Our intention is to provide a definitive reference on what it would take to safely make use of generative/predictive models in the absence of a solution to the Eliciting Latent Knowledge problem. Furthermore, we believe that large language models can be understood as such predictive models of the world, and that such a conceptualization raises significant opportunities for their safe yet powerful use via carefully conditioning them to predict desirable outputs. Unfortunately, such approaches also raise a variety of potentially fatal safety problems, particularly surrounding situations where predictive models predict the output of other AI systems, potentially unbeknownst to us. There are numerous potential solutions to such problems, however, primarily via carefully conditioning models to predict the things we want (e.g. humans) rather than the things we don't (e.g. malign AIs). Furthermore, due to the simplicity of the prediction objective, we believe that predictive models present the easiest inner alignment problem that we are aware of. As a result, we think that conditioning approaches for predictive models represent the safest known way of eliciting human-level and slightly superhuman capabilities from large language models and other similar future models.

As language models (LMs) scale, they develop many novel behaviors, good and bad, exacerbating the need to evaluate how they behave. Prior work creates evaluations with crowdwork (which is time-consuming and expensive) or existing data sources (which are not always available). Here, we automatically generate evaluations with LMs. We explore approaches with varying amounts of human effort, from instructing LMs to write yes/no questions to making complex Winogender schemas with multiple stages of LM-based generation and filtering. Crowdworkers rate the examples as highly relevant and agree with 90-100% of labels, sometimes more so than corresponding human-written datasets. We generate 154 datasets and discover new cases of inverse scaling where LMs get worse with size. Larger LMs repeat back a dialog user's preferred answer ("sycophancy") and express greater desire to pursue concerning goals like resource acquisition and goal preservation. We also find some of the first examples of inverse scaling in RL from Human Feedback (RLHF), where more RLHF makes LMs worse. For example, RLHF makes LMs express stronger political views (on gun rights and immigration) and a greater desire to avoid shut down. Overall, LM-written evaluations are high-quality and let us quickly discover many novel LM behaviors.

In some neural networks, individual neurons correspond to natural ``features'' in the input. Such \emph{monosemantic} neurons are of great help in interpretability studies, as they can be cleanly understood. In this work we report preliminary attempts to engineer monosemanticity in toy models. We find that models can be made more monosemantic without increasing the loss by just changing which local minimum the training process finds. More monosemantic loss minima have moderate negative biases, and we are able to use this fact to engineer highly monosemantic models. We are able to mechanistically interpret these models, including the residual polysemantic neurons, and uncover a simple yet surprising algorithm. Finally, we find that providing models with more neurons per layer makes the models more monosemantic, albeit at increased computational cost. These findings point to a number of new questions and avenues for engineering monosemanticity, which we intend to study these in future work.

This paper analyzes and compares 11 different proposals for building safe advanced AI under the current machine learning paradigm, including major contenders such as iterated amplification, AI safety via debate, and recursive reward modeling. Each proposal is evaluated on the four components of outer alignment, inner alignment, training competitiveness, and performance competitiveness, of which the distinction between the latter two is introduced in this paper. While prior literature has primarily focused on analyzing individual proposals, or primarily focused on outer alignment at the expense of inner alignment, this analysis seeks to take a comparative look at a wide range of proposals including a comparative analysis across all four previously mentioned components.

We analyze the type of learned optimization that occurs when a learned model (such as a neural network) is itself an optimizer - a situation we refer to as mesa-optimization, a neologism we introduce in this paper. We believe that the possibility of mesa-optimization raises two important questions for the safety and transparency of advanced machine learning systems. First, under what circumstances will learned models be optimizers, including when they should not be? Second, when a learned model is an optimizer, what will its objective be - how will it differ from the loss function it was trained under - and how can it be aligned? In this paper, we provide an in-depth analysis of these two primary questions and provide an overview of topics for future research.