One of the better studied properties for operators in judgment aggregation is independence, which essentially dictates that the collective judgment on one issue should not depend on the individual judgments given on some other issue(s) in the same agenda. Independence, although considered a desirable property, is too strong, because together with mild additional conditions it implies dictatorship. We propose here a weakening of independence, named agenda separability: a judgment aggregation rule satisfies it if, whenever the agenda is composed of several independent sub-agendas, the resulting collective judgment sets can be computed separately for each sub-agenda and then put together. We show that this property is discriminant, in the sense that among judgment aggregation rules so far studied in the literature, some satisfy it and some do not. We briefly discuss the implications of agenda separability on the computation of judgment aggregation rules.

We consider a voting setting where candidates have preferences about the outcome of the election and are free to join or leave the election. The corresponding candidacy game, where candidates choose strategically to participate or not, has been studied %initially by Dutta et al., who showed that no non-dictatorial voting procedure satisfying unanimity is candidacy-strategyproof, that is, is such that the joint action where all candidates enter the election is always a pure strategy Nash equilibrium. Dutta et al. also showed that for some voting tree procedures, there are candidacy games with no pure Nash equilibria, and that for the rule that outputs the sophisticated winner of voting by successive elimination, all games have a pure Nash equilibrium. No results were known about other voting rules. Here we prove several such results. For four candidates, the message is, roughly, that most scoring rules (with the exception of Borda) do not guarantee the existence of a pure Nash equilibrium but that Condorcet-consistent rules, for an odd number of voters, do. For five candidates, most rules we study no longer have this guarantee. Finally, we identify one prominent rule that guarantees the existence of a pure Nash equilibrium for any number of candidates (and for an odd number of voters): the Copeland rule. We also show that under mild assumptions on the voting rule, the existence of strong equilibria cannot be guaranteed.

The Twenty-Ninth AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, (AAAI-15) was held in January 2015 in Austin, Texas (USA) The conference program was cochaired by Sven Koenig and Blai Bonet. This report contains reflective summaries of the main conference, the robotics program, the AI and robotics workshop, the virtual agent exhibition, the what's hot track, the competition panel, the senior member track, student and outreach activities, the student abstract and poster program, the doctoral consortium, the women's mentoring event, and the demonstrations program.

The AAAI-15 organizing committee of about 60 researchers arranged many of the traditional AAAI events, including the Innovative Applications of Artificial Intelligence (IAAI) Conference, tutorials, workshops, the video competition, senior member summary talks (on well-developed bodies of research or important new research areas), and What's Hot talks (on research trends observed in other AIrelated conferences and, for the first time, competitions). Innovations of AAAI-15 included software and hardware demonstration programs, a virtual agent exhibition, a computer-game showcase, a funding information session with program directors from different funding agencies, and Blue Sky Idea talks (on visions intended to stimulate new directions in AI research) with awards funded by the CRA Computing Community Consortium. Seven invited talks surveyed AI research in academia and industry and its impact on society. Attendees kept track of the program through a smartphone app as well as social media channels.

We introduce Probabilistic Knowledge-Based Programs (PKBPs), a new, compact representation of policies for factored partially observable Markov decision processes. PKBPs use branching conditions such as if the probability of φ is larger than p, and many more. While similar in spirit to value-based policies, PKBPs leverage the factored representation for more compactness. They also cope with more general goals than standard state-based rewards, such as pure information-gathering goals. Compactness comes at the price of reactivity, since evaluating branching conditions on-line is not polynomial in general. In this sense, PKBPs are complementary to other representations. Our intended application is as a tool for experts to specify policies in a natural, compact language, then have them verified automatically. We study succinctness and the complexity of verification for PKBPs.

We consider voting situations in which some candidates may turn out to be unavailable. When determining availability is costly (e.g., in terms of money, time, or computation), voting prior to determining candidate availability and testing the winner's availability after the vote may be beneficial. However, since few voting rules are robust to candidate deletion, winner determination requires a number of such availability tests. We outline a model for analyzing such problems, defining robust winners relative to potential candidate unavailability. We assess the complexity of computing robust winners for several voting rules. Assuming a distribution over availability, and costs for availability tests/queries, we describe algorithms for computing optimal query policies, which minimize the expected cost of determining true winners.

Positional scoring rules in voting compute the score of an alternative by summing the scores for the alternative induced by every vote. This summation principle ensures that all votes contribute equally to the score of an alternative. We relax this assumption and, instead, aggregate scores by taking into account the rank of a score in the ordered list of scores obtained from the votes. This defines a new family of voting rules, rank-dependent scoring rules (RDSRs), based on ordered weighted average (OWA) operators, which, include all scoring rules, and many others, most of which of new. We study some properties of these rules, and show, empirically, that certain RDSRs are less manipulable than Borda voting, across a variety of statistical cultures.

In voting contexts, some new candidates may show up in the course of the process. In this case, we may want to determine which of the initial candidates are possible winners, given that a fixed number $k$ of new candidates will be added. We give a computational study of this problem, focusing on scoring rules, and we provide a formal comparison with related problems such as control via adding candidates or cloning.

In some voting situations, some new candidates may show up in the course of the process. In this case, we may want to determine which of the initial candidates are possible winners, given that a fixed number k of new candidates will be added. Focusing on scoring rules, we give complexity results for the above possible winner problem.

In many practical contexts where a number of agents have to find a common decision, the votes do not come all together at the same time. In such situations, we may want to preprocess the information given by the subelectorate (consisting of the voters who have expressed their votes) so as to ``compile'' the known votes for the time when the latecomers have expressed their votes. We study the amount of space necessary for such a compilation, as a function of the voting rule, the number of candidates, and the number of votes already known. We relate our results to existing work, especially on communication complexity.