We study the phenomenon of bias amplification in classifiers, wherein a machine learning model learns to predict classes with a greater disparity than the underlying ground truth. We demonstrate that bias amplification can arise via an inductive bias in gradient descent methods that results in the overestimation of the importance of moderately-predictive "weak" features if insufficient training data is available. This overestimation gives rise to feature-wise bias amplification -- a previously unreported form of bias that can be traced back to the features of a trained model. Through analysis and experiments, we show that while some bias cannot be mitigated without sacrificing accuracy, feature-wise bias amplification can be mitigated through targeted feature selection. We present two new feature selection algorithms for mitigating bias amplification in linear models, and show how they can be adapted to convolutional neural networks efficiently. Our experiments on synthetic and real data demonstrate that these algorithms consistently lead to reduced bias without harming accuracy, in some cases eliminating predictive bias altogether while providing modest gains in accuracy.

A machine learning model may exhibit discrimination when used to make decisions involving people. One potential cause for such outcomes is that the model uses a statistical proxy for a protected demographic attribute. In this paper we formulate a definition of proxy use for the setting of linear regression and present algorithms for detecting proxies. Our definition follows recent work on proxies in classification models, and characterizes a model's constituent behavior that: 1) correlates closely with a protected random variable, and 2) is causally influential in the overall behavior of the model. We show that proxies in linear regression models can be efficiently identified by solving a second-order cone program, and further extend this result to account for situations where the use of a certain input variable is justified as a "business necessity". Finally, we present empirical results on two law enforcement datasets that exhibit varying degrees of racial disparity in prediction outcomes, demonstrating that proxies shed useful light on the causes of discriminatory behavior in models.

We study the problem of explaining a rich class of behavioral properties of deep neural networks. Distinctively, our influence-directed explanations approach this problem by peering inside the net- work to identify neurons with high influence on the property and distribution of interest using an axiomatically justified influence measure, and then providing an interpretation for the concepts these neurons represent. We evaluate our approach by training convolutional neural net- works on MNIST, ImageNet, Pubfig, and Diabetic Retinopathy datasets. Our evaluation demonstrates that influence-directed explanations (1) identify influential concepts that generalize across instances, (2) help extract the essence of what the network learned about a class, (3) isolate individual features the network uses to make decisions and distinguish related instances, and (4) assist in understanding misclassifications.

Machine learning algorithms, when applied to sensitive data, pose a distinct threat to privacy. A growing body of prior work demonstrates that models produced by these algorithms may leak specific private information in the training data to an attacker, either through the models' structure or their observable behavior. However, the underlying cause of this privacy risk is not well understood beyond a handful of anecdotal accounts that suggest overfitting and influence might play a role. This paper examines the effect that overfitting and influence have on the ability of an attacker to learn information about the training data from machine learning models, either through training set membership inference or attribute inference attacks. Using both formal and empirical analyses, we illustrate a clear relationship between these factors and the privacy risk that arises in several popular machine learning algorithms. We find that overfitting is sufficient to allow an attacker to perform membership inference and, when the target attribute meets certain conditions about its influence, attribute inference attacks. Interestingly, our formal analysis also shows that overfitting is not necessary for these attacks and begins to shed light on what other factors may be in play. Finally, we explore the connection between membership inference and attribute inference, showing that there are deep connections between the two that lead to effective new attacks.

Deep learning takes advantage of large datasets and computationally efficient training algorithms to outperform other approaches at various machine learning tasks. However, imperfections in the training phase of deep neural networks make them vulnerable to adversarial samples: inputs crafted by adversaries with the intent of causing deep neural networks to misclassify. In this work, we formalize the space of adversaries against deep neural networks (DNNs) and introduce a novel class of algorithms to craft adversarial samples based on a precise understanding of the mapping between inputs and outputs of DNNs. In an application to computer vision, we show that our algorithms can reliably produce samples correctly classified by human subjects but misclassified in specific targets by a DNN with a 97% adversarial success rate while only modifying on average 4.02% of the input features per sample. We then evaluate the vulnerability of different sample classes to adversarial perturbations by defining a hardness measure. Finally, we describe preliminary work outlining defenses against adversarial samples by defining a predictive measure of distance between a benign input and a target classification.