This paper studies repetitive negotiation over the execution of an exploration process between two self-interested, fully rational agents in a full information environmentwith side payments. A key aspect of the protocolis that the exploration’s execution may interleaves ith the negotiation itself, inflicting some degradationon the exploration’s flexibility. The advantage of this form of negotiation is in enabling the agents supervising that the exploration’s execution takes place in its agreedform as negotiated. We show that in many cases, much of the computational complexity of the new protocol can be eliminated by solving an alternative negotiation scheme according to which the parties first negotiate theexploration terms as a whole and then execute it. As demonstrated in the paper, the solution characteristics of the new protocol are somehow different from thoseof legacy negotiation protocols where the execution of the agreement reached through the negotiation is completely separated from the negotiation process. Furthermore, if the agents are given the option to control some of the negotiation protocol parameters, the resulting exploration may be suboptimal. In particular we show that the increase in an agent’s expected utility in such casesis unbounded and so is the resulting decrease in the social welfare. Surprisingly, we show that further increasingone of the agents’ level of control in some of thenegotiation parameters enables bounding the resultingdecrease in the social welfare.

Our aim in this book is to present a survey of work on the computational aspects of cooperative game theory. We begin by formally defining transferable utility games in characteristic function form, and introducing key solution concepts such as the core and the Shapley value. We then discuss two major issues: identifying compact representations for games, and efficiently computing solution concepts for games. ISBN 9781608456529, 168 pages.

The effective tailoring of decisions to the needs and desires of specific users requires automated mechanisms for preference assessment. We provide a brief overview of recent direct preference elicitation methods: these methods ask users to answer (ideally, a small number of) queries regarding their preferences and use this information to recommend a feasible decision that would be (approximately) optimal given those preferences. We argue for the importance of assessing numerical utilities rather than qualitative preferences, and survey several utility elicitation techniques from artificial intelligence, operations research, and conjoint analysis.

This article provides an overview of the field of qualitative decision theory: its motivating tasks and issues, its antecedents, and its prospects. Qualitative decision theory studies qualitative approaches to problems of decision making and their sound and effective reconciliation and integration with quantitative approaches. Although it inherits from a long tradition, the field offers a new focus on a number of important unanswered questions of common concern to AI, economics, law, psychology, and management.