The VCG mechanism is the gold standard for combinatorial auctions (CAs), and it maximizes social welfare. In contrast, the revenue-maximizing (aka optimal) CA is unknown, and designing one is NP-hard. Therefore, research on optimal CAs has progressed into special settings. Notably, Levin [1997] derived the optimal CA for complements when each agent's private type is one-dimensional. We introduce a new research avenue for increasing revenue where we poke holes in the allocation space — based on the bids — and then use a welfare-maximizing allocation rule within the remaining allocation set. In this paper, the first step down this avenue, we introduce a new form of "reserve pricing" into CAs. We show that Levin's optimal revenue can be 2-approximated by using "monopoly reserve prices" to curtail the allocation set, followed by welfare-maximizing allocation and Levin's payment rule. A key lemma of potential independent interest is that the expected revenue from any truthful allocation-monotonic mechanism equals the expected virtual valuation; this generalizes Myerson's lemma [1981] from the single-parameter environment. Our mechanism is close to the gold standard and thus easier to adopt than Levin's. It also requires less information about the prior over the bidders' types, and is always more efficient. Finally, we show that the optimal revenue can be 6-approximated even if the "reserve pricing" is required to be symmetric across bidders.

We investigate the emergence and stability of social conventions for efficiently resolving conflicts through reinforcement learning. Facilitation of coordination and conflict resolution is an important issue in multi-agent systems. However, exhibiting coordinated and negotiation activities is computationally expensive. In this paper, we first describe a conflict situation using a Markov game which is iterated if the agents fail to resolve their conflicts, where the repeated failures result in an inefficient society. Using this game, we show that social conventions for resolving conflicts emerge, but their stability and social efficiency depend on the payoff matrices that characterize the agents. We also examine how unbalanced populations and small heterogeneous agents affect efficiency and stability of the resulting conventions. Our results show that (a) a type of indecisive agent that is generous for adverse results leads to unstable societies, and (b) selfish agents that have an explicit order of benefits make societies stable and efficient.

It is well known that cheating occurs in sports. In cup competitions, a common type of sports competition, one method of cheating is in manipulating the seeding to unfairly advantage a particular team. Previous empirical and theoretical studies of seeding manipulation have focused on competitions with unrestricted seeding. However, real cup competitions often place restrictions on seedings to ensure fairness, wide geographic interest, and so on. In this paper, we perform an extensive empirical study of seeding manipulation under comprehensive and realistic sets of restrictions. A generalized random model of competition problems is proposed. This model creates a realistic range of problem instances that are used to identify the sets of seeding restrictions that are hard to manipulate in practice. We end with a discussion of the implications of this work and recommendations for organizing competitions so as to prevent or reduce the opportunities for manipulating the seeding.

One approach for artificially intelligent agents wishing to maximise some performance metric in a given domain is to learn from a collection of training data that consists of actions or decisions made by some expert, in an attempt to imitate that expert's style. We refer to this type of agent as an expert imitator. In this paper we investigate whether performance can be improved by combining decisions from multiple expert imitators. In particular, we investigate two existing approaches for combining decisions. The first approach combines decisions by employing ensemble voting between multiple expert imitators. The second approach dynamically selects the best imitator to use at runtime given the performance of the imitators in the current environment. We investigate these approaches in the domain of computer poker. In particular, we create expert imitators for limit and no limit Texas Hold'em and determine whether their performance can be improved by combining their decisions using the two approaches listed above.

In this context, while it methods (see, e.g., [Shehory and Kraus, 1998; Sandholm et is desirable to generate a coalition structure that al., 1999; Sen and Dutta, 2000; Dang and Jennings, 2004; maximizes the sum of the values of the coalitions, Rahwan et al., 2009b]). In this context, an important line of the space of possible solutions is often too large research is the development of anytime CSG algorithms. In to allow exhaustive search. Thus, a fundamental particular, an algorithm is "anytime" if it can return a solution open question in this area is the following: Can we at any point of time during its execution, and the quality of its search through only a subset of coalition structures, solution improves monotonically until termination. This is and be guaranteed to find a solution that is within particularly desirable in the multi-agent system context since a desirable bound β from optimum? If so, what is the agents might not always have sufficient time to run the the minimum such subset?

