We consider schemes for obtaining truthful reports on a common but hidden signal from large groups of rational, self-interested agents. One example are online feedback mechanisms, where users provide observations about the quality of a product or service so that other users can have an accurate idea of what quality they can expect. However, (i) providing such feedback is costly, and (ii) there are many motivations for providing incorrect feedback. Both problems can be addressed by reward schemes which (i) cover the cost of obtaining and reporting feedback, and (ii) maximize the expected reward of a rational agent who reports truthfully. We address the design of such incentive-compatible rewards for feedback generated in environments with pure adverse selection. Here, the correlation between the true knowledge of an agent and her beliefs regarding the likelihoods of reports of other agents can be exploited to make honest reporting a Nash equilibrium. In this paper we extend existing methods for designing incentive-compatible rewards by also considering collusion. We analyze different scenarios, where, for example, some or all of the agents collude. For each scenario we investigate whether a collusion-resistant, incentive-compatible reward scheme exists, and use automated mechanism design to specify an algorithm for deriving an efficient reward mechanism.

In this paper, we explore methods for comparing agent behavior with human behavior to assist with validation. Our exploration begins by considering a simple method of behavior comparison. Motivated by shortcomings in this initial approach, we introduce behavior bounding, an automated model-based approach for comparing behavior that is inspired, in part, by Mitchell's Version Spaces. We show that behavior bounding can be used to compactly represent both human and agent behavior. We argue that relatively low amounts of human effort are required to build, maintain, and use the data structures that underlie behavior bounding, and we provide a theoretical basis for these arguments using notions of PAC Learnability. Next, we show empirical results indicating that this approach is effective at identifying differences in certain types of behaviors and that it performs well when compared against our initial benchmark methods. Finally, we demonstrate that behavior bounding can produce information that allows developers to identify and fix problems in an agent's behavior much more efficiently than standard debugging techniques.

Complexity theory is a useful tool to study computational issues surrounding the elicitation of preferences, as well as the strategic manipulation of elections aggregating together preferences of multiple agents. We study here the complexity of determining when we can terminate eliciting preferences, and prove that the complexity depends on the elicitation strategy. We show, for instance, that it may be better from a computational perspective to elicit all preferences from one agent at a time than to elicit individual preferences from multiple agents. We also study the connection between the strategic manipulation of an election and preference elicitation. We show that what we can manipulate affects the computational complexity of manipulation. In particular, we prove that there are voting rules which are easy to manipulate if we can change all of an agent's vote, but computationally intractable if we can change only some of their preferences. This suggests that, as with preference elicitation, a fine-grained view of manipulation may be informative. Finally, we study the connection between predicting the winner of an election and preference elicitation. Based on this connection, we identify a voting rule where it is computationally difficult to decide the probability of a candidate winning given a probability distribution over the votes.

Affective computing has proven to be a viable field of research comprised of a large number of multidisciplinary researchers resulting in work that is widely published. The majority of this work consists of computational models of emotion recognition, computational modeling of causal factors of emotion and emotion expression through rendered and robotic faces. A smaller part is concerned with modeling the effects of emotion, formal modeling of cognitive appraisal theory and models of emergent emotions. Part of the motivation for affective computing as a field is to better understand emotional processes through computational modeling. One of the four major topics in affective computing is computers that have emotions (the others are recognizing, expressing and understanding emotions). A critical and neglected aspect of having emotions is the experience of emotion (Barrett, Mesquita, Ochsner, and Gross, 2007): what does the content of an emotional episode look like, how does this content change over time and when do we call the episode emotional. Few modeling efforts have these topics as primary focus. The launch of a journal on synthetic emotions should motivate research initiatives in this direction, and this research should have a measurable impact on emotion research in psychology. I show that a good way to do so is to investigate the psychological core of what an emotion is: an experience. I present ideas on how the experience of emotion could be modeled and provide evidence that several computational models of emotion are already addressing the issue.

Agents and agent systems are becoming more and more important in the development of a variety of fields such as ubiquitous computing, ambient intelligence, autonomous computing, intelligent systems and intelligent robotics. The need for improvement of our basic knowledge on agents is very essential. We take a systematic approach and present extended classification of artificial agents which can be useful for understanding of what artificial agents are and what they can be in the future. The aim of this classification is to give us insights in what kind of agents can be created and what type of problems demand a specific kind of agents for their solution.

A new search algorithm for solving distributed constraint optimization problems (DisCOPs) is presented. Agents assign variables sequentially and compute bounds on partial assignments asynchronously. The asynchronous bounds computation is based on the propagation of partial assignments. The asynchronous forward-bounding algorithm (AFB) is a distributed optimization search algorithm that keeps one consistent partial assignment at all times. The algorithm is described in detail and its correctness proven. Experimental evaluation shows that AFB outperforms synchronous branch and bound by many orders of magnitude, and produces a phase transition as the tightness of the problem increases. This is an analogous effect to the phase transition that has been observed when local consistency maintenance is applied to MaxCSPs. The AFB algorithm is further enhanced by the addition of a backjumping mechanism, resulting in the AFB-BJ algorithm. Distributed backjumping is based on accumulated information on bounds of all values and on processing concurrently a queue of candidate goals for the next move back. The AFB-BJ algorithm is compared experimentally to other DisCOP algorithms (ADOPT, DPOP, OptAPO) and is shown to be a very efficient algorithm for DisCOPs.

Consumers of mass media must have a comprehensive, balanced and plural selection of news to get an unbiased perspective; but achieving this goal can be very challenging, laborious and time consuming. News stories development over time, its (in)consistency, and different level of coverage across the media outlets are challenges that a conscientious reader has to overcome in order to alleviate bias. In this paper we present an intelligent agent framework currently facilitating analysis of the main sources of on-line news in El Salvador. We show how prior tools of text analysis and Web 2.0 technologies can be combined with minimal manual intervention to help individuals on their rational decision process, while holding media outlets accountable for their work.

In both individual and collective decision making, the space of alternatives from which the agent (or the group of agents) has to choose often has a combinatorial (or multi-attribute) structure. We give an introduction to preference handling in combinatorial domains in the context of collective decision making, and show that the considerable body of work on preference representation and elicitation that AI researchers have been working on for several years is particularly relevant. After giving an overview of languages for compact representation of preferences, we discuss problems in voting in combinatorial domains, and then focus on multiagent resource allocation and fair division. These issues belong to a larger field, known as computational social choice, that brings together ideas from AI and social choice theory, to investigate mechanisms for collective decision making from a computational point of view. We conclude by briefly describing some of the other research topics studied in computational social choice.

Interactive artificial intelligence systems employ preferences in both their reasoning and their interaction with the user. This survey considers preference handling in applications such as recommender systems, personal assistant agents, and personalized user interfaces. We survey the major questions and approaches, present illustrative examples, and give an outlook on potential benefits and challenges.

This page includes all the AAAI sponsored conferences presented by AAAI Affiliates, and conferences held in cooperation with AAAI to be held during the next 9 months.