Many strategic actions carry a ‘contagious’ component beyond the immediate locale of the effort itself. Viral marketing and peacekeeping operations have both been observed to have a spreading effect. In this work, we use counterinsurgency as our illustrative domain. Defined as the effort to block the spread of support for an insurgency, such operations lack the manpower to defend the entire population and must focus onthe opinions of a subset of local leaders. As past researchers of security resource allocation have done, we propose using game theory to develop such policies and model the interconnected network of leaders as a graph. Unlike this past work in security games, actions in these domains possess a probabilistic, non-local impact. To address this new class of security games, we combine recent research in influence blocking maximization with a double oracle approach and create novel heuristic oracles to generate mixed strategies for a real-world leadership network from Afghanistan, synthetic leadership networks, and a real social network. We find that leadership networks that exhibit highly interconnected clusters can be solved equally well by our heuristic methods, but our more sophisticated heuristics outperform simpler ones in less interconnected social networks.

Designing revenue-optimal auctions for various settings is perhaps the most important, yet sometimes most elusive, problem in mechanism design. Spiteful bidders have been intensely studied recently, especially because spite occurs in many applications in multiagent system and electronic commerce. We derive the optimal auction for such bidders (as well as bidders that are altruistic). It is a generalization of Myerson’s (1981) auction. It chooses an allocation that maximizes agents’ virtual valuations, but for a generalized definition of virtual valuation. The payment rule is less intuitive. For one, it takes each bidder’s own report into consideration when determining his payment. Moreover, bidders pay even if the seller keeps the item; a similar phenomenon has been shown in other settings with neg- ative externalities (Jehiel, Moldovanu, and Stacchetti 1996; Deng and Pekec 2011). On the other hand, a novel aspect of our auction is that it sometimes subsidizes losers when the item is sold to some other bidder. We also derive a revenue equivalence theorem for this setting. Using it, we generate a short proof of (a slight generalization of) the previously known result that, in two-bidder settings with independently uniformly drawn valuations, second-price auctions yield greater expected revenue than first-price auctions. Finally, we present a template for comparing the expected revenues of any two auction mechanisms that have the same allocation rule (for the valuations distributions at hand).

This paper studies repetitive negotiation over the execution of an exploration process between two self-interested, fully rational agents in a full information environmentwith side payments. A key aspect of the protocolis that the exploration’s execution may interleaves ith the negotiation itself, inflicting some degradationon the exploration’s flexibility. The advantage of this form of negotiation is in enabling the agents supervising that the exploration’s execution takes place in its agreedform as negotiated. We show that in many cases, much of the computational complexity of the new protocol can be eliminated by solving an alternative negotiation scheme according to which the parties first negotiate theexploration terms as a whole and then execute it. As demonstrated in the paper, the solution characteristics of the new protocol are somehow different from thoseof legacy negotiation protocols where the execution of the agreement reached through the negotiation is completely separated from the negotiation process. Furthermore, if the agents are given the option to control some of the negotiation protocol parameters, the resulting exploration may be suboptimal. In particular we show that the increase in an agent’s expected utility in such casesis unbounded and so is the resulting decrease in the social welfare. Surprisingly, we show that further increasingone of the agents’ level of control in some of thenegotiation parameters enables bounding the resultingdecrease in the social welfare.

The current state-of-the-art algorithm for optimal coalition structure generation is IDP-IP — an algorithm that combines IDP (a dynamic programming algorithm due to Rahwan and Jennings, AAAI'08) with IP (a tree-search algorithm due to Rahwan et al., JAIR'09). In this paper we analyse IDP-IP, highlight its limitations, and then develop a new approach for combining IDP with IP that overcomes these limitations.

Supply Chain Formation (SCF) is the process of determining the participants in a supply chain, who will exchange what with whom, and the terms of the exchanges. Decentralized SCF appears as a highly intricate task because agents only possess local information and have limited knowledge about the capabilities of other agents. The decentralized SCF problem has been recently cast as an optimization problem that can be efficiently approximated using max-sum loopy belief propagation. Along this direction, in this paper we propose a novel encoding of the problem into a binary factor graph (containing only binary variables) as well as an alternative algorithm. We empirically show that our approach allows to significantly increase scalability, hence allowing to form supply chains in market scenarios with a large number of participants and high competition.

