Recent work on Alternating-Time Temporal Logic and Coalition Logic has allowed the expression of many interesting properties of coalitions and strategies. However there is no natural way of expressing resource requirements in these logics. This paper presents a Resource-Bounded Coalition Logic (RBCL) which has explicit representation of resource bounds in the language, and gives a complete and sound axiomatisation of RBCL.

Building and using agent-based models is often impractical, in part due to the cost of including expensive subject matter experts (SMEs) in the development process. In this paper, we describe a method for "bootstrapping" model building to lower the cost of overall model development. The models we are interested in here capture dynamic phenomena related to international and subnational conflict. The method of acquiring these models begins with event data drawn from news reports about a conflict region, and infers model characteristics particular to a conflict modeling framework called the Power Structure Toolkit (PSTK). We describe the toolkit and how it has been used prior to this work. We then describe the current problem of modeling conflict and the empirical data available to learn models, and extensions to the PSTK for model generation from this data. We also describe a formative evaluation of the system that compares the performance and costs of models built entirely by an SME against models built with an SME aided by the automated model generation process. Early results indicate at least equivalent prediction rates with significant savings in model generation costs.

It is useful to impose organizational structure over multiagent coalitions.  Hierarchies, for instance, allow for compartmentalization of tasks: if organized correctly, tasks in disjoint subtrees of the hierarchy may be performed in parallel.  Given a notion of the way in which a group of agents need to interact, the Dynamic Distributed Multiagent Hierarchy Generation (DynDisMHG) problem is to determine the best hierarchy that might expedite the process of coordination. This paper introduces a distributed algorithm, called Mobed, for both constructing and maintaining organizational agent hierarchies, enabling exploitation of parallelism in distributed problem solving.  The algorithm is proved correct and it is shown that individual additions of agents to the hierarchy will run in an amortized linear number of rounds.  The hierarchies resulting after perturbations to the agent coalition have constant-bounded edit distance, making Mobed very well suited to highly dynamic problems.

Coalition structure generation has received considerable attention in recent research. Several algorithms have been proposed to solve this problem in Characteristic Function Games (CFGs), where every coalition is assumed to perform equally well in any coalition structure containing it. In contrast, very little attention has been given to the more general Partition Function Games (PFGs), where a coalition's effectiveness may change from one coalition structure to another. In this paper, we deal with PFGs with positive and negative externalities. In this context, we identify the minimum search that is required in order to establish a bound on the quality of the best coalition structure found. We then develop an anytime algorithm that improves this bound with further search, and show that it outperforms the existing state-of-the-art algorithms by orders of magnitude.

In this paper, we describe an approach to scheduling under uncertainty that achieves scalability through a coupling of deterministic and probabilistic reasoning. Our specific focus is a class of oversubscribed scheduling problems where the goal is to maximize the reward earned by a team of agents in a distributed execution environment.  There is uncertainty in both the duration and  outcomes of executed activities. To ensure scalability, our solution approach takes as its starting point an initial deterministic schedule for the agents, computed using expected duration reasoning. This initial agent schedule is probabilistically analyzed to find likely points of failure, and then selectively strengthened based on this analysis. For each scheduled activity, the probability of failing and the impact that failure would have on the schedule's overall reward are calculated and used to focus schedule strengthening actions. Such actions generally entail fundamental trade-offs; for example, modifications that increase the certainty that a high-reward activity succeeds may decrease the schedule slack available to accommodate uncertainty during execution. We describe a principled approach to handling these trade-offs based on the schedule's "expected reward," using it as a metric to ensure that all schedule modifications are ultimately beneficial. Finally, we present experimental results obtained using a multi-agent simulation environment, which confirm that executing schedules strengthened in this way result in significantly higher rewards than are achieved by executing the corresponding initial schedules.

Resource allocation in computing clusters is traditionally centralized, which limits the cluster scale. Effective resource allocation in a network of computing clusters may enable building larger computing infrastructures. We consider this problem as a novel application for multiagent learning (MAL). We propose a MAL algorithm and apply it for optimizing online resource allocation in cluster networks. The learning is distributed to each cluster, using local information only and without access to the global system reward. Experimental results are encouraging: our multiagent learning approach performs reasonably well, compared to an optimal solution, and better than a centralized myopic allocation approach in some cases.

Recently, efficient approximation algorithms for finding Nash equilibria have been developed for the interesting class of anonymous games , where a player's utility does not depend on the identity of its opponents. In this paper, we tackle the problem of computing equilibria in such games with continuous player types , extending the framework to encompass settings with imperfect information. In particular, given the existence result for pure Bayes-Nash equilibiria in these games, we generalise the fictitious play algorithm by developing a novel procedure for finding a best response strategy, which is specifically designed to deal with continuous and, therefore, infinite type spaces. We then combine the best response computation with the general fictitious play structure to obtain an equilibrium. To illustrate the power of this approach, we apply our algorithm to the domain of simultaneous auctions with continuous private values and discrete bids, in which the algorithm shows quick convergence.

Voting is a simple mechanism to aggregate the preferences of agents. Many voting rules have been shown to be NP-hard to manipulate. However, a number of recent theoretical results suggest that this complexity may only be in the worst-case since manipulation is often easy in practice. In this paper, we show that empirical studies are useful in improving our understanding of this issue. We demonstrate that there is a smooth transition in the probability  that a coalition can elect a desired candidate using the veto rule as the size of  the manipulating coalition increases. We show that a rescaled probability curve displays a simple and universal form independent of the size of the problem. We argue that manipulation of the veto rule is asymptotically easy for many independent and identically distributed votes even when the coalition of manipulators is critical in size.  Based on this argument, we identify a situation in which manipulation is computationally hard. This is when votes are highly correlated and the election is "hung." We show, however, that even a single uncorrelated voter is enough to make manipulation easy again.

We present and analyze coalitional affinity games, a family of hedonic games that explicitly model the value that an agent receives from being associated with other agents.  We provide a characterization of the social-welfare maximizing coalition structures, and study the stability properties of affinity games, using the core solution concept.  Interestingly, we observe that members of the core do not necessarily maximize social welfare.  We introduce a new measure, the stability-gap to capture this difference.  Using the stability gap, we show that for an interesting class of coalitional affinity games, the difference between the social welfare of a stable coalition structure and a social welfare maximizing coalition structure is bounded by a factor of two, and that this bound is tight.

A tournament is a binary dominance relation on a set of alternatives. Tournaments arise in many contexts that are relevant to AI, most notably in voting (as a method to aggregate the preferences of agents). There are many works that deal with choice rules that select a desirable alternative from a tournament, but very few of them deal directly with incentive issues, despite the fact that game-theoretic considerations are crucial with respect to systems populated by selfish agents. We deal with the problem of the manipulation of choice rules by considering two types of manipulation. We say that a choice rule is monotonic if an alternative cannot get itself selected by losing on purpose, and pairwise nonmanipulable if a pair of alternatives cannot make one of them the winner by reversing the outcome of the match between them. Our main result is a combinatorial construction of a choice rule that is monotonic, pairwise nonmanipulable, and onto the set of alternatives, for any number of alternatives besides three.