We are witnessing an explosion of available data from the Web, government authorities, scientific databases, sensors and more. Such datasets could benefit from the introduction of rule sets encoding commonly accepted rules or facts, application- or domain-specific rules, commonsense knowledge etc. This raises the question of whether, how, and to what extent knowledge representation methods are capable of handling the vast amounts of data for these applications. In this paper, we consider nonmonotonic reasoning, which has traditionally focused on rich knowledge structures. In particular, we consider defeasible logic, and analyze how parallelization, using the MapReduce framework, can be used to reason with defeasible rules over huge data sets. Our experimental results demonstrate that defeasible reasoning with billions of data is performant, and has the potential to scale to trillions of facts.

Only-knowing was originally introduced by Levesque to capture the beliefs of an agent in the sense that its knowledge base is all the agent knows. When a knowledge base contains defaults Levesque also showed an exact correspondence between only-knowing and autoepistemic logic. Later these results were extended by Lakemeyer and Levesque to also capture a variant of autoepistemic logic proposed by Konolige and Reiter's default logic. One of the benefits of such an approach is that various nonmonotonic formalisms can be compared within a single monotonic logic leading, among other things, to the first axiom system for default logic. In this paper, we will bring another large class of nonmonotonic systems, which were first studied by McDermott and Doyle, into the only-knowing fold. Among other things, we will provide the first possible-world semantics for such systems, providing a new perspective on the nature of modal approaches to nonmonotonic reasoning.

The principle of maximum entropy (MaxEnt) constitutes a powerful formalism for nonmonotonic reasoning based on probabilistic conditionals. Conditionals are defeasible rules which allow one to express that certain subclasses of some broader concept behave exceptional. In the (common) probabilistic semantics of conditional statements, these exceptions are formalized only implicitly: The conditional (B A)[p] expresses that if A holds, then B is typically true, namely with probability p, but without explicitly talking about the subclass of A for which B does not hold. There is no possibility to express within the conditional that a subclass C of A is excluded from the inference to B because one is unaware of the probability of B given C. In this paper, we apply the concept of default negation to probabilistic MaxEnt reasoning in order to formalize this kind of unawareness and propose a context-based inference formalism. We exemplify the usefulness of this inference relation, and show that it satisfies basic formal properties of probabilistic reasoning.

The exact relationship between formal argumentation and nonmonotonic logics is a research topic that keeps on eluding researchers despite recent intensified efforts. We contribute to a deeper understanding of this relation by investigating characterizations of abstract dialectical frameworks in conditional logics for nonmonotonic reasoning. We first show that in general, there is a gap between argumentation and conditional semantics when applying several intuitive translations, but then prove that this gap can be closed when focusing on specific classes of translations.

The rich expressivity provided by the cognitive event calculus (CEC) knowledge representation framework allows for reasoning over deeply nested beliefs, desires, intentions, and so on. I put CEC to the test by attempting to model the complex reasoning and deceptive planning used in an episode of the popular television show Breaking Bad. CEC is used to represent the knowledge used by reasoners coming up with plans like the ones devised by the fictional characters I describe. However, it becomes clear that a form of nonmonotonic reasoning is necessary--specifically so that an agent can reason about the nonmonotonic beliefs of another agent. I show how CEC can be augmented to have this ability, and then provide examples detailing how my proposed augmentation enables much of the reasoning used by agents such as the Breaking Bad characters. I close by discussing what sort of reasoning tool would be necessary to implement such nonmonotonic reasoning.

Answer set programming (ASP) is an efficient problem-solving approach, which has been strongly supported both scientifically and technologically by several solvers, ongoing active research, and implementations in many different fields. However, although researchers acknowledged long ago the necessity of epistemic operators in the language of ASP for better introspective reasoning, this research venue did not attract much attention until recently. Moreover, the existing epistemic extensions of ASP in the literature are not widely approved either, due to the fact that some propose unintended results even for some simple acyclic epistemic programs, new unexpected results may possibly be found, and more importantly, researchers have different reasonings for some critical programs. To that end, Cabalar et al. have recently identified some structural properties of epistemic programs to formally support a possible semantics proposal of such programs and standardise their results. Nonetheless, the soundness of these properties is still under debate, and they are not widely accepted either by the ASP community. Thus, it seems that there is still time to really understand the paradigm, have a mature formalism, and determine the principles providing formal justification of their understandable models. In this paper, we mainly focus on the existing semantics approaches, the criteria that a satisfactory semantics is supposed to satisfy, and the ways to improve them. We also extend some well-known propositions of here-and-there logic (HT) into epistemic HT so as to reveal the real behaviour of programs. Finally, we propose a slightly novel semantics for epistemic ASP, which can be considered as a reflexive extension of Cabalar et al.'s recent formalism called autoepistemic ASP.

Defeasible rules are used in providing computable representations of legal documents and, more recently, have been suggested as a basis for explainable AI. Such applications draw attention to the scalability of implementations. The defeasible logic $DL(\partial_{||})$ was introduced as a more scalable alternative to $DL(\partial)$, which is better known. In this paper we consider the use of (implementations of) $DL(\partial_{||})$ as a computational aid to computing conclusions in $DL(\partial)$ and other defeasible logics, rather than as an alternative to $DL(\partial)$. We identify conditions under which $DL(\partial_{||})$ can be substituted for $DL(\partial)$ with no change to the conclusions drawn, and conditions under which $DL(\partial_{||})$ can be used to draw some valid conclusions, leaving the remainder to be drawn by $DL(\partial)$.

Hardware architectures can range from the use of GPUs and other hardware accelerators, through multi-core multi-threaded architectures, to shared-nothing cloud computing. Causes for failure to exploit these architectures include lack of expertise in the architectural features, lack of manpower more generally, and difficulty in updating legacy systems. Such problems can be ameliorated by mapping a logic to logic programming as an intermediate language. This is a common strategy in the implementation of defeasible logics. The first implementation of a defeasible logic, d-Prolog, was implemented as a Prolog meta-interpreter (Covington et al. 1997). Courteous Logic Programs (Grosof 1997) and its successors LPDA (Wan et al. 2009), Rulelog (Grosof and Kifer 2013), Flora2 (Kifer et al. 2018), are implemented in XSB (Swift and Warren 2012).

(Maher 2012) introduced an approach for relative expressiveness of defeasible logics, and two notions of relative expressiveness were investigated. Using the first of these definitions of relative expressiveness, we show that all the defeasible logics in the DL framework are equally expressive under this formulation of relative expressiveness. The second formulation of relative expressiveness is stronger than the first. However, we show that logics incorporating individual defeat are equally expressive as the corresponding logics with team defeat. Thus the only differences in expressiveness of logics in DL arise from differences in how ambiguity is handled. This completes the study of relative expressiveness in DL begun in \cite{Maher12}.

Logical formalisms provide a natural and concise means for specifying and reasoning about preferences. In this paper, we propose lexicographic logic, an extension of classical propositional logic that can express a variety of preferences, most notably lexicographic ones. The proposed logic supports a simple new connective whose semantics can be defined in terms of finite lists of truth values. We demonstrate that, despite the well-known theoretical limitations that pose barriers to the quantitative representation of lexicographic preferences, there exists a subset of the rational numbers over which the proposed new connective can be naturally defined. Lexicographic logic can be used to define in a simple way some well-known preferential operators, like "$A$ and if possible $B$", and "$A$ or failing that $B$". Moreover, many other hierarchical preferential operators can be defined using a systematic approach. We argue that the new logic is an effective formalism for ranking query results according to the satisfaction level of user preferences.