This study considers a novel problem setting, referred to as bandit task assignment, that incorporates the processing time of each task in the bandit setting. In this problem setting, a player sequentially chooses a set of tasks to start so that the set of processing tasks satisfies a given combinatorial constraint. The reward and processing time for each task follow unknown distributions, values of which are revealed only after the task has been completed.

Evidence that visual communication preceded written language and provided a basis for it goes back to prehistory, in forms such as cave and rock paintings depicting traces of our distant ancestors. Emergent communication research has sought to explore how agents can learn to communicate in order to collaboratively solve tasks. Existing research has focused on language, with a learned communication channel transmitting sequences of discrete tokens between the agents. In this work, we explore a visual communication channel between agents that are allowed to draw with simple strokes. Our agents are parameterised by deep neural networks, and the drawing procedure is differentiable, allowing for end-to-end training. In the framework of a referential communication game, we demonstrate that agents can not only successfully learn to communicate by drawing, but with appropriate inductive biases, can do so in a fashion that humans can interpret. We hope to encourage future research to consider visual communication as a more flexible and directly interpretable alternative of training collaborative agents.

Simulation is used extensively in autonomous systems, particularly in robotic manipulation. By far, the most common approach is to train a controller in simulation, and then use it as an initial starting point for the real system. We demonstrate how to learn simultaneously from both simulation and interaction with the real environment. We propose an algorithm for balancing the large number of samples from the high throughput but less accurate simulation and the low-throughput, high-fidelity and costly samples from the real environment. We achieve that by maintaining a replay buffer for each environment the agent interacts with. We analyze such multi-environment interaction theoretically, and provide convergence properties, through a novel theoretical replay buffer analysis. We demonstrate the efficacy of our method on a sim-to-real environment.

Despite significant progress on multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) in recent years, coordination in complex domains remains a challenge. Work in MARL often focuses on solving tasks where agents interact with all other agents and entities in the environment; however, we observe that real-world tasks are often composed of several isolated instances of local agent interactions (subtasks), and each agent can meaningfully focus on one subtask to the exclusion of all else in the environment. In these composite tasks, successful policies can often be decomposed into two levels of decision-making: agents are allocated to specific subtasks and each agent acts productively towards their assigned subtask alone. This decomposed decision making provides a strong structural inductive bias, significantly reduces agent observation spaces, and encourages subtask-specific policies to be reused and composed during training, as opposed to treating each new composition of subtasks as unique. We introduce ALMA, a general learning method for taking advantage of these structured tasks. ALMA simultaneously learns a high-level subtask allocation policy and low-level agent policies. We demonstrate that ALMA learns sophisticated coordination behavior in a number of challenging environments, outperforming strong baselines. ALMA's modularity also enables it to better generalize to new environment configurations. Finally, we find that while ALMA can integrate separately trained allocation and action policies, the best performance is obtained only by training all components jointly.

Multi-agent learning in stochastic N-player games is a notoriously difficult problem1 because, in addition to their changing strategic decisions, the players of the game2 must also contend with the fact that the game itself evolves over time, possibly in a3 very complicated manner. Because of this, the equilibrium convergence properties4 of popular learning algorithms - like policy gradient and its variants - are poorly5 understood, except in specific classes of games (such as potential or two-player,6 zero-sum games). In view of all this, we examine the long-run behavior of policy7 gradient methods with respect to Nash equilibrium policies that are second-order8 stationary (SOS) in a sense similar to the type of KKT sufficiency conditions9 used in optimization. Our analysis shows that SOS policies are locally attracting10 with high probability, and we show that policy gradient trajectories with gradient11 estimates provided by the Reinforcealgorithm achieve an O(1/ n) convergence12 rate to such equilibria if the method's step-size is chosen appropriately.