Neural Information Processing Systems http://nips.cc/

Neural network training relies on our ability to find "good" minimizers of highly non-convex loss functions. It is well-known that certain network architecture designs (e.g., skip connections) produce loss functions that train easier, and wellchosen training parameters (batch size, learning rate, optimizer) produce minimizers that generalize better. However, the reasons for these differences, and their effect on the underlying loss landscape, are not well understood. In this paper, we explore the structure of neural loss functions, and the effect of loss landscapes on generalization, using a range of visualization methods. First, we introduce a simple "filter normalization" method that helps us visualize loss function curvature and make meaningful side-by-side comparisons between loss functions. Then, using a variety of visualizations, we explore how network architecture affects the loss landscape, and how training parameters affect the shape of minimizers.

Data poisoning is an attack on machine learning models wherein the attacker adds examples to the training set to manipulate the behavior of the model at test time. This paper explores poisoning attacks on neural nets. The proposed attacks use "clean-labels"; they don't require the attacker to have any control over the labeling of training data. They are also targeted; they control the behavior of the classifier on a specific test instance without degrading overall classifier performance. For example, an attacker could add a seemingly innocuous image (that is properly labeled) to a training set for a face recognition engine, and control the identity of a chosen person at test time. Because the attacker does not need to control the labeling function, poisons could be entered into the training set simply by leaving them on the web and waiting for them to be scraped by a data collection bot. We present an optimization-based method for crafting poisons, and show that just one single poison image can control classifier behavior when transfer learning is used. For full end-to-end training, we present a "watermarking" strategy that makes poisoning reliable using multiple ( 50) poisoned training instances. We demonstrate our method by generating poisoned frog images from the CIFAR dataset and using them to manipulate image classifiers.

Neural network training relies on our ability to find "good" minimizers of highly non-convex loss functions. It is well-known that certain network architecture designs (e.g., skip connections) produce loss functions that train easier, and wellchosen training parameters (batch size, learning rate, optimizer) produce minimizers that generalize better. However, the reasons for these differences, and their effect on the underlying loss landscape, are not well understood. In this paper, we explore the structure of neural loss functions, and the effect of loss landscapes on generalization, using a range of visualization methods. First, we introduce a simple "filter normalization" method that helps us visualize loss function curvature and make meaningful side-by-side comparisons between loss functions. Then, using a variety of visualizations, we explore how network architecture affects the loss landscape, and how training parameters affect the shape of minimizers.

Adversarial training, in which a network is trained on adversarial examples, is one of the few defenses against adversarial attacks that withstands strong attacks. Unfortunately, the high cost of generating strong adversarial examples makes standard adversarial training impractical on large-scale problems like ImageNet. We present an algorithm that eliminates the overhead cost of generating adversarial examples by recycling the gradient information computed when updating model parameters. Our "free" adversarial training algorithm achieves comparable robustness to PGD adversarial training on the CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100 datasets at negligible additional cost compared to natural training, and can be 7 to 30 times faster than other strong adversarial training methods. Using a single workstation with 4 P100 GPUs and 2 days of runtime, we can train a robust model for the large-scale ImageNet classification task that maintains 40% accuracy against PGD attacks.

Data poisoning is an attack on machine learning models wherein the attacker adds examples to the training set to manipulate the behavior of the model at test time. This paper explores poisoning attacks on neural nets. The proposed attacks use "clean-labels"; they don't require the attacker to have any control over the labeling of training data. They are also targeted; they control the behavior of the classifier on a specific test instance without degrading overall classifier performance. For example, an attacker could add a seemingly innocuous image (that is properly labeled) to a training set for a face recognition engine, and control the identity of a chosen person at test time. Because the attacker does not need to control the labeling function, poisons could be entered into the training set simply by leaving them on the web and waiting for them to be scraped by a data collection bot. We present an optimization-based method for crafting poisons, and show that just one single poison image can control classifier behavior when transfer learning is used. For full end-to-end training, we present a "watermarking" strategy that makes poisoning reliable using multiple ( 50) poisoned training instances. We demonstrate our method by generating poisoned frog images from the CIFAR dataset and using them to manipulate image classifiers.

Adversarial training, in which a network is trained on adversarial examples, is one of the few defenses against adversarial attacks that withstands strong attacks. Unfortunately, the high cost of generating strong adversarial examples makes standard adversarial training impractical on large-scale problems like ImageNet. We present an algorithm that eliminates the overhead cost of generating adversarial examples by recycling the gradient information computed when updating model parameters. Our "free" adversarial training algorithm achieves comparable robustness to PGD adversarial training on the CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100 datasets at negligible additional cost compared to natural training, and can be 7 to 30 times faster than other strong adversarial training methods. Using a single workstation with 4 P100 GPUs and 2 days of runtime, we can train a robust model for the large-scale ImageNet classification task that maintains 40% accuracy against PGD attacks.

Currently, deep neural networks are deployed on low-power portable devices by first training a full-precision model using powerful hardware, and then deriving a corresponding lowprecision model for efficient inference on such systems. However, training models directly with coarsely quantized weights is a key step towards learning on embedded platforms that have limited computing resources, memory capacity, and power consumption. Numerous recent publications have studied methods for training quantized networks, but these studies have mostly been empirical. In this work, we investigate training methods for quantized neural networks from a theoretical viewpoint. We first explore accuracy guarantees for training methods under convexity assumptions. We then look at the behavior of these algorithms for non-convex problems, and show that training algorithms that exploit high-precision representations have an important greedy search phase that purely quantized training methods lack, which explains the difficulty of training using low-precision arithmetic.