Agents
Local and Adaptive Mirror Descents in Extensive-Form Games
In imperfect information games (IIGs), players may only have access to partial information about the current game state upon taking action.
Bicriteria Multidimensional Mechanism Design with Side Information
Mechanism design is a high-impact branch of economics and computer science that studies the implementation of socially desirable outcomes among strategic self-interested agents. Major real-world use cases include combinatorial auctions ( e.g., strategic sourcing, radio spectrum auctions),
Diversity Is Not All You Need: Training A Robust Cooperative Agent Needs Specialist Partners
In this paper, we show that partner specialization, in addition to diversity, is crucial for the robustness of a downstream generalist agent.
On Imitation in Mean-field Games
In this paper, departing from the existing literature on IL for MFGs, we introduce a new solution concept called the Nash imitation gap.
On Imitation in Mean-field Games
In this paper, departing from the existing literature on IL for MFGs, we introduce a new solution concept called the Nash imitation gap.
