In either view, typical examples are closer where (only) positive examples ought to exceptional cases, case memory, analogy, to the prototype, and atypical examples and be.

In this short note, we discuss several aspects of "dimensions" and the related construct of "factors". We concentrate on those aspects that are relevant to articles in this special issue, especially those dealing with the analysis of the wild animal cases discussed in Berman and Hafner's 1993 ICAIL article. We review the basic ideas about dimensions, as used in HYPO, and point out differences with factors, as used in subsequent systems like CATO. Our goal is to correct certain misconceptions that have arisen over the years.

In this paper we discuss a hybrid approach combining Case-Based Reasoning (CBR) .

We discuss several aspects of legal arguments, primarily arguments about the meaning of statutes. First, we discuss how the requirements of argument guide the specification and selection of supporting cases and how an existing case base influences argument formation.

We focus on realistic, complex domains where the concepts, terms and predicates used by domain rules or by rule-based models are not well-defined. Often, in such inherently ill-defined domains the rules do not encompass all the situations they are asked or assumed to cover, admit tacit exceptions, or can be contradicted and annulled by other rules. Interpretation is therefore required of the terms and predicates used. The law is a prototypical example of such an area, where terms used in legal statutes are not completely defined by legal regulations. The use of case-based reasoning (CBR) to complement and supplement other types of reasoning involves many computational questions of system architecture and control. The key focus of this work is how and when to interleave CBR with other modes of reasoning in the context of applying a rule or model to a new set of facts in light of a corpus of cases of past application. The goal is to generate an explanation or argument as to how the new fact situation might be interpreted. In particular, we report on a system called CABARET (CAse-BAsed REasoning Tool), a hybrid architecture we have built to study and experiment with these issues.

The next project was Joel Moses's program SIN. See Moses, Symbolic Integration: The Stormy Decade, 14 Comm.

This paper presents a hybrid case-based reasoning (CBR) and information retrieval (IR) system, called SPIRE, that both retrieves documents from a full-text document corpus and from within individual documents, and locates passages likely to contain information about important problem-solving features of cases. SPIRE uses two case-bases, one containing past precedents, and one containing excerpts from past case texts. Both are used by SPIRE to automatically generate queries, which are then run by the INQUERY full-text retrieval engine on a large text collection in the case of document retrieval and on individual text documents for passage retrieval.

We discuss key ingredients of case-based reasoning, in general, and 3. A technique, the "claim lattice", for organizing the the correspondence of these to elements of HYPO.

Most recent work on reasoning with cases in law has taken the style of reasoning used in the CATO system as its model, and uses the notion of factors, as found in that system. Fundamental to CATO, a successor the HYPO system, were factors, which are closely related to HYPO-style dimensions. In this paper, we will argue that the simplification involved in using factors, while it has proved pragmatically useful both for clarifying understanding of certain aspects of reasoning with cases and for implementation, causes problems with domain analysis and precludes certain kinds of argument that we would wish to model. We therefore believe that the time is now ripe to go back to the original notion of dimensions, while retaining the insights that have been gained from working with the simpler notion of factors. The paper uses two case studies to argue that this is so.

For In this paper we discuss a general approach to detecting instance, a single Supreme Court case created the conceptual change developed in our on-going work on "automobile exception" to the Fourth Amendment's warrant concept drift [Rissland et al., 1994]. We illustrate our requirement for a constitutionally acceptable search; this approach on an actual, still evolving, legal example, the case forever changed the meaning of our Fourth "good faith" concept in the law of personal bankruptcy. In Amendment, which is still evolving today [Rissland, 1989; our approach, we detect that a concept is changing by Rissland & Collins, 19861.