For problems requiring cooperation, many multiagent systems implement solutions among either individual agents or across an entire population towards a common goal. Multiagent teams are primarily studied when in conflict; however, organizational psychology (OP) highlights the benefits of teams among human populations for learning how to coordinate and cooperate. In this paper, we propose a new model of multiagent teams for reinforcement learning (RL) agents inspired by OP and early work on teams in artificial intelligence. We validate our model using complex social dilemmas that are popular in recent multiagent RL and find that agents divided into teams develop cooperative pro-social policies despite incentives to not cooperate. Furthermore, agents are better able to coordinate and learn emergent roles within their teams and achieve higher rewards compared to when the interests of all agents are aligned.

While it has long been recognized that a team of individual learning agents can be greater than the sum of its parts, recent work has shown that larger teams are not necessarily more effective than smaller ones. In this paper, we study why and under which conditions certain team structures promote effective learning for a population of individual learning agents. We show that, depending on the environment, some team structures help agents learn to specialize into specific roles, resulting in more favorable global results. However, large teams create credit assignment challenges that reduce coordination, leading to large teams performing poorly compared to smaller ones. We support our conclusions with both theoretical analysis and empirical results.

Citizen-focused democratic processes where participants deliberate on alternatives and then vote to make the final decision are increasingly popular today. While the computational social choice literature has extensively investigated voting rules, there is limited work that explicitly looks at the interplay of the deliberative process and voting. In this paper, we build a deliberation model using established models from the opinion-dynamics literature and study the effect of different deliberation mechanisms on voting outcomes achieved when using well-studied voting rules. Our results show that deliberation generally improves welfare and representation guarantees, but the results are sensitive to how the deliberation process is organized. We also show, experimentally, that simple voting rules, such as approval voting, perform as well as more sophisticated rules such as proportional approval voting or method of equal shares if deliberation is properly supported. This has ramifications on the practical use of such voting rules in citizen-focused democratic processes.

The recent We propose a model for multi-objective optimization, a credo, for call to make cooperation central to the development of AI places emphasis agents in a system that are configured into multiple groups (i.e., on understanding the mechanisms behind teamwork beyond teams). Our model of credo regulates how agents optimize their just competition [14, 15] and to adapt findings from Organizational behavior for the groups they belong to. We evaluate credo in the Psychology [5]. In MARL, agents learning to cooperate often build context of challenging social dilemmas with reinforcement learning common interest by sharing exogenous rewards [1, 7]; however, agents. Our results indicate that the interests of teammates, or the purely pro-social agents may not be possible when considering entire system, are not required to be fully aligned for achieving agents designed by different manufacturers or hybrid AI/human globally beneficial outcomes. We identify two scenarios without populations. Agents in these settings may have some self-interest full common interest that achieve high equality and significantly for personal goals; therefore, it is important to understand how and higher mean population rewards compared to when the interests when cooperation can be supported in systems where agents may of all agents are aligned.

A central design problem in game theoretic analysis is the estimation of the players' utilities. In many real-world interactive situations of human decision making, including human driving, the utilities are multi-objective in nature; therefore, estimating the parameters of aggregation, i.e., mapping of multi-objective utilities to a scalar value, becomes an essential part of game construction. However, estimating this parameter from observational data introduces several challenges due to a host of unobservable factors, including the underlying modality of aggregation and the possibly boundedly rational behaviour model that generated the observation. Based on the concept of rationalisability, we develop algorithms for estimating multi-objective aggregation parameters for two common aggregation methods, weighted and satisficing aggregation, and for both strategic and non-strategic reasoning models. Based on three different datasets, we provide insights into how human drivers aggregate the utilities of safety and progress, as well as the situational dependence of the aggregation process. Additionally, we show that irrespective of the specific solution concept used for solving the games, a data-driven estimation of utility aggregation significantly improves the predictive accuracy of behaviour models with respect to observed human behaviour.

Multi-agent reinforcement learning typically suffers from the problem of sample inefficiency, where learning suitable policies involves the use of many data samples. Learning from external demonstrators is a possible solution that mitigates this problem. However, most prior approaches in this area assume the presence of a single demonstrator. Leveraging multiple knowledge sources (i.e., advisors) with expertise in distinct aspects of the environment could substantially speed up learning in complex environments. This paper considers the problem of simultaneously learning from multiple independent advisors in multi-agent reinforcement learning. The approach leverages a two-level Q-learning architecture, and extends this framework from single-agent to multi-agent settings. We provide principled algorithms that incorporate a set of advisors by both evaluating the advisors at each state and subsequently using the advisors to guide action selection. We also provide theoretical convergence and sample complexity guarantees. Experimentally, we validate our approach in three different test-beds and show that our algorithms give better performances than baselines, can effectively integrate the combined expertise of different advisors, and learn to ignore bad advice.

