Computational Thinking (CT) is considered a core competency in problem formulation and problem solving. We have developed the Computational Thinking using Simulation and Modeling (CTSiM) learning environment to help middle school students learn science and CT concepts simultaneously. In this paper, we present an approach that leverages multiple linked representations to help students learn by constructing and analyzing computational models of science topics. Results from a recent study show that students successfully use the linked representations to become better modelers and learners.

Spear-phishing attacks pose a serious threat to sensitive computer systems, since they sidestep technical security mechanisms by exploiting the carelessness of authorized users. A common way to mitigate such attacks is to use e-mail filters which block e-mails with a maliciousness score above a chosen threshold. Optimal choice of such a threshold involves a tradeoff between the risk from delivered malicious emails and the cost of blocking benign traffic. A further complicating factor is the strategic nature of an attacker, who may selectively target users offering the best value in terms of likelihood of success and resulting access privileges. Previous work on strategic threshold-selection considered a single organization choosing thresholds for all users. In reality, many organizations are potential targets of such attacks, and their incentives need not be well aligned. We therefore consider the problem of strategic threshold-selection by a collection of independent self-interested users. We characterize both Stackelberg multi-defender equilibria, corresponding to short-term strategic dynamics, as well as Nash equilibria of the simultaneous game between all users and the attacker, modeling long-term dynamics, and exhibit a polynomial-time algorithm for computing short-term (Stackelberg) equilibria. We find that while Stackelberg multi-defender equilibrium need not exist, Nash equilibrium always exists, and remarkably, both equilibria are unique and socially optimal.

Submodular optimization, particularly under cardinality or cost constraints, has received considerable attention, stemming from its breadth of application, ranging from sensor placement to targeted marketing. However, the constraints faced in many real domains are more complex. We investigate an important and very general class of problems of maximizing a submodular function subject to general cost constraints, especially focusing on costs coming from route planning. Canoni- cal problems that motivate our framework include mobile robotic sensing, and door-to-door marketing. We propose a generalized cost-benefit (GCB) greedy al- gorithm for our problem, and prove bi-criterion approximation guarantees under significantly weaker assumptions than those in related literature. Experimental evaluation on realistic mobile sensing and door-to-door marketing problems, as well as using simulated networks, show that our algorithm achieves significantly higher utility than state-of-the-art alternatives, and has either lower or competitive running time.

Humans are very good at making daily, straight forward decisions; however, due to our propensity to be case based reasoners, errors can be introduced while making complex decisions. Technology becomes more complex daily, and as we move towards autonomous vehicles and future integration of smart robotic technology, it will become more difficult for humans to understand the fundamental functioning of this complex technology and to make accurate and beneficial decisions in very complex situations. Future mission deployments will team human personnel with heterogeneous unmanned systems that will vary not only by type (e.g., ground, aerial and underwater), but also in their intelligence and autonomous capabilities. Artificial Intelligence provides a number of approaches for supporting the human’s decision making process and reducing the potential for error.

Indexter is a plan-based computational model of narrative discourse which leverages cognitive scientific theories of how events are stored in memory during online comprehension. These discourse models are valuable for static and interactive narrative generation systems because they allow the author to reason about the audience's understanding and attention as they experience a story. A pair of Indexter events can share up to five indices: protagonist , time , space , causality , and intentionality . We present the first in a planned series of evaluations that will explore increasingly nuanced methods of using these indices to predict salience. The Pairwise Event Salience Hypothesis states that when a past event shares one or more indices with the most recently narrated event, that past event is more salient than one which shares no indices with the most recently narrated event. A crowd-sourced (n=200) study of 24 short text stories that control for content, text, and length supports this hypothesis. While this is encouraging, we believe it also motivates the development of a richer model that accounts for intervening events, narrative complexity, and episodic memory decay.

