Agents
Reasoning about Actual Causes in Nondeterministic Domains -- Extended Version
Khan, Shakil M., Lespérance, Yves, Rostamigiv, Maryam
Reasoning about the causes behind observations is crucial to the formalization of rationality. While extensive research has been conducted on root cause analysis, most studies have predominantly focused on deterministic settings. In this paper, we investigate causation in more realistic nondeterministic domains, where the agent does not have any control on and may not know the choices that are made by the environment. We build on recent preliminary work on actual causation in the nondeterministic situation calculus to formalize more sophisticated forms of reasoning about actual causes in such domains. We investigate the notions of ``Certainly Causes'' and ``Possibly Causes'' that enable the representation of actual cause for agent actions in these domains. We then show how regression in the situation calculus can be extended to reason about such notions of actual causes.
Regulator-Manufacturer AI Agents Modeling: Mathematical Feedback-Driven Multi-Agent LLM Framework
The increasing complexity of regulatory updates from global authorities presents significant challenges for medical device manufacturers, necessitating agile strategies to sustain compliance and maintain market access. Concurrently, regulatory bodies must effectively monitor manufacturers' responses and develop strategic surveillance plans. This study employs a multi-agent modeling approach, enhanced with Large Language Models (LLMs), to simulate regulatory dynamics and examine the adaptive behaviors of key actors, including regulatory bodies, manufacturers, and competitors. These agents operate within a simulated environment governed by regulatory flow theory, capturing the impacts of regulatory changes on compliance decisions, market adaptation, and innovation strategies. Our findings illuminate the influence of regulatory shifts on industry behaviour and identify strategic opportunities for improving regulatory practices, optimizing compliance, and fostering innovation. By leveraging the integration of multi-agent systems and LLMs, this research provides a novel perspective and offers actionable insights for stakeholders navigating the evolving regulatory landscape of the medical device industry.
Gradient-based Trajectory Optimization with Parallelized Differentiable Traffic Simulation
Son, Sanghyun, Zheng, Laura, Clipp, Brian, Greenwell, Connor, Philip, Sujin, Lin, Ming C.
We present a parallelized differentiable traffic simulator based on the Intelligent Driver Model (IDM), a car-following framework that incorporates driver behavior as key variables. Our simulator efficiently models vehicle motion, generating trajectories that can be supervised to fit real-world data. By leveraging its differentiable nature, IDM parameters are optimized using gradient-based methods. With the capability to simulate up to 2 million vehicles in real time, the system is scalable for large-scale trajectory optimization. We show that we can use the simulator to filter noise in the input trajectories (trajectory filtering), reconstruct dense trajectories from sparse ones (trajectory reconstruction), and predict future trajectories (trajectory prediction), with all generated trajectories adhering to physical laws. We validate our simulator and algorithm on several datasets including NGSIM and Waymo Open Dataset.
2024 AAAI / ACM SIGAI Doctoral Consortium interviews compilation
Each year, a small group of PhD students are chosen to participate in the AAAI/SIGAI Doctoral Consortium. This initiative provides an opportunity for the students to discuss and explore their research interests and career objectives in an interdisciplinary workshop together with a panel of established researchers. During 2024, we met with some of the students to find out more about their research and the doctoral consortium experience. They also shared their advice for prospective PhD students. Changhoon Kim completed his PhD in Computer Engineering at Arizona State University.
MLE-bench: Evaluating Machine Learning Agents on Machine Learning Engineering
Chan, Jun Shern, Chowdhury, Neil, Jaffe, Oliver, Aung, James, Sherburn, Dane, Mays, Evan, Starace, Giulio, Liu, Kevin, Maksin, Leon, Patwardhan, Tejal, Weng, Lilian, Mądry, Aleksander
We introduce MLE-bench, a benchmark for measuring how well AI agents perform at machine learning engineering. To this end, we curate 75 ML engineering-related competitions from Kaggle, creating a diverse set of challenging tasks that test real-world ML engineering skills such as training models, preparing datasets, and running experiments. We establish human baselines for each competition using Kaggle's publicly available leaderboards. We use open-source agent scaffolds to evaluate several frontier language models on our benchmark, finding that the best-performing setup--OpenAI's o1-preview with AIDE scaffolding--achieves at least the level of a Kaggle bronze medal in 16.9% of competitions. In addition to our main results, we investigate various forms of resource scaling for AI agents and the impact of contamination from pre-training. We open-source our benchmark code (github.com/openai/mle-bench/) to facilitate future research in understanding the ML engineering capabilities of AI agents.
Adaptable and Precise: Enterprise-Scenario LLM Function-Calling Capability Training Pipeline
Zeng, Guancheng, Ding, Wentao, Xu, Beining, Zhang, Chi, Han, Wenqiang, Li, Gang, Mo, Jingjing, Qiu, Pengxu, Tao, Xinran, Tao, Wang, Hu, Haowen
Enterprises possess a vast array of API assets scattered across various functions, forming the backbone of existing business processes. By leveraging these APIs as functional tools, enterprises can design diverse, scenario-specific agent applications, driven by on-premise function-calling models as the core engine. However, generic models often fail to meet enterprise requirements in terms of computational efficiency, output accuracy, and stability, necessitating scenario-specific adaptation. In this paper, we propose a training pipeline for function-calling capabilities tailored to real-world business scenarios. This pipeline includes the synthesis and augmentation of scenario-specific function-calling data, model fine-tuning, and performance evaluation and analysis. Using this pipeline, we generated 1,260 fully AI-generated samples and 1,035 augmented manually-labeled samples in digital HR agent scenario. The Qwen2.5-Coder-7B-Instruct model was employed as the base model and fine-tuned using the LoRA method on four GPUs with 24GB VRAM. Our fine-tuned model demonstrated outstanding performance in evaluations and practical applications, surpassing GPT-4 and GPT-4o in accuracy on the test set. These results validate the reliability of the proposed pipeline for training scenario-specific function-calling models.
