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Molina, Mathieu
Trading-off price for data quality to achieve fair online allocation
Molina, Mathieu, Gast, Nicolas, Loiseau, Patrick, Perchet, Vianney
We consider the problem of online allocation subject to a long-term fairness penalty. Contrary to existing works, however, we do not assume that the decision-maker observes the protected attributes -- which is often unrealistic in practice. Instead they can purchase data that help estimate them from sources of different quality; and hence reduce the fairness penalty at some cost. We model this problem as a multi-armed bandit problem where each arm corresponds to the choice of a data source, coupled with the online allocation problem. We propose an algorithm that jointly solves both problems and show that it has a regret bounded by $\mathcal{O}(\sqrt{T})$. A key difficulty is that the rewards received by selecting a source are correlated by the fairness penalty, which leads to a need for randomization (despite a stochastic setting). Our algorithm takes into account contextual information available before the source selection, and can adapt to many different fairness notions. We also show that in some instances, the estimates used can be learned on the fly.
Bounding and Approximating Intersectional Fairness through Marginal Fairness
Molina, Mathieu, Loiseau, Patrick
Discrimination in machine learning often arises along multiple dimensions (a.k.a. protected attributes); it is then desirable to ensure \emph{intersectional fairness} -- i.e., that no subgroup is discriminated against. It is known that ensuring \emph{marginal fairness} for every dimension independently is not sufficient in general. Due to the exponential number of subgroups, however, directly measuring intersectional fairness from data is impossible. In this paper, our primary goal is to understand in detail the relationship between marginal and intersectional fairness through statistical analysis. We first identify a set of sufficient conditions under which an exact relationship can be obtained. Then, we prove bounds (easily computable through marginal fairness and other meaningful statistical quantities) in high-probability on intersectional fairness in the general case. Beyond their descriptive value, we show that these theoretical bounds can be leveraged to derive a heuristic improving the approximation and bounds of intersectional fairness by choosing, in a relevant manner, protected attributes for which we describe intersectional subgroups. Finally, we test the performance of our approximations and bounds on real and synthetic data-sets.
On Preemption and Learning in Stochastic Scheduling
Merlis, Nadav, Richard, Hugo, Sentenac, Flore, Odic, Corentin, Molina, Mathieu, Perchet, Vianney
We study single-machine scheduling of jobs, each belonging to a job type that determines its duration distribution. We start by analyzing the scenario where the type characteristics are known and then move to two learning scenarios where the types are unknown: non-preemptive problems, where each started job must be completed before moving to another job; and preemptive problems, where job execution can be paused in the favor of moving to a different job. In both cases, we design algorithms that achieve sublinear excess cost, compared to the performance with known types, and prove lower bounds for the non-preemptive case. Notably, we demonstrate, both theoretically and through simulations, how preemptive algorithms can greatly outperform non-preemptive ones when the durations of different job types are far from one another, a phenomenon that does not occur when the type durations are known.