Testing whether a sample survey is a credible representation of the population is an important question to ensure the validity of any downstream research. While this problem, in general, does not have an efficient solution, one might take a task-based approach and aim to understand whether a certain data analysis tool, like linear regression, would yield similar answers both on the population and the sample survey. In this paper, we design an algorithm to test the credibility of a sample survey in terms of linear regression. In other words, we design an algorithm that can certify if a sample survey is good enough to guarantee the correctness of data analysis done using linear regression tools. Nowadays, one is naturally concerned about data privacy in surveys. Thus, we further test the credibility of surveys published in a differentially private manner. Specifically, we focus on Local Differential Privacy (LDP), which is a standard technique to ensure privacy in surveys where the survey participants might not trust the aggregator. We extend our algorithm to work even when the data analysis has been done using surveys with LDP. In the process, we also propose an algorithm that learns with high probability the guarantees a linear regression model on a survey published with LDP. Our algorithm also serves as a mechanism to learn linear regression models from data corrupted with noise coming from any subexponential distribution. We prove that it achieves the optimal estimation error bound for $\ell_1$ linear regression, which might be of broader interest. We prove the theoretical correctness of our algorithms while trying to reduce the sample complexity for both public and private surveys. We also numerically demonstrate the performance of our algorithms on real and synthetic datasets.

We study incentivized exploration for the multi-armed bandit (MAB) problem with non-stationary reward distributions, where players receive compensation for exploring arms other than the greedy choice and may provide biased feedback on the reward. We consider two different non-stationary environments: abruptly-changing and continuously-changing, and propose respective incentivized exploration algorithms. We show that the proposed algorithms achieve sublinear regret and compensation over time, thus effectively incentivizing exploration despite the nonstationarity and the biased or drifted feedback.

Reasoning about knowledge among multiple agents plays an important role in studying real-world problems in a distributed setting, e.g., in communicating processes, protocols, strategies and games. Multi-agent epistemic logic (EL) [1] and its dynamic extensions, popularly known as dynamic epistemic logics (DEL) [2] are well-known logical systems to specify and reason about such dynamic interactions of knowledge. Traditionally, agents' knowledge is about facts and EL/DEL mostly deals with this phenomenon of'knowing that'. More recently, the notions of'knowing whether', 'knowing why' and'knowing how' have also been investigated from a formal viewpoint [3]. These agents also have expectations about the world around them, and they reason based on what they observe around them, and such observations may or may not match the expectations they have about their surroundings.