The AAAI-10 Workshop program was held Sunday and Monday, July 11–12, 2010 at the Westin Peachtree Plaza in Atlanta, Georgia. The AAAI-10 workshop program included 13 workshops covering a wide range of topics in artificial intelligence. The titles of the workshops were AI and Fun, Bridging the Gap between Task and Motion Planning, Collaboratively-Built Knowledge Sources and Artificial Intelligence, Goal-Directed Autonomy, Intelligent Security, Interactive Decision Theory and Game Theory, Metacognition for Robust Social Systems, Model Checking and Artificial Intelligence, Neural-Symbolic Learning and Reasoning, Plan, Activity, and Intent Recognition, Statistical Relational AI, Visual Representations and Reasoning, and Abstraction, Reformulation, and Approximation. This article presents short summaries of those events.

Much of AI is concerned with the design of intelligent agents. A complementary challenge is to understand how to design “rules of encounter” by which to promote simple, robust and beneficial interactions between multiple intelligent agents. This is a natural development, as AI is increasingly used for automated decision making in real-world settings. As we extend the ideas of mechanism design from economic theory, the mechanisms (or rules) become algorithmic and many new challenges surface. Starting with a short background on mechanism design theory, the aim of this paper is to provide a nontechnical exposition of recent results on dynamic incentive mechanisms, which provide rules for the coordination of agents in sequential decision problems. The framework of dynamic mechanism design embraces coordinated decision-making both in the context of uncertainty about the world external to an agent and also in regard to the dynamics of agent preferences. In addition to tracing some recent developments, we point to ongoing research challenges.

Friedgut, Kalai, and Nisan also assume that there is a single manipulator. In the first part of the survey we discussed worstcase Their main insight is that a completely random hardness as a barrier against manipulation in manipulation may succeed with nonnegligible elections.

Game-theoretic solution concepts prescribe how rational parties should act, but to become operational the concepts need to be accompanied by algorithms. I will review the state of solving incomplete-information games. They encompass many practical problems such as auctions, negotiations, and security applications. I will discuss them in the context of how they have transformed computer poker. In short, game-theoretic reasoning now scales to many large problems, outperforms the alternatives on those problems, and in some games beats the best humans.

In this article, we survey a number of mechanisms created to elicit predictions, many newly proposed within the last decade. We focus on the engineering questions: How do they work and why? What factors and goals are most important in their design? The primary goal of a prediction mechanism is to obtain and aggregate dispersed information, which often exists in tacit forms as beliefs, opinions, or judgements of agents. Coalescing information is a necessary first step for decision making in almost all domains. For example, consider seasonal influenza, a significant cause of illness and death around the world. Although it recurs every year, the geographic location, timing, magnitude, and duration of outbreaks vary widely. Many people possess relevant pieces of the full information puzzle, including doctors who meet patients, clinical microbiologists who perform respiratory culture tests, pharmacists who fill prescriptions, people who have the flu, and people who know people who have the flu.

Indeed, game theory now serves as perhaps the main analytical framework in microeconomic theory, as evidenced by its prominent role in economics textbooks (for example, Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green 1995) and by the many Nobel prizes in economic sciences awarded to prominent game theorists. Artificial intelligence got its start shortly after game theory (McCarthy et al. 1955), and indeed pioneers such as von Neumann and Simon made early contributions to both fields (see, for example, Findler [1988], Simon [1981]). Both game theory and AI draw (nonexclusively) on decision theory (von Neumann and Morgenstern 1947); for example, one prominent view defines artificial intelligence as "the study and construction of rational agents" (Russell and Norvig 2003), and hence takes a decision-theoretic approach when the world is stochastic. However, artificial intelligence spent most of its first 40 years focused on the design and analysis of agents that act in isolation, and hence had little need for game-theoretic analysis. Starting in the mid to late 1990s, game theory became a major topic of study for computer scientists, for at least two main reasons. First, economists began to be interested in systems whose computational properties posed serious barriers to practical use, and hence reached out to computer scientists; notably, this occurred around the study of combinatorial auctions (see, for example, Cramton, Shoham, and Steinberg 2006). Second, the rise of distributed computing in general and the Internet in particular made it increasingly necessary for computer scientists to study settings in which intelligent agents reason about and interact with other agents.

Performing effective preference-based data retrieval requires detailed and preferentially meaningful structurized information about the current user as well as the items under consideration. A common problem is that representations of items often only consist of mere technical attributes, which do not resemble human perception. This is particularly true for integral items such as movies or songs. It is often claimed that meaningful item features could be extracted from collaborative rating data, which is becoming available through social networking services. However, there is only anecdotal evidence supporting this claim; but if it is true, the extracted information could very valuable for preference-based data retrieval. In this paper, we propose a methodology to systematically check this common claim. We performed a preliminary investigation on a large collection of movie ratings and present initial evidence.

Software testing is an expensive process, which is vital in the industry. Construction of the test-data in software testing requires the major cost and to decide which method to use in order to generate the test data is important. This paper discusses the efficiency of search-based algorithms (preferably genetic algorithm) versus random testing, in soft- ware test-data generation. This study differs from all previous studies due to sample programs (SUTs) which are used. Since we want to in- crease the complexity of SUTs gradually, and the program generation is automatic as well, Grammatical Evolution is used to guide the program generation. SUTs are generated according to the grammar we provide, with different levels of complexity. SUTs will first undergo genetic al- gorithm and then random testing. Based on the test results, this paper recommends one method to use for automation of software testing.

When choosing a suitable technique for regression and classification with multivariate predictor variables, one is often faced with a tradeoff between interpretability and high predictive accuracy. To give a classical example, classification and regression trees are easy to understand and interpret. Tree ensembles like Random Forests provide usually more accurate predictions. Yet tree ensembles are also more difficult to analyze than single trees and are often criticized, perhaps unfairly, as `black box' predictors. Node harvest is trying to reconcile the two aims of interpretability and predictive accuracy by combining positive aspects of trees and tree ensembles. Results are very sparse and interpretable and predictive accuracy is extremely competitive, especially for low signal-to-noise data. The procedure is simple: an initial set of a few thousand nodes is generated randomly. If a new observation falls into just a single node, its prediction is the mean response of all training observation within this node, identical to a tree-like prediction. A new observation falls typically into several nodes and its prediction is then the weighted average of the mean responses across all these nodes. The only role of node harvest is to `pick' the right nodes from the initial large ensemble of nodes by choosing node weights, which amounts in the proposed algorithm to a quadratic programming problem with linear inequality constraints. The solution is sparse in the sense that only very few nodes are selected with a nonzero weight. This sparsity is not explicitly enforced. Maybe surprisingly, it is not necessary to select a tuning parameter for optimal predictive accuracy. Node harvest can handle mixed data and missing values and is shown to be simple to interpret and competitive in predictive accuracy on a variety of data sets.

The Baum-Welsh algorithm together with its derivatives and variations has been the main technique for learning Hidden Markov Models (HMM) from observational data. We present an HMM learning algorithm based on the non-negative matrix factorization (NMF) of higher order Markovian statistics that is structurally different from the Baum-Welsh and its associated approaches. The described algorithm supports estimation of the number of recurrent states of an HMM and iterates the non-negative matrix factorization (NMF) algorithm to improve the learned HMM parameters. Numerical examples are provided as well.