In large multiagent games, partial observability, coordination, and credit assignment persistently plague attempts to design good learning algorithms. We provide a simple and efficient algorithm that in part uses a linear system to model the world from a single agent's limited perspective, and takes advantage of Kalman filtering to allow an agent to construct a good training signal and learn an effective policy.

Online mechanism design (MD) considers the problem of providing incentives to implement desired system-wide outcomes in systems with self-interested agents that arrive and depart dynamically. Agents can choose to misrepresent their arrival and departure times, in addition to information about their value for different outcomes. We consider the problem of maximizing the total longterm value of the system despite the self-interest of agents. The online MD problem induces a Markov Decision Process (MDP), which when solved can be used to implement optimal policies in a truth-revealing Bayesian-Nash equilibrium.

In large multiagent games, partial observability, coordination, and credit assignment persistently plague attempts to design good learning algorithms. We provide a simple and efficient algorithm that in part uses a linear system to model the world from a single agent's limited perspective, and takes advantage of Kalman filtering to allow an agent to construct a good training signal and learn an effective policy.

Online mechanism design (MD) considers the problem of providing incentives to implement desired system-wide outcomes in systems with self-interested agents that arrive and depart dynamically. Agents can choose to misrepresent their arrival and departure times, in addition to information about their value for different outcomes. We consider the problem of maximizing the total longterm value of the system despite the self-interest of agents. The online MD problem induces a Markov Decision Process (MDP), which when solved can be used to implement optimal policies in a truth-revealing Bayesian-Nash equilibrium.

We study how to learn to play a Pareto-optimal strict Nash equilibrium when there exist multiple equilibria and agents may have different preferences among the equilibria. We focus on repeated coordination games of non-identical interest where agents do not know the game structure up front and receive noisy payoffs. We design efficient near-optimal algorithms for both the perfect monitoring and the imperfect monitoring setting(where the agents only observe their own payoffs and the joint actions).

Recent multi-agent extensions of Q-Learning require knowledge of other agents' payoffs and Q-functions, and assume game-theoretic play at all times by all other agents. This paper proposes a fundamentally different approach, dubbed "Hyper-Q" Learning, in which values of mixed strategies rather than base actions are learned, and in which other agents' strategies are estimated from observed actions via Bayesian inference. Hyper-Q may be effective against many different types of adaptive agents, even if they are persistently dynamic. Against certain broad categories of adaptation, it is argued that Hyper-Q may converge to exact optimal time-varying policies. In tests using Rock-Paper-Scissors, Hyper-Q learns to significantly exploit an Infinitesimal Gradient Ascent (IGA) player, as well as a Policy Hill Climber (PHC) player. Preliminary analysis of Hyper-Q against itself is also presented.

Recent multi-agent extensions of Q-Learning require knowledge of other agents' payoffs and Q-functions, and assume game-theoretic play at all times by all other agents. This paper proposes a fundamentally different approach, dubbed "Hyper-Q" Learning, in which values of mixed strategies rather than base actions are learned, and in which other agents' strategies are estimated from observed actions via Bayesian inference. Hyper-Qmay be effective against many different types of adaptive agents, even if they are persistently dynamic. Against certain broad categories of adaptation, it is argued that Hyper-Q may converge to exact optimaltime-varying policies. In tests using Rock-Paper-Scissors, Hyper-Q learns to significantly exploit an Infinitesimal Gradient Ascent (IGA) player, as well as a Policy Hill Climber (PHC) player. Preliminary analysis of Hyper-Q against itself is also presented.

Learning in a single-agent stationary-enVironment setting can be a hard problem, but relative to the rnulti-agent learning problem, it is easy.

We study how to learn to play a Pareto-optimal strict Nash equilibrium when there exist multiple equilibria and agents may have different preferences amongthe equilibria. We focus on repeated coordination games of non-identical interest where agents do not know the game structure up front and receive noisy payoffs. We design efficient near-optimal algorithms forboth the perfect monitoring and the imperfect monitoring setting(where the agents only observe their own payoffs and the joint actions).

Online mechanism design (MD) considers the problem of providing incentivesto implement desired system-wide outcomes in systems withself-interested agents that arrive and depart dynamically. Agentscan choose to misrepresent their arrival and departure times, in addition to information about their value for different outcomes. We consider the problem of maximizing the total longterm valueof the system despite the self-interest of agents. The online MD problem induces a Markov Decision Process (MDP), which when solved can be used to implement optimal policies in a truth-revealing Bayesian-Nash equilibrium.