The ability to derive underlying principles from a handful of observations and then generalize to novel situations -- known as inductive reasoning -- is central to human intelligence. Prior work suggests that language models (LMs) often fall short on inductive reasoning, despite achieving impressive success on research benchmarks. In this work, we conduct a systematic study of the inductive reasoning capabilities of LMs through iterative hypothesis refinement, a technique that more closely mirrors the human inductive process than standard input-output prompting. Iterative hypothesis refinement employs a three-step process: proposing, selecting, and refining hypotheses in the form of textual rules. By examining the intermediate rules, we observe that LMs are phenomenal hypothesis proposers (i.e., generating candidate rules), and when coupled with a (task-specific) symbolic interpreter that is able to systematically filter the proposed set of rules, this hybrid approach achieves strong results across inductive reasoning benchmarks that require inducing causal relations, language-like instructions, and symbolic concepts. However, they also behave as puzzling inductive reasoners, showing notable performance gaps between rule induction (i.e., identifying plausible rules) and rule application (i.e., applying proposed rules to instances), suggesting that LMs are proposing hypotheses without being able to actually apply the rules. Through empirical and human analyses, we further reveal several discrepancies between the inductive reasoning processes of LMs and humans, shedding light on both the potentials and limitations of using LMs in inductive reasoning tasks.

Commonsense norms are defeasible by context: reading books is usually great, but not when driving a car. While contexts can be explicitly described in language, in embodied scenarios, contexts are often provided visually. This type of visually grounded reasoning about defeasible commonsense norms is generally easy for humans, but (as we show) poses a challenge for machines, as it necessitates both visual understanding and reasoning about commonsense norms. We construct a new multimodal benchmark for studying visual-grounded commonsense norms: NORMLENS. NORMLENS consists of 10K human judgments accompanied by free-form explanations covering 2K multimodal situations, and serves as a probe to address two questions: (1) to what extent can models align with average human judgment? and (2) how well can models explain their predicted judgments? We find that state-of-the-art model judgments and explanations are not well-aligned with human annotation. Additionally, we present a new approach to better align models with humans by distilling social commonsense knowledge from large language models. The data and code are released at https://seungjuhan.me/normlens.

The recent wave of generative AI has sparked unprecedented global attention, with both excitement and concern over potentially superhuman levels of artificial intelligence: models now take only seconds to produce outputs that would challenge or exceed the capabilities even of expert humans. At the same time, models still show basic errors in understanding that would not be expected even in non-expert humans. This presents us with an apparent paradox: how do we reconcile seemingly superhuman capabilities with the persistence of errors that few humans would make? In this work, we posit that this tension reflects a divergence in the configuration of intelligence in today's generative models relative to intelligence in humans. Specifically, we propose and test the Generative AI Paradox hypothesis: generative models, having been trained directly to reproduce expert-like outputs, acquire generative capabilities that are not contingent upon -- and can therefore exceed -- their ability to understand those same types of outputs. This contrasts with humans, for whom basic understanding almost always precedes the ability to generate expert-level outputs. We test this hypothesis through controlled experiments analyzing generation vs. understanding in generative models, across both language and image modalities. Our results show that although models can outperform humans in generation, they consistently fall short of human capabilities in measures of understanding, as well as weaker correlation between generation and understanding performance, and more brittleness to adversarial inputs. Our findings support the hypothesis that models' generative capability may not be contingent upon understanding capability, and call for caution in interpreting artificial intelligence by analogy to human intelligence.

Transformer large language models (LLMs) have sparked admiration for their exceptional performance on tasks that demand intricate multi-step reasoning. Yet, these models simultaneously show failures on surprisingly trivial problems. This begs the question: Are these errors incidental, or do they signal more substantial limitations? In an attempt to demystify transformer LLMs, we investigate the limits of these models across three representative compositional tasks -- multi-digit multiplication, logic grid puzzles, and a classic dynamic programming problem. These tasks require breaking problems down into sub-steps and synthesizing these steps into a precise answer. We formulate compositional tasks as computation graphs to systematically quantify the level of complexity, and break down reasoning steps into intermediate sub-procedures. Our empirical findings suggest that transformer LLMs solve compositional tasks by reducing multi-step compositional reasoning into linearized subgraph matching, without necessarily developing systematic problem-solving skills. To round off our empirical study, we provide theoretical arguments on abstract multi-step reasoning problems that highlight how autoregressive generations' performance can rapidly decay with\,increased\,task\,complexity.

Data scarcity has been a long standing issue in the field of open-domain social dialogue. To quench this thirst, we present SODA: the first publicly available, million-scale high-quality social dialogue dataset. By contextualizing social commonsense knowledge from a knowledge graph, we are able to distill an exceptionally broad spectrum of social interactions from a large language model. Human evaluation shows that conversations in SODA are more consistent, specific, and (surprisingly) natural than those in prior human-authored datasets. Using SODA, we train COSMO: a generalizable conversation model that is significantly more natural and consistent on unseen datasets than best-performing conversation models (e.g., GODEL, BlenderBot-1, Koala, Vicuna). Experiments reveal COSMO is sometimes even preferred to the original human-written gold responses. Additionally, our results shed light on the distinction between knowledge-enriched conversations and natural social chitchats. We plan to make our data, model, and code public.

