In previous work (Fertig and Breese, 1989; Fertig and Breese, 1990) we defined a mechanism for performing probabilistic reasoning in influence diagrams using interval rather than point-valued probabilities. In this paper we extend these procedures to incorporate decision nodes and interval-valued value functions in the diagram. We derive the procedures for chance node removal (calculating expected value) and decision node removal (optimization) in influence diagrams where lower bounds on probabilities are stored at each chance node and interval bounds are stored on the value function associated with the diagram's value node. The output of the algorithm are a set of admissible alternatives for each decision variable and a set of bounds on expected value based on the imprecision in the input. The procedure can be viewed as an approximation to a full e-dimensional sensitivity analysis where n are the number of imprecise probability distributions in the input. We show the transformations are optimal and sound. The performance of the algorithm on an influence diagrams is investigated and compared to an exact algorithm.

We describe an environment that considerably simplifies the process of generating Bayesian belief networks. The system has been implemented on readily available, inexpensive hardware, and provides clarity and high performance. We present an introduction to Bayesian belief networks, discuss algorithms for inference with these networks, and delineate the classes of problems that can be solved with this paradigm. We then describe the hardware and software that constitute the system, and illustrate Ergo's use with several examples.

A significant problem in designing mobile robot control systems involves coping with the uncertainty that arises in moving about in an unknown or partially unknown environment and relying on noisy or ambiguous sensor data to acquire knowledge about that environment. We describe a control system that chooses what activity to engage in next on the basis of expectations about how the information re- turned as a result of a given activity will improve 2 its knowledge about the spatial layout of its environment. Certain of the higher-level components of the control system are specified in terms of probabilistic decision models whose output is used to mediate the behavior of lower-level control components responsible for movement and sensing.

Within diagnostic reasoning there have been a number of proposed definitions of a diagnosis, and thus of the most likely diagnosis, including most probable posterior hypothesis, most probable interpretation, most probable covering hypothesis, etc. Most of these approaches assume that the most likely diagnosis must be computed, and that a definition of what should be computed can be made a priori, independent of what the diagnosis is used for. We argue that the diagnostic problem, as currently posed, is incomplete: it does not consider how the diagnosis is to be used, or the utility associated with the treatment of the abnormalities. In this paper we analyze several well-known definitions of diagnosis, showing that the different definitions of the most likely diagnosis have different qualitative meanings, even given the same input data. We argue that the most appropriate definition of (optimal) diagnosis needs to take into account the utility of outcomes and what the diagnosis is used for.

Comprehensible explanations of probabilistic reasoning are a prerequisite for wider acceptance of Bayesian methods in expert systems and decision support systems. A study of human reasoning under uncertainty suggests two different strategies for explaining probabilistic reasoning: The first, qualitative belief propagation, traces the qualitative effect of evidence through a belief network from one variable to the next. This propagation algorithm is an alternative to the graph reduction algorithms of Wellman (1988) for inference in qualitative probabilistic networks. It is based on a qualitative analysis of intercausal reasoning, which is a generalization of Pearl's "explaining away", and an alternative to Wellman's definition of qualitative synergy. The other, Scenario-based reasoning, involves the generation of alternative causal "stories" accounting for the evidence. Comparing a few of the most probable scenarios provides an approximate way to explain the results of probabilistic reasoning. Both schemes employ causal as well as probabilistic knowledge. Probabilities may be presented as phrases and/or numbers. Users can control the style, abstraction and completeness of explanations.

Several different uncertain inference systems (UISs) have been developed for representing uncertainty in rule-based expert systems. Some of these, such as Mycin's Certainty Factors, Prospector, and Bayes' Networks were designed as approximations to probability, and others, such as Fuzzy Set Theory and DempsterShafer Belief Functions were not. How different are these UISs in practice, and does it matter which you use? When combining and propagating uncertain information, each UIS must, at least by implication, make certain assumptions about correlations not explicily specified. The maximum entropy principle with minimum cross-entropy updating, provides a way of making assumptions about the missing specification that minimizes the additional information assumed, and thus offers a standard against which the other UISs can be compared. We describe a framework for the experimental comparison of the performance of different UISs, and provide some illustrative results.

This paper is concerned with two theories of probability judgment: the Bayesian theory and the theory of belief functions. It illustrates these theories with some simple examples and discusses some of the issues that arise when we try to implement them in expert systems. The Bayesian theory is well known; its main ideas go back to the work of Thomas Bayes (1702-1761). The theory of belief functions, often called the Dempster-Shafer theory in the artificial intelligence community, is less well known, but it has even older antecedents; belief-function arguments appear in the work of George Hooper (16401723) and James Bernoulli (1654-1705). For elementary expositions of the theory of belief functions, see Shafer (1976, 1985).

Judea Pearl Computer Science Department, Univenity of California, Loa Angelea The paper demonstrates that strict adherence to probability theory does not preclude the use of concurrent, self-activated constraint-propagation mechanisms for managing uncer tainty. Maintaining local records of sources-of-belief allows both predictive and diagnostic inferences to be activated simultanously and propagate harmoniously towards a stable equillibrium.

This paper examines the quantities used by MYCIN to reason with uncertainty, called certainty factors. It is shown that the original definition of certainty factors is inconsistent with the functions used in MYCIN to combine the quantities. This inconsistency is used to argue for a redefinition of certainty factors in terms of the intuitively appealing desiderata associated with the combining functions. It is shown that this redefinition accommodates an unlimited number of probabilistic interpretations. These interpretations are shown to be monotonic transformations of the likelihood ratio p(EIH)/p(El H). The construction of these interpretations provides insight into the assumptions implicit in the certainty factor model. In particular, it is shown that if uncertainty is to be propagated through an inference network in accordance with the desiderata, evidence must be conditionally independent given the hypothesis and its negation and the inference network must have a tree structure. It is emphasized that assumptions implicit in the model are rarely true in practical applications. Methods for relaxing the assumptions are suggested.

We propose an inequality paradigm for probabilistic reasoning based on a logic of upper and lower bounds on conditional probabilities. We investigate a family of probabilistic logics, generalizing the work of Nilsson [14]. We develop a variety of logical notions for probabilistic reasoning, including soundness, completeness justification; and convergence: reduction of a theory to a simpler logical class. We argue that a bound view is especially useful for describing the semantics of probabilistic knowledge representation and for describing intermediate states of probabilistic inference and updating. We show that the Dempster-Shafer theory of evidence is formally identical to a special case of our generalized probabilistic logic. Our paradigm thus incorporates both Bayesian "rule-based" approaches and avowedly non-Bayesian "evidential" approaches such as MYCIN and DempsterShafer. We suggest how to integrate the two "schools", and explore some possibilities for novel synthesis of a variety of ideas in probabilistic reasoning.