Persuasion is a common social and economic activity. It usually arises when conflicting interests among agents exist, and one of the agents wishes to sway the opinions of others. This paper considers the problem of an automated agent that needs to influence the decision of a group of self-interested agents that must reach an agreement on a joint action. For example, consider an automated agent that aims to reduce the energy consumption of a nonresidential building, by convincing a group of people who share an office to agree on an economy mode of the air-conditioning and low light intensity. In this paper we present four problems that address issues of minimality and safety of the persuasion process. We discuss the relationships to similar problems from social choice, and show that if the agents are using Plurality or Veto as their voting rule all of our problems are in P. We also show that with k-Approval, Bucklin and Borda voting rules some problems become intractable. We thus present heuristics for efficient persuasion with Borda, and evaluate them through simulations.

Coordination in mixed agent-human environments is an important, yet not a simple, problem. Little attention has been given to the issues raised in teams that consist of both computerized agents and people. In such situations different considerations are in order, as people tend to make mistakes and they are affected by cognitive, social and cultural factors. In this paper we present a novel agent designed to proficiently coordinate with a human counterpart. The agent uses a neural network model that is based on a pre-existing knowledge base which allows it to achieve an efficient modeling of a human's decisions and predict their behavior. A novel communication mechanism which takes into account the expected effect of communication on the other member will allow communication costs to be minimized. In extensive simulations involving more than 200 people we investigated our approach and showed that our agent achieves better coordination when involved, compared to settings in which only humans or another state-of-the-art agent are involved.

The interaction of people with autonomous agents has become increasingly prevalent. Some of these settings include security domains, where people can be characterized as uncooperative, hostile, manipulative, and tending to take advantage of the situation for their own needs. This makes it challenging to design proficient agents to interact with people in such environments. Evaluating the success of the agents automatically before evaluating them with people or deploying them could alleviate this challenge and result in better designed agents. In this paper we show how Peer Designed Agents (PDAs) -- computer agents developed by human subjects -- can be used as a method for evaluating autonomous agents in security domains. Such evaluation can reduce the effort and costs involved in evaluating autonomous agents interacting with people to validate their efficacy. Our experiments included more than 70 human subjects and 40 PDAs developed by students. The study provides empirical support that PDAs can be used to compare the proficiency of autonomous agents when matched with people in security domains.

Computer agents are increasingly deployed in settings in which they make decisions with people, such as electronic commerce, collaborative interfaces, and cognitive assistants. However, the scientific evaluation of computational strategies for human-computer decision-making is a costly process, involving time, effort and personnel. This paper investigates the use of Peer Designed Agents (PDA) — computer agents developed by human subjects — as a tool for facilitating the evaluation process of automatic negotiators that were developed by researchers. It compared the performance between automatic negotiators that interacted with PDAs to automatic negotiators that interacted with actual people in different domains. The experiments included more than 300 human subjects and 50 PDAs developed by students. Results showed that the automatic negotiators outperformed PDAs in the same situations in which they outperformed people, and that on average, they exhibited the same measure of generosity towards their negotiation partners. These patterns were significant for all types of domains, and for all types of automated negotiators, despite the fact that there were individual differences between the behavior of PDAs and people. The study thus provides an empirical proof that PDAs can alleviate the evaluation process of automatic negotiators, and facilitate their design.