An important problem in computational social choice concerns whether it is possible to prevent manipulation of voting rules by making it computationally intractable. To answer this, a key question is how frequently voting rules are manipulable. We [Xia and Conitzer, 2008] recently defined the class of generalized scoring rules (GSRs) and characterized the frequency of manipulability for such rules. We showed, by examples, that most common rules seem to fall into this class. However, no natural axiomatic characterization of the class was given, leaving the possibility that there are natural rules to which these results do not apply. In this paper, we characterize the class of GSRs based on two natural properties: it is equal to the class of rules that are anonymous and finitely locally consistent. Generalized scoring rules also have other uses in computational social choice. For these uses, the order of the GSR (the dimension of its score vector) is important. Our characterization result implies that the order of a GSR is related to the minimum number of locally consistent components of the rule. We proceed to bound the minimum number of locally consistent components for some common rules.

Recently, online reputation mechanisms have been proposed that reward agents for honest feedback about products and services with fixed quality. Many real-world settings, however, are inherently dynamic. As an example, consider a web service that wishes to publish the expected download speed of a file mirrored on different server sites. In contrast to the models of Miller, Resnick and Zeckhauser and of Jurca and Faltings, the quality of the service (e. g., a server’s available bandwidth) changes over time and future agents are solely interested in the present quality levels. We show that hidden Markov models (HMM) provide natural generalizations of these static models and design a payment scheme that elicits honest reports from the agents after they have experienced the quality of the service.

Voting is a simple mechanism to aggregate the preferences of agents. Many voting rules have been shown to be NP-hard to manipulate. However, a number of recent theoretical results suggest that this complexity may only be in the worst-case since manipulation is often easy in practice. In this paper, we show that empirical studies are useful in improving our understanding of this issue. We demonstrate that there is a smooth transition in the probability  that a coalition can elect a desired candidate using the veto rule as the size of  the manipulating coalition increases. We show that a rescaled probability curve displays a simple and universal form independent of the size of the problem. We argue that manipulation of the veto rule is asymptotically easy for many independent and identically distributed votes even when the coalition of manipulators is critical in size.  Based on this argument, we identify a situation in which manipulation is computationally hard. This is when votes are highly correlated and the election is "hung." We show, however, that even a single uncorrelated voter is enough to make manipulation easy again.

Building and using agent-based models is often impractical, in part due to the cost of including expensive subject matter experts (SMEs) in the development process. In this paper, we describe a method for "bootstrapping" model building to lower the cost of overall model development. The models we are interested in here capture dynamic phenomena related to international and subnational conflict. The method of acquiring these models begins with event data drawn from news reports about a conflict region, and infers model characteristics particular to a conflict modeling framework called the Power Structure Toolkit (PSTK). We describe the toolkit and how it has been used prior to this work. We then describe the current problem of modeling conflict and the empirical data available to learn models, and extensions to the PSTK for model generation from this data. We also describe a formative evaluation of the system that compares the performance and costs of models built entirely by an SME against models built with an SME aided by the automated model generation process. Early results indicate at least equivalent prediction rates with significant savings in model generation costs.

We consider all possible games that have unique PNE payoffs. Our starting point is the classes of games that can be expressed by a conjunction class of two-person strictly competitive games. We first formulate of two binary clauses, and our program rediscovered the notions of games, strictly competitive games and Kats and Thisse's class of weakly unilaterally PNEs in first-order logic. Under our formulation, a class of competitive two-person games, and came games corresponds to a first-order sentence. In particular, the up with several other classes of games that have sentence that corresponds to the class of strictly competitive unique pure Nash equilibrium payoffs. It also came games is a conjunction of two binary clauses with all variables up with new classes of strict games that have unique universally quantified. So we implemented a program pure Nash equilibria, where a game is strict if for that examines all these universally quantified conjunctions of both player different profiles have different payoffs.

It is useful to impose organizational structure over multiagent coalitions.  Hierarchies, for instance, allow for compartmentalization of tasks: if organized correctly, tasks in disjoint subtrees of the hierarchy may be performed in parallel.  Given a notion of the way in which a group of agents need to interact, the Dynamic Distributed Multiagent Hierarchy Generation (DynDisMHG) problem is to determine the best hierarchy that might expedite the process of coordination. This paper introduces a distributed algorithm, called Mobed, for both constructing and maintaining organizational agent hierarchies, enabling exploitation of parallelism in distributed problem solving.  The algorithm is proved correct and it is shown that individual additions of agents to the hierarchy will run in an amortized linear number of rounds.  The hierarchies resulting after perturbations to the agent coalition have constant-bounded edit distance, making Mobed very well suited to highly dynamic problems.

In this paper, we introduce an on-line, decentralised coordination algorithm for monitoring and predicting the state of spatial phenomena by a team of mobile sensors. These sensors have their application domain in disaster response, where strict time constraints prohibit path planning in advance. The algorithm enables sensors to coordinate their movements with their direct neighbours to maximise the collective information gain, while predicting measurements at unobserved locations using a Gaussian process. It builds upon the max-sum message passing algorithm for decentralised coordination, for which we present two new generic pruning techniques that result in speed-up of up to 92% for 5 sensors. We empirically evaluate our algorithm against several on-line adaptive coordination mechanisms, and report a reduction in root mean squared error up to 50% compared to a greedy strategy.

Emerging service-oriented technologies allow software agents to automatically procure distributed services to complete complex tasks. However, in many application scenarios, service providers demand financial remuneration, execution times are uncertain and consumers have  deadlines for their tasks. In this paper, we address these issues by developing a novel approach that dynamically procures multiple, redundant services over time, in order to ensure success by the deadline. Specifically, we first present an algorithm for finding optimal procurement solutions, as well as a heuristic algorithm that achieves over 99% of the optimal and is capable of handling thousands of providers. Using experiments, we show that these algorithms achieve an improvement of up to 130% over current strategies that procure only single services. Finally, we consider settings where service costs are not known to the consumer, and introduce several mechanisms that incentivise providers to reveal their costs truthfully and that still achieve up to 95% efficiency.

Autonomous agents that sense, reason, and act in real-world environments for extended periods often need to solve streams of incoming problems. Traditionally, effort is applied only to problems that have already arrived and have been noted. We examine continual computation methods that allow agents to ideally allocate time to solving current as well as potential future problems under uncertainty. We first review prior work on continual computation. Then, we present new directions and results, including the consideration of shared subtasks and multiple tasks. We present results on the computational complexity of the continual-computation problem and provide approximations for arbitrary models of computational performance. Finally, we review special formulations for addressing uncertainty about the best algorithm to apply, learning about performance, and considering costs associated with delayed use of results.

Equilibrium or near-equilibrium solutions to very large extensive form games are often computed by using abstractions to reduce the game size. A common abstraction technique for games with a large number of available actions is to restrict the number of legal actions in every state. This method has been used to discover equilibrium solutions for the game of no-limit heads-up Texas Hold'em. When using a solution to an abstracted game to play one side in the un-abstracted (real) game, the real opponent actions may not correspond to actions in the abstracted game. The most popular method for handling this situation is to translate opponent actions in the real game to the closest legal actions in the abstracted game. We show that this approach can result in a very exploitable player and propose an alternative solution. We use probabilistic mapping to translate a real action into a probability distribution over actions, whose weights are determined by a similarity metric. We show that this approach significantly reduces the exploitability when using an abstract solution in the real game.