We consider the situation in which an organizer is trying to convenean event, and needs to choose whom out of a given set of agents to invite.Agents have preferences over how many attendees should be at the eventand possibly also who the attendees should be.This induces a stability requirement: All invited agents should preferattending to not attending, and all the other agents should not regretbeing not invited.The organizer's objective is to find an invitation of maximum size,subject to the stability requirement. We investigate the computational complexity of finding such an invitation when agents are truthful, as well as the mechanism design problem when agents act strategically.

We introduce a new interpretation of two related notions - conditional utility and utility independence. Unlike the traditional interpretation, the new interpretation renders the notions the direct analogues of their probabilistic counterparts. To capture these notions formally, we appeal to the notion of utility distribution, introduced in previous paper. We show that utility distributions, which have a structure that is identical to that of probability distributions, can be viewed as a special case of an additive multiattribute utility functions, and show how this special case permits us to capture the novel senses of conditional utility and utility independence. Finally, we present the notion of utility networks, which do for utilities what Bayesian networks do for probabilities. Specifically, utility networks exploit the new interpretation of conditional utility and utility independence to compactly represent a utility distribution.

We introduce a new class of graphical representations, expected utility networks (EUNs), and discuss some of its properties and potential applications to artificial intelligence and economic theory. In EUNs not only probabilities, but also utilities enjoy a modular representation. EUNs are undirected graphs with two types of arc, representing probability and utility dependencies respectively. The representation of utilities is based on a novel notion of conditional utility independence, which we introduce and discuss in the context of other existing proposals. Just as probabilistic inference involves the computation of conditional probabilities, strategic inference involves the computation of conditional expected utilities for alternative plans of action. We define a new notion of conditional expected utility (EU) independence, and show that in EUNs node separation with respect to the probability and utility subgraphs implies conditional EU independence.

Computational pool is a relatively recent entrant into the group of games played by computer agents. It features a unique combination of properties that distinguish it from oth- ers such games, including continuous action and state spaces, uncertainty in execution, a unique turn-taking structure, and of course an adversarial nature. This article discusses some of the work done to date, focusing on the software side of the pool-playing problem. We discuss in some depth CueCard, the program that won the 2008 computational pool tournament. Research questions and ideas spawned by work on this problem are also discussed. We close by announcing the 2011 computational pool tournament, which will take place in conjunction with the Twenty-Fifth AAAI Conference.

This is a concise and accessible introduction to the field of game theory. The audience for game theory has drastically expanded and now is used in diverse disciplines such as political science, biology, psychology, economics, linguistics, sociology, and computer science. The book covers the main classes of games, their representations, and the main concepts used to analyze them. ISBN 9781598295931, 88 pages.

We propose a new set of criteria for learning algorithms in multi-agent systems, one that is more stringent and (we argue) better justified than previous proposed criteria. Our criteria, which apply most straightforwardly in repeated games with average rewards, consist of three requirements: (a) against a specified class of opponents (this class is a parameter of the criterion) the algorithm yield a payoff that approaches the payoff of the best response, (b) against other opponents the algorithm's payoff at least approach (and possibly exceed) the security level payoff (or maximin value), and (c) subject to these requirements, the algorithm achieve a close to optimal payoff in self-play. We furthermore require that these average payoffs be achieved quickly. We then present a novel algorithm, and show that it meets these new criteria for a particular parameter class, the class of stationary opponents. Finally, we show that the algorithm is effective not only in theory, but also empirically. Using a recently introduced comprehensive game theoretic test suite, we show that the algorithm almost universally outperforms previous learning algorithms.

We propose a new set of criteria for learning algorithms in multi-agent systems, one that is more stringent and (we argue) better justified than previous proposed criteria. Our criteria, which apply most straightforwardly inrepeated games with average rewards, consist of three requirements: (a) against a specified class of opponents (this class is a parameter of the criterion) the algorithm yield a payoff that approaches the payoff of the best response, (b) against other opponents the algorithm's payoff at least approach (and possibly exceed) the security level payoff (or maximin value),and (c) subject to these requirements, the algorithm achieve a close to optimal payoff in self-play. We furthermore require that these average payoffs be achieved quickly. We then present a novel algorithm, and show that it meets these new criteria for a particular parameter class, the class of stationary opponents. Finally, we show that the algorithm is effective not only in theory, but also empirically. Using a recently introduced comprehensive game theoretic test suite, we show that the algorithm almost universally outperforms previous learning algorithms.

In Howard Shrobe, editor, Exploring Artificial Intelligence. Morgan Kaufmann