We provide an in-depth study of Nash equilibria in multi-objective normal form games (MONFGs), i.e., normal form games with vectorial payoffs. Taking a utility-based approach, we assume that each player's utility can be modelled with a utility function that maps a vector to a scalar utility. In the case of a mixed strategy, it is meaningful to apply such a scalarisation both before calculating the expectation of the payoff vector as well as after. This distinction leads to two optimisation criteria. With the first criterion, players aim to optimise the expected value of their utility function applied to the payoff vectors obtained in the game. With the second criterion, players aim to optimise the utility of expected payoff vectors given a joint strategy. Under this latter criterion, it was shown that Nash equilibria need not exist. Our first contribution is to provide a sufficient condition under which Nash equilibria are guaranteed to exist. Secondly, we show that when Nash equilibria do exist under both criteria, no equilibrium needs to be shared between the two criteria, and even the number of equilibria can differ. Thirdly, we contribute a study of pure strategy Nash equilibria under both criteria. We show that when assuming quasiconvex utility functions for players, the sets of pure strategy Nash equilibria under both optimisation criteria are equivalent. This result is further extended to games in which players adhere to different optimisation criteria. Finally, given these theoretical results, we construct an algorithm to compute all pure strategy Nash equilibria in MONFGs where players have a quasiconvex utility function.

We cover different settings and the assumptions they admit, including sensing, human computation, peer grading, reviews, and predictions. We survey different incentive mechanisms, including proper scoring rules, prediction markets and peer prediction, Bayesian Truth Serum, Peer Truth Serum, Correlated Agreement, and the settings where each of them would be suitable. As an alternative, we also consider reputation mechanisms. We complement the game-theoretic analysis with practical examples of applications in prediction platforms, community sensing, and peer grading.

Over the last few years, the Shapley value, a solution concept from cooperative game theory, has found numerous applications in machine learning. In this paper, we first discuss fundamental concepts of cooperative game theory and axiomatic properties of the Shapley value. Then we give an overview of the most important applications of the Shapley value in machine learning: feature selection, explainability, multi-agent reinforcement learning, ensemble pruning, and data valuation. We examine the most crucial limitations of the Shapley value and point out directions for future research.

Forecasting has always been at the forefront of decision making and planning. The uncertainty that surrounds the future is both exciting and challenging, with individuals and organisations seeking to minimise risks and maximise utilities. The large number of forecasting applications calls for a diverse set of forecasting methods to tackle real-life challenges. This article provides a non-systematic review of the theory and the practice of forecasting. We provide an overview of a wide range of theoretical, state-of-the-art models, methods, principles, and approaches to prepare, produce, organise, and evaluate forecasts. We then demonstrate how such theoretical concepts are applied in a variety of real-life contexts. We do not claim that this review is an exhaustive list of methods and applications. However, we wish that our encyclopedic presentation will offer a point of reference for the rich work that has been undertaken over the last decades, with some key insights for the future of forecasting theory and practice. Given its encyclopedic nature, the intended mode of reading is non-linear. We offer cross-references to allow the readers to navigate through the various topics. We complement the theoretical concepts and applications covered by large lists of free or open-source software implementations and publicly-available databases.

In recent years, a new branch of auction models called diffusion auction has extended the traditional auction into social network scenarios. The diffusion auction models the auction as a networked market whose nodes are potential customers and whose edges are the relations between these customers. The diffusion auction mechanism can incentivize buyers to not only submit a truthful bid, but also further invite their surrounding neighbors to participate into the auction. It can convene more participants than traditional auction mechanisms, which leads to better optimizations of different key aspects, such as social welfare, seller's revenue, amount of redistributed money and so on. The diffusion auctions have recently attracted a discrete interest in the algorithmic game theory and market design communities. This survey summarizes the current progress of diffusion auctions.