Schulze's rule and ranked pairs are two Condorcet methods that both satisfy many natural axiomatic properties. Schulze's rule is used in the elections of many organizations, including the Wikimedia Foundation, the Pirate Party of Sweden and Germany, the Debian project, and the Gento Project. Both rules are immune to control by cloning alternatives, but little is otherwise known about their strategic robustness, including resistance to manipulation by one or more voters, control by adding or deleting alternatives, adding or deleting votes, and bribery. Considering computational barriers, we show that these types of strategic behavior are NP-hard for ranked pairs (both constructive, in making an alternative a winner, and destructive, in precluding an alternative from being a winner). Schulze's rule, in comparison, remains vulnerable at least to constructive manipulation by a single voter and destructive manipulation by a coalition. As the first such polynomial-time rule known to resist all such manipulations, and considering also the broad axiomatic support, ranked pairs seems worthwhile to consider for practical applications.

Multiagent Partially Observable Markov Decision Processes (MPOMDPs) provide a powerful framework for optimal decision making under the assumption of instantaneous communication. We focus on a delayed communication setting (MPOMDP-DC), in which broadcasted information is delayed by at most one time step. This model allows agents to act on their most recent (private) observation. Such an assumption is a strict generalization over having agents wait until the global information is available and is more appropriate for applications in which response time is critical. In this setting, however, value function backups are significantly more costly, and naive application of incremental pruning, the core of many state-of-the-art optimal POMDP techniques, is intractable. In this paper, we overcome this problem by demonstrating that computation of the MPOMDP-DC backup can be structured as a tree and introducing two novel tree-based pruning techniques that exploit this structure in an effective way. We experimentally show that these methods have the potential to outperform naive incremental pruning by orders of magnitude, allowing for the solution of larger problems.

We introduce the Bayes-Adaptive Interactive Partially Observable Markov Decision Process (BA-IPOMDP), the first multiagent decision model that explicitly incorporates model learning. As in I-POMDPs, the BA-IPOMDP agent maintains beliefs over interactive states, which include the physical states as well as the other agents’ models. The BA-IPOMDP assumes that the state transition and observation probabilities are unknown, and augments the interactive states to include these parameters. Beliefs are maintained over this augmented interactive state space. This (necessary) state expansion exacerbates the curse of dimensionality, especially since each I-POMDP belief update is already a recursive procedure (because an agent invokes belief updates from other agents’ perspectives as part of its own belief update, in order to anticipate other agents’ actions). We extend the interactive particle filter to perform approximate belief update on BA-IPOMDPs. We present our findings on the multiagent Tiger problem.

We propose a natural model for agent failures in congestion games. In our model, each of the agents may fail to participate in the game, introducing uncertainty regarding the set of active agents. We examine how such uncertainty may change the Nash equilibria (NE) of the game. We prove that although the perturbed game induced by the failure model is not always a congestion game, it still admits at least one pure Nash equilibrium. Then, we turn to examine the effect of failures on the maximal social cost in any NE of the perturbed game. We show that in the limit case where failure probability is negligible new equilibria never emerge, and that the social cost may decrease but it never increases. For the case of non-negligible failure probabilities, we provide a full characterization of the maximal impact of failures on the social cost under worst-case equilibrium outcomes.

Real-world AI systems have been recently deployed which can automatically analyze the plan and tactics of tennis players. As the game-state is updated regularly at short intervals (i.e. point-level), a library of successful and unsuccessful plans of a player can be learnt over time. Given the relative strengths and weaknesses of a player’s plans, a set of proven plans or tactics from the library that characterize a player can be identified. For low-scoring, continuous team sports like soccer, such analysis for multi-agent teams does not exist as the game is not segmented into “discretized” plays (i.e. plans), making it difficult to obtain a library that characterizes a team’s behavior. Additionally, as player tracking data is costly and difficult to obtain, we only have partial team tracings in the form of ball actions which makes this problem even more difficult. In this paper, we propose a method to overcome these issues by representing team behavior via play-segments, which are spatio-temporal descriptions of ball movement over fixed windows of time. Using these representations we can characterize team behavior from entropy maps, which give a measure of predictability of team behaviors across the field. We show the efficacy and applicability of our method on the 2010-2011 English Premier League soccer data.