Ecological rationality refers to the notion that humans are rational agents adapted to their environment. However, testing this theory remains challenging due to two reasons: the difficulty in defining what tasks are ecologically valid and building rational models for these tasks. In this work, we demonstrate that large language models can generate cognitive tasks, specifically category learning tasks, that match the statistics of real-world tasks, thereby addressing the first challenge. We tackle the second challenge by deriving rational agents adapted to these tasks using the framework of meta-learning, leading to a class of models called ecologically rational meta-learned inference (ERMI). ERMI quantitatively explains human data better than seven other cognitive models in two different experiments. It additionally matches human behavior on a qualitative level: (1) it finds the same tasks difficult that humans find difficult, (2) it becomes more reliant on an exemplar-based strategy for assigning categories with learning, and (3) it generalizes to unseen stimuli in a human-like way. Furthermore, we show that ERMI's ecologically valid priors allow it to achieve state-of-the-art performance on the OpenML-CC18 classification benchmark.

World models can represent potentially high-dimensional pixel observations in compact latent spaces, making it tractable to model the dynamics of the environment. However, the latent dynamics inferred by these models may still be highly complex. Abstracting the dynamics of the environment with simple models can have several benefits. If the latent dynamics are simple, the model may generalize better to novel transitions, and discover useful latent representations of environment states. We propose a regularization scheme that simplifies the world model's latent dynamics. Our model, the Parsimonious Latent Space Model (PLSM), minimizes the mutual information between latent states and the dynamics that arise between them. This makes the dynamics softly state-invariant, and the effects of the agent's actions more predictable. We combine the PLSM with three different model classes used for i) future latent state prediction, ii) video prediction, and iii) planning. We find that our regularization improves accuracy, generalization, and performance in downstream tasks.

A chief goal of artificial intelligence is to build machines that think like people. Yet it has been argued that deep neural network architectures fail to accomplish this. Researchers have asserted these models' limitations in the domains of causal reasoning, intuitive physics, and intuitive psychology. Yet recent advancements, namely the rise of large language models, particularly those designed for visual processing, have rekindled interest in the potential to emulate human-like cognitive abilities. This paper evaluates the current state of vision-based large language models in the domains of intuitive physics, causal reasoning, and intuitive psychology. Through a series of controlled experiments, we investigate the extent to which these modern models grasp complex physical interactions, causal relationships, and intuitive understanding of others' preferences. Our findings reveal that, while these models demonstrate a notable proficiency in processing and interpreting visual data, they still fall short of human capabilities in these areas. The models exhibit a rudimentary understanding of physical laws and causal relationships, but their performance is hindered by a lack of deeper insights - a key aspect of human cognition. Furthermore, in tasks requiring an intuitive theory of mind, the models fail altogether. Our results emphasize the need for integrating more robust mechanisms for understanding causality, physical dynamics, and social cognition into modern-day, vision-based language models, and point out the importance of cognitively-inspired benchmarks.

Large language models (LLMs) are being increasingly incorporated into scientific workflows. However, we have yet to fully grasp the implications of this integration. How should the advent of large language models affect the practice of science? For this opinion piece, we have invited four diverse groups of scientists to reflect on this query, sharing their perspectives and engaging in debate. Schulz et al. make the argument that working with LLMs is not fundamentally different from working with human collaborators, while Bender et al. argue that LLMs are often misused and over-hyped, and that their limitations warrant a focus on more specialized, easily interpretable tools. Marelli et al. emphasize the importance of transparent attribution and responsible use of LLMs. Finally, Botvinick and Gershman advocate that humans should retain responsibility for determining the scientific roadmap. To facilitate the discussion, the four perspectives are complemented with a response from each group. By putting these different perspectives in conversation, we aim to bring attention to important considerations within the academic community regarding the adoption of LLMs and their impact on both current and future scientific practices.

In everyday conversations, humans can take on different roles and adapt their vocabulary to their chosen roles. We explore whether LLMs can take on, that is impersonate, different roles when they generate text in-context. We ask LLMs to assume different personas before solving vision and language tasks. We do this by prefixing the prompt with a persona that is associated either with a social identity or domain expertise. In a multi-armed bandit task, we find that LLMs pretending to be children of different ages recover human-like developmental stages of exploration. In a language-based reasoning task, we find that LLMs impersonating domain experts perform better than LLMs impersonating non-domain experts. Finally, we test whether LLMs' impersonations are complementary to visual information when describing different categories. We find that impersonation can improve performance: an LLM prompted to be a bird expert describes birds better than one prompted to be a car expert. However, impersonation can also uncover LLMs' biases: an LLM prompted to be a man describes cars better than one prompted to be a woman. These findings demonstrate that LLMs are capable of taking on diverse roles and that this in-context impersonation can be used to uncover their hidden strengths and biases.

