These are the voyages of the MIT Artificial Intelligence Laboratory, and these remarks may help to understand the context of this collection, though in many ways the memoranda speak quite clearly for themselves and my comments are not, in any case, to be regarded as history, for I have written them quite hastily, in much the same spirit of the memos themselves, when it was our strategy in those early days to be unscholarly: we tended to assume, for better or for worse, that everything we did was so likely to be new that there was little need for caution or for reviewing literature or for double -checking anything. As luck would have it, that almost always turned out true.

This paper argues for the position that experimental human studies are relevant to most facets of AI research and that closer ties between AI and experimental psychology will enhance the development of booth the principles of artificial intelligence and their implementation in computers. Raising psychological assumptions from the level of ad hoc intuitions to the level of systematic empirical observation, in the long run, will improve the quality of AI research and help to integrate it with related studies in other disciplines.

When I took on the job of programme chairman of IJCAI-83 the trustees presented me with a list of problems with the way IJCAI programmes had traditionally been organized. Some of these problems had been raised by previous programme chairmen, some by attendees and some been subsequently been raised by me. I have tried to organise the IJCAI-83 programme to solve these problems -or at least some of them, I have been unable to devise a scheme which simultaneously solves all the problems. (I leave this as an exercise for the reader.) My plans converged after consultation with many people in the AI community, including the IJCAI-83 conference committee, and they have that committee's approval. Inevitably this means that IJCAI-83 will be a little different from here-to -fore, and in order for my changes to be also solutions, it is necessary for you, the paying customer, to be aware of these differences and to take advantage of them. The aim of this article is to raise you awareness.

Our group's work in medical decision making has led us to formulate a framework for expert system design, in particular about how the domain knowledge may be decomposed into substructures. We propose that there exist different problem-solving types, i.e., uses of knowledge, and corresponding to each is a separate substructure specializing in that type of problem-solving. Each substructure is in turn further decomposed into a hierarchy of specialist which differ from each other not in the type of problem-solving, but in the conceptual content of their knowledge; e.g.; one of them may specialize in "heart disease," while another may do so in "liver," though both of them are doing the same type of problem solving. Thus ultimately all the knowledge in the system is distributed among problem-solvers which know how to use that knowledge. This is in contrast to the currently dominant expert system paradigm which proposes a common knowledge base accessed by knowledge-free problem-solvers of various kinds. In our framework there is no distinction between knowledge bases and problem-solvers: each knowledge source is a problem-solver. We have so far had occasion to deal with three generic problem-solving types in expert clinical reasoning: diagnosis (classification), data retrieval and organization, and reasoning about consequences of actions. In novice, these expert structures are often incomplete, and other knowledge structures and learning processes are needed to construct and complete them.

The Fairchild Laboratory for Artificial Intelligence Research (FLAIR) was inaugurated in October, 1980, with the purposes of introduction AI Technology into Fairchild Camera and Instrument Corporation, and of broadening the AI base of its parent company, Schlumberger Ltd. The charter of the laboratory includes basic and applied research in all AI disciplines. Currently, we have significant efforts underway in several areas of computational perception, knowledge representation and reasoning, and AI-related architectures. We also engage in various tool-building activities to support our research program. The current computational environment includes several large mainframes dedicated to AI research, a number of high-performance personal scientific machines, and extensive graphics capabilities.

To Date Gross margin, by activity: Rosenschein will complete McCarthy's term on the Council for

These are the voyages of the MIT Artificial Intelligence Laboratory, and these remarks may help to understand the context of this collection, though in many ways the memoranda speak quite clearly for themselves and my comments are not, in any case, to be regarded as history, for I have written them quite hastily, in much the same spirit of the memos themselves, when it was our strategy in those early days to be unscholarly: we tended to assume, for better or for worse, that everything we did was so likely to be new that there was little need for caution or for reviewing literature or for double -checking anything. As luck would have it, that almost always turned out true.

This paper explores the paradigm that heuristics are discovered by consulting simplified models of the problem domain. After describing the features of typical heuristics on some popular problems, we demonstrate that these heuristics can be obtained by the process of deleting constraints from the original problem and solving the relaxed problem which ensues. We then outline a scheme for generating such heuristics mechanically, which involves systematic refinement and deletion of constraints from the original problem specification until a semidecomposable model is identified. The solution to the latter constitutes a heuristic for the former.

This paper argues for the position that experimental human studies are relevant to most facets of AI research and that closer ties between AI and experimental psychology will enhance the development of booth the principles of artificial intelligence and their implementation in computers. Raising psychological assumptions from the level of ad hoc intuitions to the level of systematic empirical observation, in the long run, will improve the quality of AI research and help to integrate it with related studies in other disciplines.