There are several well-known justifications for conditioning as the appropriate method for updating a single probability measure, given an observation. However, there is a significant body of work arguing for sets of probability measures, rather than single measures, as a more realistic model of uncertainty. Conditioning still makes sense in this context--we can simply condition each measure in the set individually, then combine the results--and, indeed, it seems to be the preferred updating procedure in the literature. But how justified is conditioning in this richer setting? Here we show, by considering an axiomatic account of conditioning given by van Fraassen, that the single-measure and sets-of-measures cases are very different. We show that van Fraassen's axiomatization for the former case is nowhere near sufficient for updating sets of measures. We give a considerably longer (and not as compelling) list of axioms that together force conditioning in this setting, and describe other update methods that are allowed once any of these axioms is dropped.

A significant theoretical advantage of search-and-score methods for learning Bayesian Networks is that they can accept informative prior beliefs for each possible network, thus complementing the data. In this paper, a method is presented for assigning priors based on beliefs on the presence or absence of certain paths in the true network. Such beliefs correspond to knowledge about the possible causal and associative relations between pairs of variables. This type of knowledge naturally arises from prior experimental and observational data, among others. In addition, a novel search-operator is proposed to take advantage of such prior knowledge. Experiments show that, using path beliefs improves the learning of the skeleton, as well as the edge directions in the network.

A large amount of observational data has been accumulated in various fields in recent times, and there is a growing need to estimate the generating processes of these data. A linear non-Gaussian acyclic model (LiNGAM) based on the non-Gaussianity of external influences has been proposed to estimate the data-generating processes of variables. However, the results of the estimation can be biased if there are latent classes. In this paper, we first review LiNGAM, its extended model, as well as the estimation procedure for LiNGAM in a Bayesian framework. We then propose a new Bayesian estimation procedure that solves the problem.

Feature selection, identifying a subset of variables that are relevant for predicting a response, is an important and challenging component of many methods in statistics and machine learning. Feature selection is especially difficult and computationally intensive when the number of variables approaches or exceeds the number of samples, as is often the case for many genomic datasets. Here, we introduce a new approach -- the Bayesian Ising Approximation (BIA) -- to rapidly calculate posterior probabilities for feature relevance in L2 penalized linear regression. In the regime where the regression problem is strongly regularized by the prior, we show that computing the marginal posterior probabilities for features is equivalent to computing the magnetizations of an Ising model. Using a mean field approximation, we show it is possible to rapidly compute the feature selection path described by the posterior probabilities as a function of the L2 penalty. We present simulations and analytical results illustrating the accuracy of the BIA on some simple regression problems. Finally, we demonstrate the applicability of the BIA to high dimensional regression by analyzing a gene expression dataset with nearly 30,000 features.

We propose a general algorithm for approximating nonstandard Bayesian posterior distributions. The algorithm minimizes the Kullback-Leibler divergence of an approximating distribution to the intractable posterior distribution. Our method can be used to approximate any posterior distribution, provided that it is given in closed form up to the proportionality constant. The approximation can be any distribution in the exponential family or any mixture of such distributions, which means that it can be made arbitrarily precise. Several examples illustrate the speed and accuracy of our approximation method in practice.

It is commonly-accepted wisdom that more information is better, and that information should never be ignored. Here we argue, using both a Bayesian and a non-Bayesian analysis, that in some situations you are better off ignoring information if your uncertainty is represented by a set of probability measures. These include situations in which the information is relevant for the prediction task at hand. In the non-Bayesian analysis, we show how ignoring information avoids dilation, the phenomenon that additional pieces of information sometimes lead to an increase in uncertainty. In the Bayesian analysis, we show that for small sample sizes and certain prediction tasks, the Bayesian posterior based on a noninformative prior yields worse predictions than simply ignoring the given information.

We consider how an agent should update her uncertainty when it is represented by a set P of probability distributions and the agent observes that a random variable X takes on value x, given that the agent makes decisions using the minimax criterion, perhaps the best-studied and most commonly-used criterion in the literature. We adopt a game-theoretic framework, where the agent plays against a bookie, who chooses some distribution from P. We consider two reasonable games that differ in what the bookie knows when he makes his choice. Anomalies that have been observed before, like time inconsistency, can be understood as arising because different games are being played, against bookies with different information. We characterize the important special cases in which the optimal decision rules according to the minimax criterion amount to either conditioning or simply ignoring the information. Finally, we consider the relationship between conditioning and calibration when uncertainty is described by sets of probabilities.

We introduce a logic for reasoning about evidence, that essentially views evidence as a function from prior beliefs (before making an observation) to posterior beliefs (after making the observation). We provide a sound and complete axiomatization for the logic, and consider the complexity of the decision problem. Although the reasoning in the logic is mainly propositional, we allow variables representing numbers and quantification over them. This expressive power seems necessary to capture important properties of evidence

A general notion of algebraic conditional plausibility measures is defined. Probability measures, ranking functions, possibility measures, and (under the appropriate definitions) sets of probability measures can all be viewed as defining algebraic conditional plausibility measures. It is shown that the technology of Bayesian networks can be applied to algebraic conditional plausibility measures.

In mixture model-based clustering applications, it is common to fit several models from a family and report clustering results from only the `best' one. In such circumstances, selection of this best model is achieved using a model selection criterion, most often the Bayesian information criterion. Rather than throw away all but the best model, we average multiple models that are in some sense close to the best one, thereby producing a weighted average of clustering results. Two (weighted) averaging approaches are considered: averaging the component membership probabilities and averaging models. In both cases, Occam's window is used to determine closeness to the best model and weights are computed within a Bayesian model averaging paradigm. In some cases, we need to merge components before averaging; we introduce a method for merging mixture components based on the adjusted Rand index. The effectiveness of our model-based clustering averaging approaches is illustrated using a family of Gaussian mixture models on real and simulated data.