As children grow older, they develop an intuitive understanding of the physical processes around them. Their physical understanding develops in stages, moving along developmental trajectories which have been mapped out extensively in previous empirical research. Here, we investigate how the learning trajectories of deep generative neural networks compare to children's developmental trajectories using physical understanding as a testbed. We outline an approach that allows us to examine two distinct hypotheses of human development - stochastic optimization and complexity increase. We find that while our models are able to accurately predict a number of physical processes, their learning trajectories under both hypotheses do not follow the developmental trajectories of children.

Humans possess the ability to identify and generalize relevant features of natural objects, which aids them in various situations. To investigate this phenomenon and determine the most effective representations for predicting human behavior, we conducted two experiments involving category learning and reward learning. Our experiments used realistic images as stimuli, and participants were tasked with making accurate decisions based on novel stimuli for all trials, thereby necessitating generalization. In both tasks, the underlying rules were generated as simple linear functions using stimulus dimensions extracted from human similarity judgments. Notably, participants successfully identified the relevant stimulus features within a few trials, demonstrating effective generalization. We performed an extensive model comparison, evaluating the trial-by-trial predictive accuracy of diverse deep learning models' representations of human choices. Intriguingly, representations from models trained on both text and image data consistently outperformed models trained solely on images, even surpassing models using the features that generated the task itself. These findings suggest that language-aligned visual representations possess sufficient richness to describe human generalization in naturalistic settings and emphasize the role of language in shaping human cognition.

Large language models are powerful systems that excel at many tasks, ranging from translation to mathematical reasoning. Yet, at the same time, these models often show unhuman-like characteristics. In the present paper, we address this gap and ask whether large language models can be turned into cognitive models. We find that -- after finetuning them on data from psychological experiments -- these models offer accurate representations of human behavior, even outperforming traditional cognitive models in two decision-making domains. In addition, we show that their representations contain the information necessary to model behavior on the level of individual subjects. Finally, we demonstrate that finetuning on multiple tasks enables large language models to predict human behavior in a previously unseen task. Taken together, these results suggest that large, pre-trained models can be adapted to become generalist cognitive models, thereby opening up new research directions that could transform cognitive psychology and the behavioral sciences as a whole.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are transforming society and permeating into diverse applications. As a result, LLMs will frequently interact with us and other agents. It is, therefore, of great societal value to understand how LLMs behave in interactive social settings. Here, we propose to use behavioral game theory to study LLM's cooperation and coordination behavior. To do so, we let different LLMs (GPT-3, GPT-3.5, and GPT-4) play finitely repeated games with each other and with other, human-like strategies. Our results show that LLMs generally perform well in such tasks and also uncover persistent behavioral signatures. In a large set of two players-two strategies games, we find that LLMs are particularly good at games where valuing their own self-interest pays off, like the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma family. However, they behave sub-optimally in games that require coordination. We, therefore, further focus on two games from these distinct families. In the canonical iterated Prisoner's Dilemma, we find that GPT-4 acts particularly unforgivingly, always defecting after another agent has defected only once. In the Battle of the Sexes, we find that GPT-4 cannot match the behavior of the simple convention to alternate between options. We verify that these behavioral signatures are stable across robustness checks. Finally, we show how GPT-4's behavior can be modified by providing further information about the other player as well as by asking it to predict the other player's actions before making a choice. These results enrich our understanding of LLM's social behavior and pave the way for a behavioral game theory for machines.

Everything else being equal, simpler models should be preferred over more complex ones. In reinforcement learning (RL), simplicity is typically quantified on an action-by-action basis -- but this timescale ignores temporal regularities, like repetitions, often present in sequential strategies. We therefore propose an RL algorithm that learns to solve tasks with sequences of actions that are compressible. We explore two possible sources of simple action sequences: Sequences that can be learned by autoregressive models, and sequences that are compressible with off-the-shelf data compression algorithms. Distilling these preferences into sequence priors, we derive a novel information-theoretic objective that incentivizes agents to learn policies that maximize rewards while conforming to these priors. We show that the resulting RL algorithm leads to faster learning, and attains higher returns than state-of-the-art model-free approaches in a series of continuous control tasks from the DeepMind Control Suite. These priors also produce a powerful information-regularized agent that is robust to noisy observations and can perform open-loop control.