Human teammates often form conscious and subconscious expectations of each other during interaction. Teaming success is contingent on whether such expectations can be met. Similarly, for an intelligent agent to operate beside a human, it must consider the human's expectation of its behavior. Disregarding such expectations can lead to the loss of trust and degraded team performance. A key challenge here is that the human's expectation may not align with the agent's

In this paper, we focus on a specific subclass of coordination problems in which humans are able to discover self-explaining deviations (SEDs).

We consider the problem of fairly allocating sequentially arriving items to a set of individuals. For this problem, the recently-introduced P ACE algorithm leverages the dual averaging algorithm to approximate competitive equilibria and thus generate online fair allocations. P ACE is simple, distributed, and parameter-free, making it appealing for practical use in large-scale systems. However, current performance guarantees for P ACE require i.i.d.

With the representation, a skill selection mechanism is invented to realize the assignment from agents to skills.

While mathematically elegant, a fundamental issue with AIXI is that it is only asymptotically computable.