One of the most striking features of human cognition is the capacity to plan. Two aspects of human planning stand out: its efficiency, even in complex environments, and its flexibility, even in changing environments. Efficiency is especially impressive because directly computing an optimal plan is intractable, even for modestly complex tasks, and yet people successfully solve myriad everyday problems despite limited cognitive resources. Standard accounts in psychology, economics, and artificial intelligence have suggested this is because people have a mental representation of a task and then use heuristics to plan in that representation. However, this approach generally assumes that mental representations are fixed. Here, we propose that mental representations can be controlled and that this provides opportunities to adaptively simplify problems so they can be more easily reasoned about -- a process we refer to as construal. We construct a formal model of this process and, in a series of large, pre-registered behavioral experiments, show both that construal is subject to online cognitive control and that people form value-guided construals that optimally balance the complexity of a representation and its utility for planning and acting. These results demonstrate how strategically perceiving and conceiving problems facilitates the effective use of limited cognitive resources.

A key aspect of human intelligence is the ability to infer abstract rules directly from high-dimensional sensory data, and to do so given only a limited amount of training experience. Deep neural network algorithms have proven to be a powerful tool for learning directly from high-dimensional data, but currently lack this capacity for data-efficient induction of abstract rules, leading some to argue that symbol-processing mechanisms will be necessary to account for this capacity. In this work, we take a step toward bridging this gap by introducing the Emergent Symbol Binding Network (ESBN), a recurrent network augmented with an external memory that enables a form of variable-binding and indirection. This binding mechanism allows symbol-like representations to emerge through the learning process without the need to explicitly incorporate symbol-processing machinery, enabling the ESBN to learn rules in a manner that is abstracted away from the particular entities to which those rules apply. Across a series of tasks, we show that this architecture displays nearly perfect generalization of learned rules to novel entities given only a limited number of training examples, and outperforms a number of other competitive neural network architectures.

Human intelligence is characterized by a remarkable ability to infer abstract rules from experience and apply these rules to novel domains. As such, designing neural network algorithms with this capacity is an important step toward the development of deep learning systems with more human-like intelligence. However, doing so is a major outstanding challenge, one that some argue will require neural networks to use explicit symbol-processing mechanisms. In this work, we focus on neural networks' capacity for arbitrary role-filler binding, the ability to associate abstract "roles" to context-specific "fillers," which many have argued is an important mechanism underlying the ability to learn and apply rules abstractly. Using a simplified version of Raven's Progressive Matrices, a hallmark test of human intelligence, we introduce a sequential formulation of a visual problem-solving task that requires this form of binding. Further, we introduce the Emergent Symbol Binding Network (ESBN), a recurrent neural network model that learns to use an external memory as a binding mechanism. This mechanism enables symbol-like variable representations to emerge through the ESBN's training process without the need for explicit symbol-processing machinery. We empirically demonstrate that the ESBN successfully learns the underlying abstract rule structure of our task and perfectly generalizes this rule structure to novel fillers.

Modern machine learning systems struggle with sample efficiency and are usually trained with enormous amounts of data for each task. This is in sharp contrast with humans, who often learn with very little data. In recent years, meta-learning, in which one trains on a family of tasks (i.e. a task distribution), has emerged as an approach to improving the sample complexity of machine learning systems and to closing the gap between human and machine learning. However, in this paper, we argue that current meta-learning approaches still differ significantly from human learning. We argue that humans learn over tasks by constructing compositional generative models and using these to generalize, whereas current meta-learning methods are biased toward the use of simpler statistical patterns. To highlight this difference, we construct a new meta-reinforcement learning task with a compositional task distribution. We also introduce a novel approach to constructing a "null task distribution" with the same statistical complexity as the compositional distribution but without explicit compositionality. We train a standard meta-learning agent, a recurrent network trained with model-free reinforcement learning, and compare it with human performance across the two task distributions. We find that humans do better in the compositional task distribution whereas the agent does better in the non-compositional null task distribution -- despite comparable statistical complexity. This work highlights a particular difference between human learning and current meta-learning models, introduces a task that displays this difference, and paves the way for future work on human-like meta-learning.

The terms multi-task learning and multitasking are easily confused. Multi-task learning refers to a paradigm in machine learning in which a network is trained on various related tasks to facilitate the acquisition of tasks. In contrast, multitasking is used to indicate, especially in the cognitive science literature, the ability to execute multiple tasks simultaneously. While multi-task learning exploits the discovery of common structure between tasks in the form of shared representations, multitasking is promoted by separating representations between tasks to avoid processing interference. Here, we build on previous work involving shallow networks and simple task settings suggesting that there is a trade-off between multi-task learning and multitasking, mediated by the use of shared versus separated representations. We show that the same tension arises in deep networks and discuss a meta-learning algorithm for an agent to manage this trade-off in an unfamiliar environment. We display through different experiments that the agent is able to successfully optimize its training strategy as a function of the environment.

