Automated decision-making tools increasingly assess individuals to determine if they qualify for high-stakes opportunities. A recent line of research investigates how strategic agents may respond to such scoring tools to receive favorable assessments. While prior work has focused on the short-term strategic interactions between a decision-making institution (modeled as a principal) and individual decisionsubjects (modeled as agents), we investigate interactions spanning multiple timesteps. In particular, we consider settings in which the agent's effort investment today can accumulate over time in the form of an internal state--impacting both his future rewards and that of the principal. We characterize the Stackelberg equilibrium of the resulting game and provide novel algorithms for computing it. Our analysis reveals several intriguing insights about the role of multiple interactions in shaping the game's outcome: First, we establish that in our stateful setting, the class of all linear assessment policies remains as powerful as the larger class of all monotonic assessment policies. While recovering the principal's optimal policy requires solving a non-convex optimization problem, we provide polynomial-time algorithms for recovering both the principal and agent's optimal policies under common assumptions about the process by which effort investments convert to observable features. Most importantly, we show that with multiple rounds of interaction at her disposal, the principal is more effective at incentivizing the agent to accumulate effort in her desired direction. Our work addresses several critical gaps in the growing literature on the societal impacts of automated decisionmaking--by focusing on longer time horizons and accounting for the compounding nature of decisions individuals receive over time.

Since the inception of our planet, the meteorological environment, as reflected through spatio-temporal data, has always been a fundamental factor influencing human life, socio-economic progress, and ecological conservation. A comprehensive exploration of this data is thus imperative to gain a deeper understanding and more accurate forecasting of these environmental shifts. Despite the success of deep learning techniques within the realm of spatio-temporal data and earth science, existing public datasets are beset with limitations in terms of spatial scale, temporal coverage, and reliance on limited time series data. These constraints hinder their optimal utilization in practical applications. To address these issues, we introduce Terra, a multimodal spatio-temporal dataset spanning the earth. This dataset encompasses hourly time series data from 6,480,000 grid areas worldwide over the past 45 years, while also incorporating multimodal spatial supplementary information including geo-images and explanatory text. Through a detailed data analysis and evaluation of existing deep learning models within earth sciences, utilizing our constructed dataset.

An emerging area of research in situated and multimodal interactive conversations (SIMMC) includes interactions in scientific papers. Since scientific papers are primarily composed of text, equations, figures, and tables, SIMMC methods must be developed specifically for each component to support the depth of inquiry and interactions required by research scientists.

This paper investigates the problem of computing the equilibrium of competitive games, which is often modeled as a constrained saddle-point optimization problem with probability simplex constraints. Despite recent efforts in understanding the last-iterate convergence of extragradient methods in the unconstrained setting, the theoretical underpinnings of these methods in the constrained settings, especially those using multiplicative updates, remain highly inadequate, even when the objective function is bilinear. Motivated by the algorithmic role of entropy regularization in single-agent reinforcement learning and game theory, we develop provably efficient extragradient methods to find the quantal response equilibrium (QRE)--which are solutions to zero-sum two-player matrix games with entropy regularization--at a linear rate. The proposed algorithms can be implemented in a decentralized manner, where each player executes symmetric and multiplicative updates iteratively using its own payoff without observing the opponent's actions directly. In addition, by controlling the knob of entropy regularization, the proposed algorithms can locate an approximate Nash equilibrium of the unregularized matrix game at a sublinear rate without assuming the Nash equilibrium to be unique. Our methods also lead to efficient policy extragradient algorithms for solving entropy-regularized zero-sum Markov games at a linear rate. All of our convergence rates are nearly dimension-free, which are independent of the size of the state and action spaces up to logarithm factors, highlighting the positive role of entropy regularization for accelerating convergence.

Based on the plot, one can see that the retrieved documents are grouped in two clusters with all relevant publications belonging to one of them (bottom-right part of the plot). This can be an indicator that any model will likely remove the other "non-relevant" cluster of documents and hence achieve good score in detecting true negatives.

We study the problem of list-decodable sparse mean estimation.

This paper studies delayed stochastic algorithms for weakly convex optimization in a distributed network with workers connected to a master node. Recently, Xu et al. 2022 showed that an inertial stochastic subgradient method converges at a rate of O(τ

Opponent modeling is a longstanding research topic aimed at enhancing decisionmaking by modeling information about opponents in multi-agent environments. However, existing approaches often face challenges such as having difficulty generalizing to unknown opponent policies and conducting unstable performance. To tackle these challenges, we propose a novel approach based on in-context learning and decision-time search named Opponent Modeling with In-context Search (OMIS). OMIS leverages in-context learning-based pretraining to train a Transformer model for decision-making. It consists of three in-context components: an actor learning best responses to opponent policies, an opponent imitator mimicking opponent actions, and a critic estimating state values. When testing in an environment that features unknown non-stationary opponent agents, OMIS uses pretrained in-context components for decision-time search to refine the actor's policy. Theoretically, we prove that under reasonable assumptions, OMIS without search converges in opponent policy recognition and has good generalization properties; with search, OMIS provides improvement guarantees, exhibiting performance stability. Empirically, in competitive, cooperative, and mixed environments, OMIS demonstrates more effective and stable adaptation to opponents than other approaches. See our project website at https://sites.google.com/view/nips2024-omis.