Human values are crucial to human decision-making. Value pluralism is the view that multiple correct values may be held in tension with one another (e.g., when considering lying to a friend to protect their feelings, how does one balance honesty with friendship?). As statistical learners, AI systems fit to averages by default, washing out these potentially irreducible value conflicts. To improve AI systems to better reflect value pluralism, the first-order challenge is to explore the extent to which AI systems can model pluralistic human values, rights, and duties as well as their interaction. We introduce ValuePrism, a large-scale dataset of 218k values, rights, and duties connected to 31k human-written situations. ValuePrism's contextualized values are generated by GPT-4 and deemed high-quality by human annotators 91% of the time. We conduct a large-scale study with annotators across diverse social and demographic backgrounds to try to understand whose values are represented. With ValuePrism, we build Kaleido, an open, light-weight, and structured language-based multi-task model that generates, explains, and assesses the relevance and valence (i.e., support or oppose) of human values, rights, and duties within a specific context. Humans prefer the sets of values output by our system over the teacher GPT-4, finding them more accurate and with broader coverage. In addition, we demonstrate that Kaleido can help explain variability in human decision-making by outputting contrasting values. Finally, we show that Kaleido's representations transfer to other philosophical frameworks and datasets, confirming the benefit of an explicit, modular, and interpretable approach to value pluralism. We hope that our work will serve as a step to making more explicit the implicit values behind human decision-making and to steering AI systems to make decisions that are more in accordance with them.

Context is everything, even in commonsense moral reasoning. Changing contexts can flip the moral judgment of an action; "Lying to a friend" is wrong in general, but may be morally acceptable if it is intended to protect their life. We present ClarifyDelphi, an interactive system that learns to ask clarification questions (e.g., why did you lie to your friend?) in order to elicit additional salient contexts of a social or moral situation. We posit that questions whose potential answers lead to diverging moral judgments are the most informative. Thus, we propose a reinforcement learning framework with a defeasibility reward that aims to maximize the divergence between moral judgments of hypothetical answers to a question. Human evaluation demonstrates that our system generates more relevant, informative and defeasible questions compared to competitive baselines. Our work is ultimately inspired by studies in cognitive science that have investigated the flexibility in moral cognition (i.e., the diverse contexts in which moral rules can be bent), and we hope that research in this direction can assist both cognitive and computational investigations of moral judgments.

It is commonly perceived that the strongest language models (LMs) rely on a combination of massive scale, instruction data, and human feedback to perform specialized tasks -- e.g. summarization and paraphrasing, without supervision. In this paper, we propose that language models can learn to summarize and paraphrase sentences, with none of these 3 factors. We present Impossible Distillation, a framework that distills a task-specific dataset directly from an off-the-shelf LM, even when it is impossible for the LM itself to reliably solve the task. By training a student model on the generated dataset and amplifying its capability through self-distillation, our method yields a high-quality model and dataset from a low-quality teacher model, without the need for scale or supervision. Using Impossible Distillation, we are able to distill an order of magnitude smaller model (with only 770M parameters) that outperforms 175B parameter GPT-3, in both quality and controllability, as confirmed by automatic and human evaluations. Furthermore, as a useful byproduct of our approach, we obtain DIMSUM+, a high-quality dataset with 3.4M sentence summaries and paraphrases. Our analyses show that this dataset, as a purely LM-generated corpus, is more diverse and more effective for generalization to unseen domains than all human-authored datasets -- including Gigaword with 4M samples.

Toxicity annotators and content moderators often default to mental shortcuts when making decisions. This can lead to subtle toxicity being missed, and seemingly toxic but harmless content being over-detected. We introduce BiasX, a framework that enhances content moderation setups with free-text explanations of statements' implied social biases, and explore its effectiveness through a large-scale crowdsourced user study. We show that indeed, participants substantially benefit from explanations for correctly identifying subtly (non-)toxic content. The quality of explanations is critical: imperfect machine-generated explanations (+2.4% on hard toxic examples) help less compared to expert-written human explanations (+7.2%). Our results showcase the promise of using free-text explanations to encourage more thoughtful toxicity moderation.

Polyak and Juditsky [30] famously showed that the stochastic gradient method for minimizing smooth and strongly convex functions enjoys a central limit theorem: the error between the running average of the iterates and the minimizer, normalized by the square root of the iteration counter, converges to a normal random vector. Moreover, the covariance matrix of the limiting distribution is in a precise sense "optimal" among any estimation procedure. A long standing open question is whether similar guarantees - asymptotic normality and optimality - exist for nonsmooth optimization and, more generally, for equilibrium problems. In this work, we obtain such guarantees under mild conditions that hold both in concrete circumstances (e.g.