Ensemble methods have been widely applied in Reinforcement Learning (RL) in order to enhance stability, increase convergence speed, and improve exploration. These methods typically work by employing an aggregation mechanism over actions of different RL algorithms. We show that a variety of these methods can be unified by drawing parallels from committee voting rules in Social Choice Theory. We map the problem of designing an action aggregation mechanism in an ensemble method to a voting problem which, under different voting rules, yield popular ensemble-based RL algorithms like Majority Voting Q-learning or Bootstrapped Q-learning. Our unification framework, in turn, allows us to design new ensemble-RL algorithms with better performance. For instance, we map two diversity-centered committee voting rules, namely Single Non-Transferable Voting Rule and Chamberlin-Courant Rule, into new RL algorithms that demonstrate excellent exploratory behavior in our experiments.

We consider a two-agent MDP framework where agents repeatedly solve a task in a collaborative setting. We study the problem of designing a learning algorithm for the first agent (A1) that facilitates a successful collaboration even in cases when the second agent (A2) is adapting its policy in an unknown way. The key challenge in our setting is that the presence of the second agent leads to non-stationarity and non-obliviousness of rewards and transitions for the first agent. We design novel online learning algorithms for agent A1 whose regret decays as $O(T^{1-\frac{3}{7} \cdot \alpha})$ with $T$ learning episodes provided that the magnitude of agent A2's policy changes between any two consecutive episodes are upper bounded by $O(T^{-\alpha})$. Here, the parameter $\alpha$ is assumed to be strictly greater than $0$, and we show that this assumption is necessary provided that the {\em learning parity with noise} problem is computationally hard. We show that sub-linear regret of agent A1 further implies near-optimality of the agents' joint return for MDPs that manifest the properties of a {\em smooth} game.

Societies often rely on human experts to take a wide variety of decisions affecting their members, from jail-or-release decisions taken by judges and stop-and-frisk decisions taken by police officers to accept-or-reject decisions taken by academics. In this context, each decision is taken by an expert who is typically chosen uniformly at random from a pool of experts. However, these decisions may be imperfect due to limited experience, implicit biases, or faulty probabilistic reasoning. Can we improve the accuracy and fairness of the overall decision making process by optimizing the assignment between experts and decisions? In this paper, we address the above problem from the perspective of sequential decision making and show that, for different fairness notions from the literature, it reduces to a sequence of (constrained) weighted bipartite matchings, which can be solved efficiently using algorithms with approximation guarantees. Moreover, these algorithms also benefit from posterior sampling to actively trade off exploitation---selecting expert assignments which lead to accurate and fair decisions---and exploration---selecting expert assignments to learn about the experts' preferences and biases. We demonstrate the effectiveness of our algorithms on both synthetic and real-world data and show that they can significantly improve both the accuracy and fairness of the decisions taken by pools of experts.

Learning near-optimal behaviour from an expert's demonstrations typically relies on the assumption that the learner knows the features that the true reward function depends on. In this paper, we study the problem of learning from demonstrations in the setting where this is not the case, i.e., where there is a mismatch between the worldviews of the learner and the expert. We introduce a natural quantity, the teaching risk, which measures the potential suboptimality of policies that look optimal to the learner in this setting. We show that bounds on the teaching risk guarantee that the learner is able to find a near-optimal policy using standard algorithms based on inverse reinforcement learning. Based on these findings, we suggest a teaching scheme in which the expert can decrease the teaching risk by updating the learner's worldview, and thus ultimately enable her to find a near-optimal policy.

In real-world applications of education, an effective teacher adaptively chooses the next example to teach based on the learner's current state. However, most existing work in algorithmic machine teaching focuses on the batch setting, where adaptivity plays no role. In this paper, we study the case of teaching consistent, version space learners in an interactive setting. At any time step, the teacher provides an example, the learner performs an update, and the teacher observes the learner's new state. We highlight that adaptivity does not speed up the teaching process when considering existing models of version space learners, such as the "worst-case" model (the learner picks the next hypothesis randomly from the version space) and the "preference-based" model (the learner picks hypothesis according to some global preference). Inspired by human teaching, we propose a new model where the learner picks hypotheses according to some local preference defined by the current hypothesis. We show that our model exhibits several desirable properties, e.g., adaptivity plays a key role, and the learner's transitions over hypotheses are smooth/interpretable. We develop adaptive teaching algorithms, and demonstrate our results via simulation and user studies.

