All the source code can be found at our project website https://sites.google.com/view/ In order to prove Theorem 1, we introduce the following lemma, which uses Assumption 1. Lemma 1. The proof is largely based on [2]. Let Hd = H Hbe a vector-valued RKHS, and F[f] be a functional of f. Pure Task Expansion Results on MPE: VACL contains entity progression in the result of Figure 1. To specifically study the performance of task expansion, we exclude entity progression module from VACL and compare with baselines in Simple-Spread with n= 4 and Push-Ball with n= 2. For a fair comparison, we also provide additional experiments to combine GoalGAN and AMIGo with the initial knowledge of easy tasks.

We study social learning dynamics motivated by reviews on online platforms. The agents collectively follow a simple multi-armed bandit protocol, but each agent acts myopically, without regards to exploration. We allow a wide range of myopic behaviors that are consistent with (parameterized) confidence intervals for the arms' expected rewards. We derive stark exploration failures for any such behavior, and provide matching positive results. As a special case, we obtain the first general results on failure of the greedy algorithm in bandits, thus providing a theoretical foundation for why bandit algorithms should explore.1

We list all notations used in this paper in Table 1.

Motivated by the scenario of large-scale learning in distributed systems, this paper studies a scenario where M agents cooperate together to solve the same instance of a K-armed stochastic bandit problem. The agents have limited access to a local subset of arms and are asynchronous with different gaps between decision-making rounds. The goal is to find the global optimal arm, and agents are able to pull any arm; however, they can only observe the reward when the selected arm is local. The challenge is a tradeoff for agents between pulling a local arm with observable feedback or pulling external arms without feedback and relying on others' observations that occur at different rates. We propose AAE-LCB, a two-stage algorithm that prioritizes pulling local arms following an active arm elimination policy and switches to other arms only if all local arms are dominated by some external arms. We analyze the regret of AAE-LCBand show it matches the regret lower bound up to a small factor.

In two-player zero-sum extensive-form games, Nash equilibrium prescribes optimal strategies against perfectly rational opponents. However, it does not guarantee rational play in parts of the game tree that can only be reached by the players making mistakes. This can be problematic when operationalizing equilibria in the real world among imperfect players. Trembling-hand refinements are a sound remedy to this issue, and are subsets of Nash equilibria that are designed to handle the possibility that any of the players may make mistakes. In this paper, we initiate the study of equilibrium refinements for settings where one of the players is perfectly rational (the "machine") and the other may make mistakes.

In two-player zero-sum extensive-form games, Nash equilibrium prescribes optimal strategies against perfectly rational opponents. However, it does not guarantee rational play in parts of the game tree that can only be reached by the players making mistakes. This can be problematic when operationalizing equilibria in the real world among imperfect players. Trembling-hand refinements are a sound remedy to this issue, and are subsets of Nash equilibria that are designed to handle the possibility that any of the players may make mistakes. In this paper, we initiate the study of equilibrium refinements for settings where one of the players is perfectly rational (the "machine") and the other may make mistakes.

Multi-agent behavior modeling and trajectory forecasting are crucial for the safe navigation of autonomous agents in interactive scenarios. Variational Autoencoder (VAE) has been widely applied in multi-agent interaction modeling to generate diverse behavior and learn a low-dimensional representation for interacting systems. However, existing literature did not formally discuss if a VAE-based model can properly encode interaction into its latent space. In this work, we argue that one of the typical formulations of VAEs in multi-agent modeling suffers from an issue we refer to as social posterior collapse, i.e., the model is prone to ignoring historical social context when predicting the future trajectory of an agent. It could cause significant prediction errors and poor generalization performance.