Multi Agent Reinforcement Learning for Sequential Satellite Assignment Problems
Holder, Joshua, Jaques, Natasha, Mesbahi, Mehran
Assignment problems are a classic combinatorial optimization problem in which a group of agents must be assigned to a group of tasks such that maximum utility is achieved while satisfying assignment constraints. Given the utility of each agent completing each task, polynomial-time algorithms exist to solve a single assignment problem in its simplest form. However, in many modern-day applications such as satellite constellations, power grids, and mobile robot scheduling, assignment problems unfold over time, with the utility for a given assignment depending heavily on the state of the system. We apply multi-agent reinforcement learning to this problem, learning the value of assignments by bootstrapping from a known polynomial-time greedy solver and then learning from further experience. We then choose assignments using a distributed optimal assignment mechanism rather than by selecting them directly. We demonstrate that this algorithm is theoretically justified and avoids pitfalls experienced by other RL algorithms in this setting. Finally, we show that our algorithm significantly outperforms other methods in the literature, even while scaling to realistic scenarios with hundreds of agents and tasks.
Principal-Agent Bandit Games with Self-Interested and Exploratory Learning Agents
Liu, Junyan, Ratliff, Lillian J.
We study the repeated principal-agent bandit game, where the principal indirectly interacts with the unknown environment by proposing incentives for the agent to play arms. Most existing work assumes the agent has full knowledge of the reward means and always behaves greedily, but in many online marketplaces, the agent needs to learn the unknown environment and sometimes explore. Motivated by such settings, we model a self-interested learning agent with exploration behaviors who iteratively updates reward estimates and either selects an arm that maximizes the estimated reward plus incentive or explores arbitrarily with a certain probability. As a warm-up, we first consider a self-interested learning agent without exploration. We propose algorithms for both i.i.d. and linear reward settings with bandit feedback in a finite horizon $T$, achieving regret bounds of $\widetilde{O}(\sqrt{T})$ and $\widetilde{O}( T^{2/3} )$, respectively. Specifically, these algorithms are established upon a novel elimination framework coupled with newly-developed search algorithms which accommodate the uncertainty arising from the learning behavior of the agent. We then extend the framework to handle the exploratory learning agent and develop an algorithm to achieve a $\widetilde{O}(T^{2/3})$ regret bound in i.i.d. reward setup by enhancing the robustness of our elimination framework to the potential agent exploration. Finally, when reducing our agent behaviors to the one studied in (Dogan et al., 2023a), we propose an algorithm based on our robust framework, which achieves a $\widetilde{O}(\sqrt{T})$ regret bound, significantly improving upon their $\widetilde{O}(T^{11/12})$ bound.
Towards Safe and Honest AI Agents with Neural Self-Other Overlap
Carauleanu, Marc, Vaiana, Michael, Rosenblatt, Judd, Berg, Cameron, de Lucena, Diogo Schwerz
As AI systems increasingly make critical decisions, deceptive AI poses a significant challenge to trust and safety. We present Self-Other Overlap (SOO) fine-tuning, a promising approach in AI Safety that could substantially improve our ability to build honest artificial intelligence. Inspired by cognitive neuroscience research on empathy, SOO aims to align how AI models represent themselves and others. Our experiments on LLMs with 7B, 27B, and 78B parameters demonstrate SOO's efficacy: deceptive responses of Mistral-7B-Instruct-v0.2 dropped from 73.6% to 17.2% with no observed reduction in general task performance, while in Gemma-2-27b-it and CalmeRys-78B-Orpo-v0.1 deceptive responses were reduced from 100% to 9.3% and 2.7%, respectively, with a small impact on capabilities. In reinforcement learning scenarios, SOO-trained agents showed significantly reduced deceptive behavior. SOO's focus on contrastive self and other-referencing observations offers strong potential for generalization across AI architectures. While current applications focus on language models and simple RL environments, SOO could pave the way for more trustworthy AI in broader domains. Ethical implications and long-term effects warrant further investigation, but SOO represents a significant step forward in AI safety research.
Responsibility-aware Strategic Reasoning in Probabilistic Multi-Agent Systems
Mu, Chunyan, Najib, Muhammad, Oren, Nir
Responsibility plays a key role in the development and deployment of trustworthy autonomous systems. In this paper, we focus on the problem of strategic reasoning in probabilistic multi-agent systems with responsibility-aware agents. We introduce the logic PATL+R, a variant of Probabilistic Alternating-time Temporal Logic. The novelty of PATL+R lies in its incorporation of modalities for causal responsibility, providing a framework for responsibility-aware multi-agent strategic reasoning. We present an approach to synthesise joint strategies that satisfy an outcome specified in PATL+R, while optimising the share of expected causal responsibility and reward. This provides a notion of balanced distribution of responsibility and reward gain among agents. To this end, we utilise the Nash equilibrium as the solution concept for our strategic reasoning problem and demonstrate how to compute responsibility-aware Nash equilibrium strategies via a reduction to parametric model checking of concurrent stochastic multi-player games.