The Web and its Semantic extension (i.e. Linked Open Data) contain open global-scale knowledge and make it available to potentially intelligent machines that want to benefit from it. Nevertheless, most of Linked Open Data lack ontological distinctions and have sparse axiomatisation. For example, distinctions such as whether an entity is inherently a class or an individual, or whether it is a physical object or not, are hardly expressed in the data, although they have been largely studied and formalised by foundational ontologies (e.g. DOLCE, SUMO). These distinctions belong to common sense too, which is relevant for many artificial intelligence tasks such as natural language understanding, scene recognition, and the like. There is a gap between foundational ontologies, that often formalise or are inspired by pre-existing philosophical theories and are developed with a top-down approach, and Linked Open Data that mostly derive from existing databases or crowd-based effort (e.g. DBpedia, Wikidata). We investigate whether machines can learn foundational distinctions over Linked Open Data entities, and if they match common sense. We want to answer questions such as "does the DBpedia entity for dog refer to a class or to an instance?". We report on a set of experiments based on machine learning and crowdsourcing that show promising results.

The need for a massive symbolic artificial intelligence project of this ilk was born in the early 1980s out of a large number of experiences early AI researchers had, in the previous 25 years, wherein their AI programs would generate encouraging early results but then fail to "scale up"--fail to cope with novel situations and problems outside the narrow area they were conceived and engineered to cope with. Douglas Lenat and Alan Kay publicized this need,[1][2][3] and organized a meeting at Stanford in 1983 to consider the problem; the back-of-the-envelope calculations by them and colleagues including Marvin Minsky, Allen Newell, Edward Feigenbaum, and John McCarthy indicated that that effort would require between 1000 and 3000 person-years of effort, hence not fit into the standard academic project model. Fortuitously, events within a year of that meeting enabled that Manhattan-Project-sized effort to get underway. The project was started in July,1984 as the flagship project of the 400-person Microelectronics and Computer Technology Corporation, a research consortium started by two dozen large United States based corporations "to counter a then ominous Japanese effort in AI, the so-called "fifth-generation" project."[4] The US Government reacted to the Fifth Generation threat by passing the National Cooperative Research Act of 1984, which for the first time allowed US companies to "collude" on long-term high-risk high-payoff research, and MCC and Sematech sprang up to take advantage of that ten-year opportunity.

In this paper we discuss some of the issues concerning the Memory and Content aspects in the recent debate on the identification of a Standard Model of the Mind (Laird, Lebiere, and Rosenbloom in press). In particular, we focus on the representational models concerning the Declarative Memories of current Cognitive Architectures (CAs). In doing so we outline some of the main problems affecting the current CAs and suggest that the Conceptual Spaces, a representational framework developed by Gardenfors, is worth-considering to address such problems. Finally, we briefly analyze the alternative representational assumptions employed in the three CAs constituting the current baseline for the Standard Model (i.e. SOAR, ACT-R and Sigma). In doing so, we point out the respective differences and discuss their implications in the light of the analyzed problems.

Games have always been a popular domain of AI research, and they have been used for many recent competitions. However, reaching human-level performance often either focuses on comprehensive world knowledge or solving decision-making problems with unmanageable solution spaces. Building on the popular Taboo board game, the Taboo Challenge Competition addresses a different problem — that of bridging the gap between the domain knowledge of heterogeneous agents trying to jointly identify a concept without making reference to its most salient features. The competition, which was run for the first time at IJCAI 2017, aims to provide a simple testbed for diversity-aware AI where the focus is on integrating independently engineered AI components, while offering a scenario that is challenging yet simple enough to not require mastering general commonsense knowledge or natural language understanding. We describe the design and preparation of the competition, discuss results, and lessons learned.

Reasoning is a crucial part of natural language argumentation. To comprehend an argument, one must analyze its warrant, which explains why its claim follows from its premises. As arguments are highly contextualized, warrants are usually presupposed and left implicit. Thus, the comprehension does not only require language understanding and logic skills, but also depends on common sense. In this paper we develop a methodology for reconstructing warrants systematically. We operationalize it in a scalable crowdsourcing process, resulting in a freely licensed dataset with warrants for 2k authentic arguments from news comments. On this basis, we present a new challenging task, the argument reasoning comprehension task. Given an argument with a claim and a premise, the goal is to choose the correct implicit warrant from two options. Both warrants are plausible and lexically close, but lead to contradicting claims. A solution to this task will define a substantial step towards automatic warrant reconstruction. However, experiments with several neural attention and language models reveal that current approaches do not suffice.

Building dialogue systems that can converse naturally with humans is a challenging yet intriguing problem of artificial intelligence. In open-domain human-computer conversation, where the conversational agent is expected to respond to human utterances in an interesting and engaging way, commonsense knowledge has to be integrated into the model effectively. In this paper, we investigate the impact of providing commonsense knowledge about the concepts covered in the dialogue. Our model represents the first attempt to integrating a large commonsense knowledge base into end-to-end conversational models. In the retrieval-based scenario, we propose a model to jointly take into account message content and related commonsense for selecting an appropriate response. Our experiments suggest that the knowledge-augmented models are superior to their knowledge-free counterparts.

McCarthy, a past president of AAAI and an AAAI Fellow, helped design the foundation of today's internet-based computing and is widely credited with coining the term, artificial intelligence. This remembrance by Edward Feigenbaum, also a past president of AAAI and a professor emeritus of computer science at Stanford University, was delivered at the celebration of John McCarthy's accomplishments, held at Stanford on 25 March 2012. Everyone knew everyone else, and saw them at the few conference panels that were held. At one of those conferences, I met John. We renewed contact upon his rearrival at Stanford, and that was to have major consequences for my professional life.

The Winograd Schema Challenge (WSC) was proposed by Hector Levesque in 2011 as an alternative to the Turing test. Chief among its features is a simple question format that can span many commonsense knowledge domains. Questions are chosen so that they do not require specialized knoweldge or training and are easy for humans to answer. This article details our plans to run the WSC and evaluate results. Turing (1950) had first introduced the notion of testing a computer system's intelligence by assessing whether it could fool a human judge into thinking that it was conversing with a human rather a computer.

The recent history of expert systems, for example, highlights how constricting the brittleness and knowledge acquisition bottlenecks are. Moreover, standard software methodology (e.g., working from a detailed "spec") has proven of little use in AI, a field which by definition tackles ill-structured problems. How can these bottlenecks be widened? Attractive, elegant answers have included machine learning, automatic programming, and natural language understanding. But decades of work on such systems (Green et al., 1974; Lenat et al., 1983; Lenat & Brown, 1984; Schank & Abelson, 1977) have convinced us that each of these approaches has difficulty "scaling up" for want of a substantial base of real world knowledge.

The articles in this special issue of AI Magazine include those that propose specific tests and those that look at the challenges inherent in building robust, valid, and reliable tests for advancing the state of the art in AI. To people outside the field, the test -- which hinges on the ability of machines to fool people into thinking that they (the machines) are people -- is practically synonymous with the quest to create machine intelligence. Within the field, the test is widely recognized as a pioneering landmark, but also is now seen as a distraction, designed over half a century ago, and too crude to really measure intelligence. Intelligence is, after all, a multidimensional variable, and no one test could possibly ever be definitive truly to measure it. Moreover, the original test, at least in its standard implementations, has turned out to be highly gameable, arguably an exercise in deception rather than a true measure of anything especially correlated with intelligence.