A key feature of neural network architectures is their ability to support the simultaneous interaction among large numbers of units in the learning and processing of representations. However, how the richness of such interactions trades off against the ability of a network to simultaneously carry out multiple independent processes -- a salient limitation in many domains of human cognition -- remains largely unexplored. In this paper we use a graph-theoretic analysis of network architecture to address this question, where tasks are represented as edges in a bipartite graph $G=(A \cup B, E)$. We define a new measure of multitasking capacity of such networks, based on the assumptions that tasks that \emph{need} to be multitasked rely on independent resources, i.e., form a matching, and that tasks \emph{can} be performed without interference if they form an induced matching. Our main result is an inherent tradeoff between the multitasking capacity and the average degree of the network that holds \emph{regardless of the network architecture}. These results are also extended to networks of depth greater than $2$. On the positive side, we demonstrate that networks that are random-like (e.g., locally sparse) can have desirable multitasking properties. Our results shed light into the parallel-processing limitations of neural systems and provide insights that may be useful for the analysis and design of parallel architectures.

Multivariate analysis of fMRI data has benefited substantially from advances in machine learning. Most recently, a range of probabilistic latent variable models applied to fMRI data have been successful in a variety of tasks, including identifying similarity patterns in neural data (Representational Similarity Analysis and its empirical Bayes variant, RSA and BRSA; Intersubject Functional Connectivity, ISFC), combining multi-subject datasets (Shared Response Mapping; SRM), and mapping between brain and behavior (Joint Modeling). Although these methods share some underpinnings, they have been developed as distinct methods, with distinct algorithms and software tools. We show how the matrix-variate normal (MN) formalism can unify some of these methods into a single framework. In doing so, we gain the ability to reuse noise modeling assumptions, algorithms, and code across models. Our primary theoretical contribution shows how some of these methods can be written as instantiations of the same model, allowing us to generalize them to flexibly modeling structured noise covariances. Our formalism permits novel model variants and improved estimation strategies: in contrast to SRM, the number of parameters for MN-SRM does not scale with the number of voxels or subjects; in contrast to BRSA, the number of parameters for MN-RSA scales additively rather than multiplicatively in the number of voxels. We empirically demonstrate advantages of two new methods derived in the formalism: for MN-RSA, we show up to 10x improvement in runtime, up to 6x improvement in RMSE, and more conservative behavior under the null. For MN-SRM, our method grants a modest improvement to out-of-sample reconstruction while relaxing an orthonormality constraint of SRM. We also provide a software prototyping tool for MN models that can flexibly reuse noise covariance assumptions and algorithms across models.

The dynamics of simple decisions are well understood and modeled as a class of random walk models (e.g. Laming, 1968; Ratcliff, 1978; Busemeyer and Townsend, 1993; Usher and McClelland, 2001; Bogacz et al., 2006). However, most real-life decisions include a rich and dynamically-changing influence of additional information we call context. In this work, we describe a computational theory of decision making under dynamically shifting context. We show how the model generalizes the dominant existing model of fixed-context decision making (Ratcliff, 1978) and can be built up from a weighted combination of fixed-context decisions evolving simultaneously. We also show how the model generalizes re- cent work on the control of attention in the Flanker task (Yu et al., 2009). Finally, we show how the model recovers qualitative data patterns in another task of longstanding psychological interest, the AX Continuous Performance Test (Servan-Schreiber et al., 1996), using the same model parameters.

Working memory is a central topic of cognitive neuroscience because it is critical for solving real world problems in which information from multiple temporally distant sources must be combined to generate appropriate behavior. However, an often neglected fact is that learning to use working memory effectively is itself a difficult problem. The Gating" framework is a collection of psychological models that show how dopamine can train the basal ganglia and prefrontal cortex to form useful working memory representations in certain types of problems. We bring together gating with ideas from machine learning about using finite memory systems in more general problems. Thus we present a normative Gating model that learns, by online temporal difference methods, to use working memory to maximize discounted future rewards in general partially observable settings. The model successfully solves a benchmark working memory problem, and exhibits limitations similar to those observed in human experiments. Moreover, the model introduces a concise, normative definition of high level cognitive concepts such as working memory and cognitive control in terms of maximizing discounted future rewards."

In a variety of behavioral tasks, subjects exhibit an automatic and apparently sub-optimal sequential effect: they respond more rapidly and accurately to a stimulus if it reinforces a local pattern in stimulus history, such as a string of repetitions or alternations, compared to when it violates such a pattern. This is often the case even if the local trends arise by chance in the context of a randomized design, such that stimulus history has no predictive power. In this work, we use a normative Bayesian framework to examine the hypothesis that such idiosyncrasies may reflect the inadvertent engagement of fundamental mechanisms critical for adapting to changing statistics in the natural environment. We show that prior belief in non-stationarity can induce experimentally observed sequential effects in an otherwise Bayes-optimal algorithm. The Bayesian algorithm is shown to be well approximated by linear-exponential filtering of past observations, a feature also apparent in the behavioral data. We derive an explicit relationship between the parameters and computations of the exact Bayesian algorithm and those of the approximate linear-exponential filter. Since the latter is equivalent to a leaky-integration process, a commonly used model of neuronal dynamics underlying perceptual decision-making and trial-to-trial dependencies, our model provides a principled account of why such dynamics are useful. We also show that near-optimal tuning of the leaky-integration process is possible, using stochastic gradient descent based only on the noisy binary inputs. This is a proof of concept that not only can neurons implement near-optimal prediction based on standard neuronal dynamics, but that they can also learn to tune the processing parameters without explicitly representing probabilities.