Large language models have shown tremendous performance in a variety of tasks. In-context learning -- the ability to improve at a task after being provided with a number of demonstrations -- is seen as one of the main contributors to their success. In the present paper, we demonstrate that the in-context learning abilities of large language models can be recursively improved via in-context learning itself. We coin this phenomenon meta-in-context learning. Looking at two idealized domains, a one-dimensional regression task and a two-armed bandit task, we show that meta-in-context learning adaptively reshapes a large language model's priors over expected tasks. Furthermore, we find that meta-in-context learning modifies the in-context learning strategies of such models. Finally, we extend our approach to a benchmark of real-world regression problems where we observe competitive performance to traditional learning algorithms. Taken together, our work improves our understanding of in-context learning and paves the way toward adapting large language models to the environment they are applied purely through meta-in-context learning rather than traditional finetuning.

Large language models are transforming research on machine learning while galvanizing public debates. Understanding not only when these models work well and succeed but also why they fail and misbehave is of great societal relevance. We propose to turn the lens of computational psychiatry, a framework used to computationally describe and modify aberrant behavior, to the outputs produced by these models. We focus on the Generative Pre-Trained Transformer 3.5 and subject it to tasks commonly studied in psychiatry. Our results show that GPT-3.5 responds robustly to a common anxiety questionnaire, producing higher anxiety scores than human subjects. Moreover, GPT-3.5's responses can be predictably changed by using emotion-inducing prompts. Emotion-induction not only influences GPT-3.5's behavior in a cognitive task measuring exploratory decision-making but also influences its behavior in a previously-established task measuring biases such as racism and ableism. Crucially, GPT-3.5 shows a strong increase in biases when prompted with anxiety-inducing text. Thus, it is likely that how prompts are communicated to large language models has a strong influence on their behavior in applied settings. These results progress our understanding of prompt engineering and demonstrate the usefulness of methods taken from computational psychiatry for studying the capable algorithms to which we increasingly delegate authority and autonomy.

Meta-learning is a framework for learning learning algorithms through repeated interactions with an environment as opposed to designing them by hand. In recent years, this framework has established itself as a promising tool for building models of human cognition. Yet, a coherent research program around meta-learned models of cognition is still missing. The purpose of this article is to synthesize previous work in this field and establish such a research program. We rely on three key pillars to accomplish this goal. We first point out that meta-learning can be used to construct Bayes-optimal learning algorithms. This result not only implies that any behavioral phenomenon that can be explained by a Bayesian model can also be explained by a meta-learned model but also allows us to draw strong connections to the rational analysis of cognition. We then discuss several advantages of the meta-learning framework over traditional Bayesian methods. In particular, we argue that meta-learning can be applied to situations where Bayesian inference is impossible and that it enables us to make rational models of cognition more realistic, either by incorporating limited computational resources or neuroscientific knowledge. Finally, we reexamine prior studies from psychology and neuroscience that have applied meta-learning and put them into the context of these new insights. In summary, our work highlights that meta-learning considerably extends the scope of rational analysis and thereby of cognitive theories more generally.

Equipping artificial agents with useful exploration mechanisms remains a challenge to this day. Humans, on the other hand, seem to manage the trade-off between exploration and exploitation effortlessly. In the present article, we put forward the hypothesis that they accomplish this by making optimal use of limited computational resources. We study this hypothesis by meta-learning reinforcement learning algorithms that sacrifice performance for a shorter description length (defined as the number of bits required to implement the given algorithm). The emerging class of models captures human exploration behavior better than previously considered approaches, such as Boltzmann exploration, upper confidence bound algorithms, and Thompson sampling. We additionally demonstrate that changing the description length in our class of models produces the intended effects: reducing description length captures the behavior of brain-lesioned patients while increasing it mirrors cognitive development during adolescence.

We study GPT-3, a recent large language model, using tools from cognitive psychology. More specifically, we assess GPT-3's decision-making, information search, deliberation, and causal reasoning abilities on a battery of canonical experiments from the literature. We find that much of GPT-3's behavior is impressive: it solves vignette-based tasks similarly or better than human subjects, is able to make decent decisions from descriptions, outperforms humans in a multi-armed bandit task, and shows signatures of model-based reinforcement learning. Yet we also find that small perturbations to vignette-based tasks can lead GPT-3 vastly astray, that it shows no signatures of directed exploration, and that it fails miserably in a causal reasoning task. These results enrich our understanding of current large language models and pave the way for future investigations using tools from cognitive psychology to study increasingly capable and opaque artificial agents.

Human decision-making deviates from the optimal solution, that maximizes cumulative rewards, in many situations. Here we approach this discrepancy from the perspective of bounded rationality and our goal is to provide a justification for such seemingly sub-optimal strategies. More specifically we investigate the hypothesis, that humans do not know optimal decision-making algorithms in advance, but instead employ a learned, resource-bounded approximation. The idea is formalized through combining a recently proposed meta-learning model based on Recurrent Neural Networks with a resource-bounded objective. The resulting approach is closely connected to variational inference and the Minimum Description Length principle. Empirical evidence is obtained from a two-armed bandit task. Here we observe patterns in our family of models that resemble differences between individual human participants.

We compare the acquisition of knowledge in humans and machines. Research from the field of developmental psychology indicates, that human-employed hypothesis are initially guided by simple rules, before evolving into more complex theories. This observation is shared across many tasks and domains. We investigate whether stages of development in artificial learning systems are based on the same characteristics. We operationalize developmental stages as the size of the data-set, on which the artificial system is trained. For our analysis we look at the developmental progress of Bayesian Neural Networks on three different data-sets, including occlusion, support and quantity comparison tasks. We compare the results with prior research from developmental psychology and find agreement between the family of optimized models and pattern of development observed in infants and children on all three tasks, indicating common principles for the acquisition of knowledge.