Autonomous agents have made great strides in specialist domains like Atari games and Go. However, they typically learn tabula rasa in isolated environments with limited and manually conceived objectives, thus failing to generalize across a wide spectrum of tasks and capabilities. Inspired by how humans continually learn and adapt in the open world, we advocate a trinity of ingredients for building generalist agents: 1) an environment that supports a multitude of tasks and goals, 2) a large-scale database of multimodal knowledge, and 3) a flexible and scalable agent architecture. We introduce MineDojo, a new framework built on the popular Minecraft game that features a simulation suite with thousands of diverse open-ended tasks and an internet-scale knowledge base with Minecraft videos, tutorials, wiki pages, and forum discussions. Using MineDojo's data, we propose a novel agent learning algorithm that leverages large pre-trained video-language models as a learned reward function.

This paper considers the challenging tasks of Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning (MARL) under partial observability, where each agent only sees her own individual observations and actions that reveal incomplete information about the underlying state of system. This paper studies these tasks under the general model of multiplayer general-sum Partially Observable Markov Games (POMGs), which is significantly larger than the standard model of Imperfect Information Extensive-Form Games (IIEFGs). We identify a rich subclass of POMGs---weakly revealing POMGs---in which sample-efficient learning is tractable. In the self-play setting, we prove that a simple algorithm combining optimism and Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE) is sufficient to find approximate Nash equilibria, correlated equilibria, as well as coarse correlated equilibria of weakly revealing POMGs, in a polynomial number of samples when the number of agents is small. In the setting of playing against adversarial opponents, we show that a variant of our optimistic MLE algorithm is capable of achieving sublinear regret when being compared against the optimal maximin policies.

Blame attribution is one of the key aspects of accountable decision making, as it provides means to quantify the responsibility of an agent for a decision making outcome. In this paper, we study blame attribution in the context of cooperative multi-agent sequential decision making. As a particular setting of interest, we focus on cooperative decision making formalized by Multi-Agent Markov Decision Processes (MMDPs), and we analyze different blame attribution methods derived from or inspired by existing concepts in cooperative game theory. We formalize desirable properties of blame attribution in the setting of interest, and we analyze the relationship between these properties and the studied blame attribution methods. Interestingly, we show that some of the well known blame attribution methods, such as Shapley value, are not performance-incentivizing, while others, such as Banzhaf index, may over-blame agents.

Self-play is a technique for machine learning in multi-agent systems where a learning algorithm learns by interacting with copies of itself. Self-play is useful for generating large quantities of data for learning, but has the drawback that the agents the learner will face post-training may have dramatically different behavior than the learner came to expect by interacting with itself. For the special case of two-player constant-sum games, self-play that reaches Nash equilibrium is guaranteed to produce strategies that perform well against any post-training opponent; however, no such guarantee exists for multiplayer games. We show that in games that approximately decompose into a set of two-player constant-sum games (called constant-sum polymatrix games) where global \epsilon -Nash equilibria are boundedly far from Nash equilibria in each subgame (called subgame stability), any no-external-regret algorithm that learns by self-play will produce a strategy with bounded vulnerability. For the first time, our results identify a structural property of multiplayer games that enable performance guarantees for the strategies produced by a broad class of self-play algorithms.

Communication requires having a common language, a lingua franca, between agents. This language could emerge via a consensus process, but it may require many generations of trial and error. Alternatively, the lingua franca can be given by the environment, where agents ground their language in representations of the observed world. We demonstrate a simple way to ground language in learned representations, which facilitates decentralized multi-agent communication and coordination. We find that a standard representation learning algorithm -- autoencoding -- is sufficient for arriving at a grounded common language.

Large sequence models (SM) such as GPT series and BERT have displayed outstanding performance and generalization capabilities in natural language process, vision and recently reinforcement learning. A natural follow-up question is how to abstract multi-agent decision making also as an sequence modeling problem and benefit from the prosperous development of the SMs. In this paper, we introduce a novel architecture named Multi-Agent Transformer (MAT) that effectively casts cooperative multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) into SM problems wherein the objective is to map agents' observation sequences to agents' optimal action sequences. Our goal is to build the bridge between MARL and SMs so that the modeling power of modern sequence models can be unleashed for MARL. Central to our MAT is an encoder-decoder architecture which leverages the multi-agent advantage decomposition theorem to transform the joint policy search problem into a sequential decision making process; this renders only linear time complexity for multi-agent problems and, most importantly, endows MAT with monotonic performance improvement guarantee.

Multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) has witnessed significant progress with the development of value function factorization methods. It allows optimizing a joint action-value function through the maximization of factorized per-agent utilities. In this paper, we show that in partially observable MARL problems, an agent's ordering over its own actions could impose concurrent constraints (across different states) on the representable function class, causing significant estimation errors during training. We tackle this limitation and propose PAC, a new framework leveraging Assistive information generated from Counterfactual Predictions of optimal joint action selection, which enable explicit assistance to value function factorization through a novel counterfactual loss. A variational inference-based information encoding method is developed to collect and encode the counterfactual predictions from an estimated baseline.

Recent studies have shown that introducing communication between agents can significantly improve overall performance in cooperative Multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL). However, existing communication schemes often require agents to exchange an excessive number of messages at run-time under a reliable communication channel, which hinders its practicality in many real-world situations. TMC applies a temporal smoothing technique to drastically reduce the amount of information exchanged between agents. Experiments show that TMC can significantly reduce inter-agent communication overhead without impacting accuracy. Furthermore, TMC demonstrates much better robustness against transmission loss than existing approaches in lossy networking environments.

All prior results suffer from at least one of the two obstacles: the curse of multiple agents and the barrier of long horizon, regardless of the sampling protocol in use. We take a step towards settling this problem, assuming access to a flexible sampling mechanism: the generative model. Focusing on non-stationary finite-horizon Markov games, we develop a fast learning algorithm called Q-FTRL and an adaptive sampling scheme that leverage the optimism principle in online adversarial learning (particularly the Follow-the-Regularized-Leader (FTRL) method). Our algorithm learns an \varepsilon -approximate CCE in a general-sum Markov game using \widetilde{O}\bigg( \frac{H 4 S \sum_{i 1} m A_i}{\varepsilon 2} \bigg) samples, where m is the number of players, S indicates the number of states, H is the horizon, and A_i denotes the number of actions for the i -th player. This is minimax-optimal (up to log factor) when m is fixed.

We consider the problem of using logged data to make predictions about what would happen if we changed the rules of the game' in a multi-agent system. This task is difficult because in many cases we observe actions individuals take but not their private information or their full reward functions. In addition, agents are strategic, so when the rules change, they will also change their actions. They make counterfactual predictions by using observed actions to learn the underlying utility function (a.k.a. This approach imposes heavy assumptions such as the rationality of the agents being observed and a correct model of the environment and agents' utility functions.