed from multiple scalar autoregressive model-based agents, coupled together by virtue of sharing memories. Each subagent infers parameters through Bayesian filtering and controls by minimizing expected free energy over a finite time horizon. We demonstrate that a coupled agent of this kind is able to learn the dynamics of a double mass-spring-damper system, and drive it to a desired position through a balance of explorative and exploitative actions. It outperforms the uncoupled subagents in terms of surprise and goal alignment.

Active inference is a Bayesian framework for understanding biological intelligence. The underlying theory brings together perception and action under one single imperative: minimizing free energy. However, despite its theoretical utility in explaining intelligence, computational implementations have been restricted to low-dimensional and idealized situations. In this paper, we present a neural architecture for building deep active inference agents operating in complex, continuous state-spaces using multiple forms of Monte-Carlo (MC) sampling. For this, we introduce a number of techniques, novel to active inference.

Active inference is a mathematical framework for understanding how agents (biological or artificial) interact with their environments, enabling continual adaptation and decision-making. It combines Bayesian inference and free energy minimization to model perception, action, and learning in uncertain and dynamic contexts. Unlike reinforcement learning, active inference integrates exploration and exploitation seamlessly by minimizing expected free energy. In this paper, we present a continual learning framework for agents operating in discrete time environments, using active inference as the foundation. We derive the mathematical formulations of variational and expected free energy and apply them to the design of a self-learning research agent. This agent updates its beliefs and adapts its actions based on new data without manual intervention. Through experiments in changing environments, we demonstrate the agent's ability to relearn and refine its models efficiently, making it suitable for complex domains like finance and healthcare. The paper concludes by discussing how the proposed framework generalizes to other systems, positioning active inference as a flexible approach for adaptive AI.

In nature, active inference agents must learn how observations of the world represent the state of the agent. In engineering, the physics behind sensors is often known reasonably accurately and measurement functions can be incorporated into generative models. When a measurement function is non-linear, the transformed variable is typically approximated with a Gaussian distribution to ensure tractable inference. We show that Gaussian approximations that are sensitive to the curvature of the measurement function, such as a second-order Taylor approximation, produce a state-dependent ambiguity term. This induces a preference over states, based on how accurately the state can be inferred from the observation. We demonstrate this preference with a robot navigation experiment where agents plan trajectories.