We study agents communicating over an underlying network by exchanging messages, in order to optimize their individual regret in a common nonstochastic multi-armed bandit problem. We derive regret minimization algorithms that guarantee for each agent v an individual expected regret of \widetilde{O}\left(\sqrt{\left(1 \frac{K}{\left \mathcal{N}\left(v\right)\right }\right)T}\right), where T is the number of time steps, K is the number of actions and \mathcal{N}\left(v\right) is the set of neighbors of agent v in the communication graph. We present algorithms both for the case that the communication graph is known to all the agents, and for the case that the graph is unknown. When the graph is unknown, each agent knows only the set of its neighbors and an upper bound on the total number of agents. The individual regret between the models differs only by a logarithmic factor.

The existence of simple, uncoupled no-regret dynamics that converge to correlated equilibria in normal-form games is a celebrated result in the theory of multi-agent systems. Specifically, it has been known for more than 20 years that when all players seek to minimize their internal regret in a repeated normal-form game, the empirical frequency of play converges to a normal-form correlated equilibrium. Extensive-form (that is, tree-form) games generalize normal-form games by modeling both sequential and simultaneous moves, as well as private information. Because of the sequential nature and presence of partial information in the game, extensive-form correlation has significantly different properties than the normal-form counterpart, many of which are still open research directions. Extensive-form correlated equilibrium (EFCE) has been proposed as the natural extensive-form counterpart to normal-form correlated equilibrium.

Multi-agent behavior modeling and trajectory forecasting are crucial for the safe navigation of autonomous agents in interactive scenarios. Variational Autoencoder (VAE) has been widely applied in multi-agent interaction modeling to generate diverse behavior and learn a low-dimensional representation for interacting systems. However, existing literature did not formally discuss if a VAE-based model can properly encode interaction into its latent space. In this work, we argue that one of the typical formulations of VAEs in multi-agent modeling suffers from an issue we refer to as social posterior collapse, i.e., the model is prone to ignoring historical social context when predicting the future trajectory of an agent. It could cause significant prediction errors and poor generalization performance.

Real-world networks, especially the ones that emerge due to actions of animate agents (e.g. Learning approaches built to capture these strategic insights would gain interpretability and flexibility benefits that are required to generalize beyond observations. To this end, we consider a game-theoretic formalism of network emergence that accounts for the underlying strategic mechanisms and take it to the observed data. We propose MINE (Multi-agent Inverse models of Network Emergence mechanism), a new learning framework that solves Markov-Perfect network emergence games using multi-agent inverse reinforcement learning. MINE jointly discovers agents' strategy profiles in the form of network emergence policy and the latent payoff mechanism in the form of learned reward function.

Synchronizing decisions across multiple agents in realistic settings is problematic since it requires agents to wait for other agents to terminate and communicate about termination reliably. Ideally, agents should learn and execute asynchronously instead. Such asynchronous methods also allow temporally extended actions that can take different amounts of time based on the situation and action executed. Unfortunately, current policy gradient methods are not applicable in asynchronous settings, as they assume that agents synchronously reason about action selection at every time step. To allow asynchronous learning and decision-making, we formulate a set of asynchronous multi-agent actor-critic methods that allow agents to directly optimize asynchronous policies in three standard training paradigms: decentralized learning, centralized learning, and centralized training for decentralized execution.

Learning-based methodologies increasingly find applications in safety-critical domains like autonomous driving and medical robotics. Due to the rare nature of dangerous events, real-world testing is prohibitively expensive and unscalable. In this work, we employ a probabilistic approach to safety evaluation in simulation, where we are concerned with computing the probability of dangerous events. We develop a novel rare-event simulation method that combines exploration, exploitation, and optimization techniques to find failure modes and estimate their rate of occurrence. We provide rigorous guarantees for the performance of our method in terms of both statistical and computational efficiency.

The rapid proliferation of decentralized learning systems mandates the need for differentially-private cooperative learning. In this paper, we study this in context of the contextual linear bandit: we consider a collection of agents cooperating to solve a common contextual bandit, while ensuring that their communication remains private. For this problem, we devise FedUCB, a multiagent private algorithm for both centralized and decentralized (peer-to-peer) federated learning. We provide a rigorous technical analysis of its utility in terms of regret, improving several results in cooperative bandit learning, and provide rigorous privacy guarantees as well. Our algorithms provide competitive performance both in terms of pseudoregret bounds and empirical benchmark performance in various multi-agent settings.

We introduce \textit{Nocturne}, a new 2D driving simulator for investigating multi-agent coordination under partial observability. The focus of Nocturne is to enable research into inference and theory of mind in real-world multi-agent settings without the computational overhead of computer vision and feature extraction from images. Agents in this simulator only observe an obstructed view of the scene, mimicking human visual sensing constraints. Unlike existing benchmarks that are bottlenecked by rendering human-like observations directly using a camera input, Nocturne uses efficient intersection methods to compute a vectorized set of visible features in a C back-end, allowing the simulator to run at 2000 steps-per-second. Using open-source trajectory and map data, we construct a simulator to load and replay arbitrary trajectories and scenes from real-world driving data.

This paper investigates the evaluation of learned multiagent strategies in the incomplete information setting, which plays a critical role in ranking and training of agents. Traditionally, researchers have relied on Elo ratings for this purpose, with recent works also using methods based on Nash equilibria. Unfortunately, Elo is unable to handle intransitive agent interactions, and other techniques are restricted to zero-sum, two-player settings or are limited by the fact that the Nash equilibrium is intractable to compute. Recently, a ranking method called \alpha -Rank, relying on a new graph-based game-theoretic solution concept, was shown to tractably apply to general games. However, evaluations based on Elo or \alpha -Rank typically assume noise-free game outcomes, despite the data often being collected from noisy simulations, making this assumption unrealistic in practice. This paper investigates multiagent evaluation in the incomplete information regime, involving general-sum many-player games with noisy outcomes.

We introduce a novel hybrid approach that augments Agent-Based Models (ABMs) with behaviors generated by Large Language Models (LLMs) to simulate human trading interactions. We call our model TraderTalk. Leveraging LLMs trained on extensive human-authored text, we capture detailed and nuanced representations of bilateral conversations in financial trading. Applying this Generative Agent-Based Model (GABM) to government bond markets, we replicate trading decisions between two stylised virtual humans. Our method addresses both structural challenges, such as coordinating turn-taking between realistic LLM-based agents, and design challenges, including the interpretation of LLM outputs by the agent model. By exploring prompt design opportunistically rather than systematically, we enhance the realism of agent interactions without exhaustive overfitting or model reliance. Our approach successfully replicates trade-to-order volume ratios observed in related asset markets, demonstrating the potential of LLM-augmented ABMs in financial simulations