Multiagent reinforcement learning (MARL) has benefited significantly from population-based and game-theoretic training regimes. One approach, Policy-Space Response Oracles (PSRO), employs standard reinforcement learning to compute response policies via approximate best responses and combines them via meta-strategy selection. We augment PSRO by adding a novel search procedure with generative sampling of world states, and introduce two new meta-strategy solvers based on the Nash bargaining solution. We evaluate PSRO's ability to compute approximate Nash equilibrium, and its performance in two negotiation games: Colored Trails, and Deal or No Deal. We conduct behavioral studies where human participants negotiate with our agents ($N = 346$). We find that search with generative modeling finds stronger policies during both training time and test time, enables online Bayesian co-player prediction, and can produce agents that achieve comparable social welfare negotiating with humans as humans trading among themselves.

In the last decade, there have been significant advances in multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) but there are still numerous challenges, such as high sample complexity and slow convergence to stable policies, that need to be overcome before wide-spread deployment is possible. However, many real-world environments already, in practice, deploy sub-optimal or heuristic approaches for generating policies. An interesting question that arises is how to best use such approaches as advisors to help improve reinforcement learning in multi-agent domains. In this paper, we provide a principled framework for incorporating action recommendations from online suboptimal advisors in multi-agent settings. We describe the problem of ADvising Multiple Intelligent Reinforcement Agents (ADMIRAL) in nonrestrictive general-sum stochastic game environments and present two novel Q-learning based algorithms: ADMIRAL - Decision Making (ADMIRAL-DM) and ADMIRAL - Advisor Evaluation (ADMIRAL-AE), which allow us to improve learning by appropriately incorporating advice from an advisor (ADMIRAL-DM), and evaluate the effectiveness of an advisor (ADMIRAL-AE). We analyze the algorithms theoretically and provide fixed point guarantees regarding their learning in general-sum stochastic games. Furthermore, extensive experiments illustrate that these algorithms: can be used in a variety of environments, have performances that compare favourably to other related baselines, can scale to large state-action spaces, and are robust to poor advice from advisors.

In the last decade, there have been significant advances in multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) but there are still numerous challenges, such as high sample complexity and slow convergence to stable policies, that need to be overcome before wide-spread deployment is possible. However, many real-world environments already, in practice, deploy sub-optimal or heuristic approaches for generating policies. An interesting question which arises is how to best use such approaches as advisors to help improve reinforcement learning in multi-agent domains. In this paper, we provide a principled framework for incorporating action recommendations from online sub-optimal advisors in multi-agent settings. We describe the problem of ADvising Multiple Intelligent Reinforcement Agents (ADMIRAL) in nonrestrictive general-sum stochastic game environments and present two novel Q-learning based algorithms: ADMIRAL - Decision Making (ADMIRAL-DM) and ADMIRAL - Advisor Evaluation (ADMIRAL-AE), which allow us to improve learning by appropriately incorporating advice from an advisor (ADMIRAL-DM), and evaluate the effectiveness of an advisor (ADMIRAL-AE). We analyze the algorithms theoretically and provide fixed-point guarantees regarding their learning in general-sum stochastic games. Furthermore, extensive experiments illustrate that these algorithms: can be used in a variety of environments, have performances that compare favourably to other related baselines, can scale to large state-action spaces, and are robust to poor advice from advisors.

In order to enable autonomous vehicles (AV) to navigate busy traffic situations, in recent years there has been a focus on game-theoretic models for strategic behavior planning in AVs. However, a lack of common taxonomy impedes a broader understanding of the strategies the models generate as well as the development of safety specification to identity what strategies are safe for an AV to execute. Based on common patterns of interaction in traffic conflicts, we develop a taxonomy for strategic interactions along the dimensions of agents' initial response to right-of-way rules and subsequent response to other agents' behavior. Furthermore, we demonstrate a process of automatic mapping of strategies generated by a strategic planner to the categories in the taxonomy, and based on vehicle-vehicle and vehicle-pedestrian interaction simulation, we evaluate two popular solution concepts used in strategic planning in AVs, QLk and Subgame perfect $\epsilon$-Nash Equilibrium, with respect to those categories.