Explaining the predictions of opaque machine learning algorithms is an important and challenging task, especially as complex models are increasingly used to assist in high-stakes decisions such as those arising in healthcare and finance. Most popular tools for post-hoc explainable artificial intelligence (XAI) are either insensitive to context (e.g., feature attributions) or difficult to summarize (e.g., counterfactuals). In this paper, I introduce \emph{rational Shapley values}, a novel XAI method that synthesizes and extends these seemingly incompatible approaches in a rigorous, flexible manner. I leverage tools from decision theory and causal modeling to formalize and implement a pragmatic approach that resolves a number of known challenges in XAI. By pairing the distribution of random variables with the appropriate reference class for a given explanation task, I illustrate through theory and experiments how user goals and knowledge can inform and constrain the solution set in an iterative fashion. The method compares favorably to state of the art XAI tools in a range of quantitative and qualitative comparisons.

Generative Adversarial Network, as a promising research direction in the AI community, recently attracts considerable attention due to its ability to generating high-quality realistic data. GANs are a competing game between two neural networks trained in an adversarial manner to reach a Nash equilibrium. Despite the improvement accomplished in GANs in the last years, there remain several issues to solve. In this way, how to tackle these issues and make advances leads to rising research interests. This paper reviews literature that leverages the game theory in GANs and addresses how game models can relieve specific generative models' challenges and improve the GAN's performance. In particular, we firstly review some preliminaries, including the basic GAN model and some game theory backgrounds. After that, we present our taxonomy to summarize the state-of-the-art solutions into three significant categories: modified game model, modified architecture, and modified learning method. The classification is based on the modifications made in the basic model by the proposed approaches from the game-theoretic perspective. We further classify each category into several subcategories. Following the proposed taxonomy, we explore the main objective of each class and review the recent work in each group. Finally, we discuss the remaining challenges in this field and present the potential future research topics.

Recent years have witnessed significant advances in technologies and services in modern network applications, including smart grid management, wireless communication, cybersecurity as well as multi-agent autonomous systems. Considering the heterogeneous nature of networked entities, emerging network applications call for game-theoretic models and learning-based approaches in order to create distributed network intelligence that responds to uncertainties and disruptions in a dynamic or an adversarial environment. This paper articulates the confluence of networks, games and learning, which establishes a theoretical underpinning for understanding multi-agent decision-making over networks. We provide an selective overview of game-theoretic learning algorithms within the framework of stochastic approximation theory, and associated applications in some representative contexts of modern network systems, such as the next generation wireless communication networks, the smart grid and distributed machine learning. In addition to existing research works on game-theoretic learning over networks, we highlight several new angles and research endeavors on learning in games that are related to recent developments in artificial intelligence. Some of the new angles extrapolate from our own research interests. The overall objective of the paper is to provide the reader a clear picture of the strengths and challenges of adopting game-theoretic learning methods within the context of network systems, and further to identify fruitful future research directions on both theoretical and applied studies.

Cohort Shapley value is a model-free method of variable importance grounded in game theory that does not use any unobserved and potentially impossible feature combinations. We use it to evaluate algorithmic fairness, using the well known COMPAS recidivism data as our example. This approach allows one to identify for each individual in a data set the extent to which they were adversely or beneficially affected by their value of a protected attribute such as their race. The method can do this even if race was not one of the original predictors and even if it does not have access to a proprietary algorithm that has made the predictions. The grounding in game theory lets us define aggregate variable importance for a data set consistently with its per subject definitions. We can investigate variable importance for multiple quantities of interest in the fairness literature including false positive predictions.

Randomized algorithms have propelled advances in artificial intelligence and represent a foundational research area in advancing AI for Science. Future advancements in DOE Office of Science priority areas such as climate science, astrophysics, fusion, advanced materials, combustion, and quantum computing all require randomized algorithms for surmounting challenges of complexity, robustness, and scalability. This report summarizes the outcomes of that workshop, "Randomized Algorithms for Scientific Computing (RASC)," held virtually across four days in December 2020 and January 2021.