In this article, we consider iteration principles for contraction, with the goal of identifying properties for contractions that respect conditional beliefs. Therefore, we investigate and evaluate four groups of iteration principles for contraction which consider the dynamics of conditional beliefs. For all these principles, we provide semantic characterization theorems and provide formulations by postulates which highlight how the change of beliefs and of conditional beliefs is constrained, whenever that is possible. The first group is similar to the syntactic Darwiche-Pearl postulates. As a second group, we consider semantic postulates for iteration of contraction by Chopra, Ghose, Meyer and Wong, and by Konieczny and Pino P\'erez, respectively, and we provide novel syntactic counterparts. Third, we propose a contraction analogue of the independence condition by Jin and Thielscher. For the fourth group, we consider natural and moderate contraction by Nayak. Methodically, we make use of conditionals for contractions, so-called contractionals and furthermore, we propose and employ the novel notion of $ \alpha $-equivalence for formulating some of the new postulates.

Activation-based conditional inference applies conditional reasoning to ACT-R, a cognitive architecture developed to formalize human reasoning. The idea of activation-based conditional inference is to determine a reasonable subset of a conditional belief base in order to draw inductive inferences in time. Central to activation-based conditional inference is the activation function which assigns to the conditionals in the belief base a degree of activation mainly based on the conditional's relevance for the current query and its usage history.

The research on non-prioritized revision studies revision operators which do not accept all new beliefs. In this paper, we contribute to this line of research by introducing the concept of dynamic-limited revision, which are revisions expressible by a total preorder over a limited set of worlds. For a belief change operator, we consider the scope, which consists of those beliefs which yield success of revision. We show that for each set satisfying single sentence closure and disjunction completeness there exists a dynamic-limited revision having the union of this set with the beliefs set as scope. We investigate iteration postulates for belief and scope dynamics and characterise them for dynamic-limited revision. As an application, we employ dynamic-limited revision to studying belief revision in the context of so-called inherent beliefs, which are beliefs globally accepted by the agent. This leads to revision operators which we call inherence-limited. We present a representation theorem for inherence-limited revision, and we compare these operators and dynamic-limited revision with the closely related credible-limited revision operators.

The principle of maximum entropy (MaxEnt) constitutes a powerful formalism for nonmonotonic reasoning based on probabilistic conditionals. Conditionals are defeasible rules which allow one to express that certain subclasses of some broader concept behave exceptional. In the (common) probabilistic semantics of conditional statements, these exceptions are formalized only implicitly: The conditional (B|A)[p] expresses that if A holds, then B is typically true, namely with probability p, but without explicitly talking about the subclass of A for which B does not hold. There is no possibility to express within the conditional that a subclass C of A is excluded from the inference to B because one is unaware of the probability of B given C. In this paper, we apply the concept of default negation to probabilistic MaxEnt reasoning in order to formalize this kind of unawareness and propose a context-based inference formalism. We exemplify the usefulness of this inference relation, and show that it satisfies basic formal properties of probabilistic reasoning.

The exact relationship between formal argumentation and nonmonotonic logics is a research topic that keeps on eluding researchers despite recent intensified efforts. We contribute to a deeper understanding of this relation by investigating characterizations of abstract dialectical frameworks in conditional logics for nonmonotonic reasoning. We first show that in general, there is a gap between argumentation and conditional semantics when applying several intuitive translations, but then prove that this gap can be closed when focusing on specific classes of translations.

Probability kinematics is a leading paradigm in probabilistic belief change. It is based on the idea that conditional beliefs should be independent from changes of their antecedents' probabilities. In this paper, we propose a re-interpretation of this paradigm for Spohn's ranking functions which we call Generalized Ranking Kinematics as a new principle for iterated belief revision of ranking functions by sets of conditional beliefs. This general setting also covers iterated revision by propositional beliefs. We then present c-revisions as belief change methodology that satisfies Generalized Ranking Kinematics.

Forgetting as a knowledge management operation has received much less attention than operations like inference, or revision. It was mainly in the area of logic programming that techniques and axiomatic properties have been studied systematically. However, at least from a cognitive view, forgetting plays an important role in restructuring and reorganizing a human's mind, and it is closely related to notions like relevance and independence which are crucial to knowledge representation and reasoning. In this paper, we propose axiomatic properties of (intentional) forgetting for general epistemic frameworks which are inspired by those for logic programming, and we evaluate various forgetting operations which have been proposed recently by Beierle et al. according to them. The general aim of this paper is to advance formal studies of (intentional) forgetting operators while capturing the many facets of forgetting in a unifying framework in which different forgetting operators can be contrasted and distinguished by means of formal properties.

MAMMA-DSCS (mammary carcinoma decision support core system) is a prototype implementation designed for the support of decision processes for breast cancer (mammary carcinoma) treatment plans: Given a set of patient values, the system suggests different applicable treatment plans. As additional knowledge sources, MAMMA-DSCS uses external ontologies containing further information and correlations which are not directly tied to the tumor itself (e.g. toxicities, drug interactions). As a consequence, general knowledge like the substance composition of a specific therapy and its pharmacological hierarchy, can be separated from the knowledge about the applicability of therapies for a patient. The latter is encoded in an ASP program that is able to access the external ontologies and to take the obtained information into account for determining the set of all therapy plans that may be applied in a given situation. The ASP program models medical knowledge combining general guidelines and up-to-date expert knowledge for treating breast cancer on a very finegrained level, originating from a hospital in Germany.

Conditional information is an integral part of representation and inference processes of causal relationships, temporal events, and even the deliberation about impossible scenarios of cognitive agents. For formalizing these inferences, a proper formal representation is needed. Psychological studies indicate that classical, monotonic logic is not the approriate model for capturing human reasoning: There are cases where the participants systematically deviate from classically valid answers, while in other cases they even endorse logically invalid ones. Many analyses covered the independent analysis of individual inference rules applied by human reasoners. In this paper we define inference patterns as a formalization of the joint usage or avoidance of these rules. Considering patterns instead of single inferences opens the way for categorizing inference studies with regard to their qualitative results. We apply plausibility relations which provide basic formal models for many theories of conditionals, nonmonotonic reasoning, and belief revision to asses the rationality of the patterns and thus the individual inferences drawn in the study. By this replacement of classical logic with formalisms most suitable for conditionals, we shift the basis of judging rationality from compatibility with classical entailment to consistency in a logic of conditionals. Using inductive reasoning on the plausibility relations we reverse engineer conditional knowledge bases as explanatory model for and formalization of the background knowledge of the participants. In this way the conditional knowledge bases derived from the inference patterns provide an explanation for the outcome of the study that generated the inference pattern.

Recent work in psychology provided evidence that plausibility monitoring is a routine component of language comprehension by showing that reactions of test persons were delayed when, e.g., a positive response was required for an implausible target word. These experimental results raise the crucial question of whether, and how, the role of plausibility assessments for the processes inherent to language comprehension can be made more precise. In this paper, we show that formal approaches to plausibility from the field of knowledge representation can explain the observed phenomena in a satisfactory way. In particular, we argue that the delays in response time are caused by belief revision processes which are necessary to overcome the mismatch between plausible context (or background resp. world) knowledge and implausible target words.