Stackelberg game models of security have received much attention, with a number of approaches for computing Stackelberg equilibria in games with a single defender protecting a collection of targets. In contrast, multi-defender security games have received significantly less attention, particularly when each defender protects more than a single target. We fill this gap by considering a multidefender security game, with a focus on theoretical characterizations of equilibria and the price of anarchy. We present the analysis of three models of increasing generality, two in which each defender protects multiple targets. In all models, we find that the defenders often have the incentive to overprotect the targets, at times significantly. Additionally, in the simpler models, we find that the price of anarchy is unbounded, linearly increasing both in the number of defenders and the number of targets per defender. Surprisingly, when we consider a more general model, this results obtains only in a “corner” case in the space of parameters; in most cases, however, the price of anarchy converges to a constant when the number of defenders increases.

To penetrate sensitive computer networks, attackers can use spear phishing to sidestep technical security mechanisms by exploiting the privileges of careless users. In order to maximize their success probability, attackers have to target the users that constitute the weakest links of the system. The optimal selection of these target users takes into account both the damage that can be caused by a user and the probability of a malicious e-mail being delivered to and opened by a user. Since attackers select their targets in a strategic way, the optimal mitigation of these attacks requires the defender to also personalize the e-mail filters by taking into account the users' properties. In this paper, we assume that a learned classifier is given and propose strategic per-user filtering thresholds for mitigating spear-phishing attacks. We formulate the problem of filtering targeted and non-targeted malicious e-mails as a Stackelberg security game. We characterize the optimal filtering strategies and show how to compute them in practice. Finally, we evaluate our results using two real-world datasets and demonstrate that the proposed thresholds lead to lower losses than non-strategic thresholds.

Team formation is a core problem in AI. Remarkably, little prior work has addressed the problem of mechanism design for team formation, accounting for the need to elicit agents' preferences over potential teammates. Coalition formation in the related hedonic games has received much attention, but only from the perspective of coalition stability, with little emphasis on the mechanism design objectives of true preference elicitation, social welfare, and equity. We present the first formal mechanism design framework for team formation, building on recent combinatorial matching market design literature. We exhibit four mechanisms for this problem, two novel, two simple extensions of known mechanisms from other domains. Two of these (one new, one known) have desirable theoretical properties. However, we use extensive experiments to show our second novel mechanism, despite having no theoretical guarantees, empirically achieves good incentive compatibility, welfare, and fairness.

Stackelberg security games have been widely deployed in recent years to schedule security resources. An assumption in most existing security game models is that one security resource assigned to a target only protects that target. However, in many important real-world security scenarios, when a resource is assigned to a target, it exhibits protection externalities: that is, it also protects other “neighbouring” targets. We investigate such Security Games with Protection Externalities (SPEs). First, we demonstrate that computing a strong Stackelberg equilibrium for an SPE is NP-hard, in contrast with traditional Stackelberg security games which can be solved in polynomial time. On the positive side, we propose a novel column generation based approach—CLASPE—to solve SPEs. CLASPE features the following novelties: 1) a novel mixed-integer linear programming formulation for the slave problem; 2) an extended greedy approach with a constant-factor approximation ratio to speed up the slave problem; and 3) a linear-scale linear programming that efficiently calculates the upper bounds of target-defined subproblems for pruning. Our experimental evaluation demonstrates that CLASPE enable us to scale to realistic-sized SPE problem instances.

The presented framework is the The multirobot coalition formation problem seeks to intelligently first to leverage a conceptual clustering technique to partition partition a team of heterogeneous robots into any set of coalition formation algorithms in order to derive coalitions for a set of real-world tasks. Besides being N Pan optimal hierarchy classification tree, given any classification complete (Sandholm et al. 1999), the problem is also hard taxonomy. The results contribute to the state-ofthe-art to approximate (Service and Adams 2011a). Traditional approaches in multiagent systems by demonstrating the existence to solving the problem include a number of greedy of crucial patterns and intricate relationships among existing algorithms (Shehory and Kraus 1998; Vig and Adams coalition algorithms.