The capacity to achieve out-of-distribution (OOD) generalization is a hallmark of human intelligence and yet remains out of reach for machines. This remarkable capability has been attributed to our abilities to make conceptual abstraction and analogy, and to a mechanism known as indirection, which binds two representations and uses one representation to refer to the other. Inspired by these mechanisms, we hypothesize that OOD generalization may be achieved by performing analogymaking and indirection in the functional space instead of the data space as in current methods. To realize this, we design FINE(Functional Indirection Neural Estimator), a neural framework that learns to compose functions that map data input to output on-the-fly. FINE consists of a backbone network and a trainable semantic memory of basis weight matrices.

Deep Gradient Leakage (DGL) is a highly effective attack that recovers private training images from gradient vectors. This attack casts significant privacy challenges on distributed learning from clients with sensitive data, where clients are required to share gradients. Defending against such attacks requires but lacks an understanding of when and how privacy leakage happens, mostly because of the black-box nature of deep networks. In this paper, we propose a novel Inversion Influence Function (I2F) that establishes a closed-form connection between the recovered images and the private gradients by implicitly solving the DGL problem. Compared to directly solving DGL, I2F is scalable for analyzing deep networks, requiring only oracle access to gradients and Jacobian-vector products. We empirically demonstrate that I2F effectively approximated the DGL generally on different model architectures, datasets, modalities, attack implementations, and perturbation-based defenses. With this novel tool, we provide insights into effective gradient perturbation directions, the unfairness of privacy protection, and privacy-preferred model initialization.