Learning near-optimal behaviour from an expert's demonstrations typically relies on the assumption that the learner knows the features that the true reward function depends on. In this paper, we study the problem of learning from demonstrations in the setting where this is not the case, i.e., where there is a mismatch between the worldviews of the learner and the expert. We introduce a natural quantity, the teaching risk, which measures the potential suboptimality of policies that look optimal to the learner in this setting. We show that bounds on the teaching risk guarantee that the learner is able to find a near-optimal policy using standard algorithms based on inverse reinforcement learning. Based on these findings, we suggest a teaching scheme in which the expert can decrease the teaching risk by updating the learner's worldview, and thus ultimately enable her to find a near-optimal policy.

In real-world applications of education, an effective teacher adaptively chooses the next example to teach based on the learner's current state. However, most existing work in algorithmic machine teaching focuses on the batch setting, where adaptivity plays no role. In this paper, we study the case of teaching consistent, version space learners in an interactive setting. At any time step, the teacher provides an example, the learner performs an update, and the teacher observes the learner's new state. We highlight that adaptivity does not speed up the teaching process when considering existing models of version space learners, such as the "worst-case" model (the learner picks the next hypothesis randomly from the version space) and the "preference-based" model (the learner picks hypothesis according to some global preference). Inspired by human teaching, we propose a new model where the learner picks hypotheses according to some local preference defined by the current hypothesis. We show that our model exhibits several desirable properties, e.g., adaptivity plays a key role, and the learner's transitions over hypotheses are smooth/interpretable. We develop adaptive teaching algorithms, and demonstrate our results via simulation and user studies.

Societies often rely on human experts to take a wide variety of decisions affecting their members, from jail-or-release decisions taken by judges and stop-and-frisk decisions taken by police officers to accept-or-reject decisions taken by academics. In this context, each decision is taken by an expert who is typically chosen uniformly at random from a pool of experts. However, these decisions may be imperfect due to limited experience, implicit biases, or faulty probabilistic reasoning. Can we improve the accuracy and fairness of the overall decision making process by optimizing the assignment between experts and decisions? In this paper, we address the above problem from the perspective of sequential decision making and show that, for different fairness notions from the literature, it reduces to a sequence of (constrained) weighted bipartite matchings, which can be solved efficiently using algorithms with approximation guarantees. Moreover, these algorithms also benefit from posterior sampling to actively trade off exploitation---selecting expert assignments which lead to accurate and fair decisions---and exploration---selecting expert assignments to learn about the experts' preferences and biases. We demonstrate the effectiveness of our algorithms on both synthetic and real-world data and show that they can significantly improve both the accuracy and fairness of the decisions taken by pools of experts.

We study the fundamental problem of learning an unknown, smooth probability function via point-wise Bernoulli tests. We provide the first scalable algorithm for efficiently solving this problem with rigorous guarantees. In particular, we prove the convergence rate of our posterior update rule to the true probability function in L2-norm. Moreover, we allow the Bernoulli tests to depend on contextual features, and provide a modified inference engine with provable guarantees for this novel setting. Numerical results show that the empirical convergence rates match the theory, and illustrate the superiority of our approach in handling contextual features over the state-of-the-art.

We consider the machine teaching problem in a classroom-like setting wherein the teacher has to deliver the same examples to a diverse group of students. Their diversity stems from differences in their initial internal states as well as their learning rates. We prove that a teacher with full knowledge about the learning dynamics of the students can teach a target concept to the entire classroom using O(min{d,N} log(1/eps)) examples, where d is the ambient dimension of the problem, N is the number of learners, and eps is the accuracy parameter. We show the robustness of our teaching strategy when the teacher has limited knowledge of the learners' internal dynamics as provided by a noisy oracle. Further, we study the trade-off between the learners' workload and the teacher's cost in teaching the target concept. Our experiments validate our theoretical results and suggest that appropriately partitioning the classroom into homogenous groups provides a balance between these two objectives.