The design of multiagent simulations devoted to complex systems, addresses the issue of modeling behaviors that are involved at different space, time, behavior scales, each one being relevant so as to represent a feature of the phenomenon. We propose here a generic formalism intended to represent multiple environments, endowed with their own spatiotemporal scales and with behavioral rules for the agents they contain. An environment can be nested inside any agent, which itself is situated in one or more environments. This leads to a lattice decomposition of the global system, which appears to be necessary for an accurate design of multi-scale systems. This uniform representation of entities and behaviors at each abstraction level relies upon an interaction-oriented approach for the design of agent simulations, which clearly separates agents from interactions, from the modeling to the code. We also explain the implementation of our formalism within an existing interaction-based platform.

Decentralized partially observable Markov decision processes (DEC-POMDPs) are used to plan policies for multiple agents that must maximize a joint reward function but do not communicate with each other. The agents act under uncertainty about each other and the environment. This planning task arises in optimization of wireless networks, and other scenarios where communication between agents is restricted by costs or physical limits. DEC-POMDPs are a promising solution, but optimizing policies quickly becomes computationally intractable when problem size grows. Factored DEC-POMDPs allow large problems to be described in compact form, but have the same worst case complexity as non-factored DEC-POMDPs. We propose an efficient optimization algorithm for large factored infinite-horizon DEC-POMDPs. We formulate expectation-maximization based optimization into a new form, where complexity can be kept tractable by factored approximations. Our method performs well, and it can solve problems with more agents and larger state spaces than state of the art DEC-POMDP methods. We give results for factored infinite-horizon DEC-POMDP problems with up to 10 agents.

Computational complexity of voting manipulation is one of the most actively studied topics in the area of computational social choice, starting with the groundbreaking work of [Bartholdi et al., 1989]. Most of the existing work in this area, including that of [Bartholdi et al., 1989], implicitly assumes that whenever several candidates receive the top score with respect to the given voting rule, the resulting tie is broken according to a lexicographic ordering over the candidates. However, till recently, an equally appealing method of tiebreaking, namely, selecting the winner uniformly at random among all tied candidates, has not been considered in the computational social choice literature. The first paper to analyze the complexity of voting manipulation under randomized tiebreaking is [Obraztsova et al., 2011], where the authors provide polynomial-time algorithms for this problem under scoring rules and—under an additional assumption on the manipulator’s utilities—for Maximin. In this paper, we extend the results of [Obraztsova et al., 2011] by showing that finding an optimal vote under randomized tie-breaking is computationally hard for Copeland and Maximin (with general utilities), as well as for STV and Ranked Pairs, but easy for the Bucklin rule and Plurality with Runoff.

In agent-oriented programming and planning, agents' actions are typically specified in terms of postconditions, and the model of execution assumes that the environment carries the actions out exactly as specified. That is, it is assumed that the state of the environment after an action has been executed will satisfy its postcondition. In reality, however, such environments are rare: the actual execution of an action may fail, and the envisaged outcome is not met. We provide a conceptual framework for reasoning about success and failure of agents' behaviours. In particular, we propose a measure that reflects how "good" an environment is with respect to agent's capabilities and a given goal it might pursue. We also discuss which types of goals are worth pursuing, depending on the type of environment the agent is acting in.

Humans have developed jurisprudence as a mechanism to solve conflictive situations by using past experiences. Following this principle, we propose an approach to enhance a multi-agent system by adding an authority which is able to generate new regulations whenever conflicts arise. Regulations are generated by learning from previous similar situations, using a machine learning technique (based on Case-Based Reasoning) that solves new problems using previous experiences. This approach requires: to be able to gather and evaluate experiences; and to be described in such a way that similar social situations require similar regulations. As a scenario to evaluate our proposal, we use a simplified version of a traffic scenario, where agents are traveling cars. Our goals are to avoid collisions between cars and to avoid heavy traffic. These situations, when happen, lead to the synthesis of new regulations. At each simulation step, applicable regulations are evaluated in terms of their effectiveness and necessity. Overtime the system generates a set of regulations that, if followed, improve system performance (i.e. goal achievement).