We consider optimizing the coalition structure in Coalitional Skill Games (CSGs), a succinct representation of coalitional games. In CSGs, the value of a coalition depends on the tasks its members can achieve. The tasks require various skills to complete them, and agents may have different skill sets. The optimal coalition structure is a partition of the agents to coalitions, that maximizes the sum of utilities obtained by the coalitions. We show that CSGs can represent any characteristic function, and consider optimal coalition structure generation in this representation. We provide hardness results, showing that in general CSGs, as well as in very restricted versions of them, computing the optimal coalition structure is hard. On the positive side, we show that the problem can be reformulated as constraint satisfaction on a hyper graph, and present an algorithm that finds the optimal coalition structure in polynomial time for instances with bounded tree-width and number of tasks.

We study a problem of dynamic allocation without money. Agents have arrivals and departures and strict preferences over items. Strategyproofness requires the use of an arrival-priority serial-dictatorship (APSD) mechanism, which is ex post Pareto efficient but has poor ex ante efficiency as measured through average rank efficiency. We introduce the scoring-rule (SR) mechanism, which biases in favor of allocating items that an agent values above the population consensus. The SR mechanism is not strategyproof but has tolerable manipulability in the sense that: (i) if every agent optimally manipulates, it reduces to APSD, and (ii) it significantly outperforms APSD for rank efficiency when only a fraction of agents are strategic. The performance of SR is also robust to mistakes by agents that manipulate on the basis of inaccurate information about the popularity of items.

In many auctions, agents bid more aggressively than self-interest would prescribe. This can be explained by spite, where the agent's utility not only increases in the agent's surplus but also decreases as the other bidders' surpluses increase. Spite can stem from long-term benefits from making competitors worse off and from inherent psychological effects. There have been important recent game-theoretic analyses of spiteful bidding assuming all agents are equally spiteful. We present, to our knowledge, the first auction analysis in the more realistic setting where bidders may be spiteful to different extents. We show that the equilibrium bidding function can still be written in the same form — except that the spite factor is replaced by an expressed spite factor. This leads to bidders expressing spites that are higher or lower than their true spite depending on others' spite. Perhaps surprisingly, in the two-bidder case, the mapping from true spite to expressed spite is the same across all common auction mechanisms. Furthermore, even with two bidders, important properties of symmetric-spite settings cease to hold: the allocation can be inefficient and the revenue ranking may reverse between first- and second-price auctions. We also show that in sealed-bid auctions under asymmetric valuation distributions, there can be a "bargaining problem" in selecting bids. Finally, we study the generalization where agents can have different extents of spite toward different other bidders.

For many election systems, bribery (and related) attacks have been shown NP-hard using constructions on combinatorially rich structures such as partitions and covers. It is important to learn how robust these hardness protection results are, in order to find whether they can be relied on in practice. This paper shows that for voters who follow the most central political-science model of electorates — single-peaked preferences — those protections vanish. By using single-peaked preferences to simplify combinatorial covering challenges, we show that NP-hard bribery problems — including those for Kemeny and Llull elections- — fall to polynomial time. By using single-peaked preferences to simplify combinatorial partition challenges, we show that NP-hard partition-of-voters problems fall to polynomial time. We furthermore show that for single-peaked electorates, the winner problems for Dodgson and Kemeny elections, though Θ 2 p -complete in the general case, fall to polynomial time. And we completely classify the complexity of weighted coalition manipulation for scoring protocols in single-peaked electorates.

Multi-agent decision problems, in which independent agents have to agree on a joint plan of action or allocation of resources, are central to AI. In such situations, agents' individual preferences over available alternatives may vary, and they may try to reconcile these differences by voting. Based on the fact that agents may have incentives to vote strategically and misreport their real preferences, a number of recent papers have explored different possibilities for avoiding or eliminating such manipulations. In contrast to most prior work, this paper focuses on convergence of strategic behavior to a decision from which no voter will want to deviate. We consider scenarios where voters cannot coordinate their actions, but are allowed to change their vote after observing the current outcome. We focus on the Plurality voting rule, and study the conditions under which this iterative game is guaranteed to converge to a Nash equilibrium (i.e., to a decision that is stable against further unilateral manipulations). We show for the first time how convergence depends on the exact attributes of the game, such as the tie-breaking scheme, and on assumptions regarding agents' weights and strategies.

The depth first proof number search (df-pn) is an effective and popular algorithm for solving and-or tree problems by using proof and disproof numbers. This paper presents a simple but effective parallelization of the df-pn search algorithm for a shared-memory system. In this parallelization, multiple agents autonomously conduct the df-pn with a shared transposition table. For effective cooperation of agents, virtual proof and disproof numbers are introduced for each node, which is an estimation of future proof and disproof numbers by using the number of agents working on the node's descendants as a possible increase. Experimental results on large checkmate problems in shogi, which is a popular chess variant in Japan, show that reasonable increases in speed were achieved with small overheads in memory.

This paper presents a technique for approximating, up to any precision, the set of subgame-perfect equilibria (SPE) in repeated games with discounting. The process starts with a single hypercube approximation of the set of SPE payoff profiles. Then the initial hypercube is gradually partitioned on to a set of smaller adjacent hypercubes, while those hypercubes that cannot contain any SPE point are gradually withdrawn. Whether a given hypercube can contain an equilibrium point is verified by an appropriate mixed integer program. A special attention is paid to the question of extracting players' strategies and their representability in form of finite automata.

Recent research has shown that surprisingly rich models of human behavior can be learned from GPS (positional) data. However, most research to date has concentrated on modeling single individuals or aggregate statistical properties of groups of people. Given noisy real-world GPS data, we---in contrast---consider the problem of modeling and recognizing activities that involve multiple related individuals playing a variety of roles. Our test domain is the game of capture the flag---an outdoor game that involves many distinct cooperative and competitive joint activities. We model the domain using Markov logic, a statistical relational language, and learn a theory that jointly denoises the data and infers occurrences of high-level activities, such as capturing a player. Our model combines constraints imposed by the geometry of the game area, the motion model of the players, and by the rules and dynamics of the game in a probabilistically and logically sound fashion. We show that while it may be impossible to directly detect a multi-agent activity due to sensor noise or malfunction, the occurrence of the activity can still be inferred by considering both its impact on the future behaviors of the people involved as well as the events that could have preceded it. We compare our unified approach with three alternatives (both probabilistic and nonprobabilistic) where either the denoising of the GPS data and the detection of the high-level activities are strictly separated, or the states of the players are not considered, or both. We show that the unified approach with the time window spanning the entire game, although more computationally costly, is significantly more accurate.

The aim of General Game Playing (GGP) is to create intelligent agents that can automatically learn how to play many different games at an expert level without any human intervention. One of the main challenges such agents face is to automatically learn knowledge-based heuristics in real-time, whether for evaluating game positions or for search guidance. In recent years, GGP agents that use Monte-Carlo simulations to reason about their actions have become increasingly more popular. For competitive play such an approach requires an effective search-control mechanism for guiding the simulation playouts. In here we introduce several schemes for automatically learning search guidance based on both statistical and reinforcement learning techniques. We compare the different schemes empirically on a variety of games and show that they improve significantly upon the current state-of-the-art in simulation-control in GGP. For example, in the chess-like game Skirmish, which has proved a particularly challenging game for simulation-based GGP agents, an agent employing one of the proposed schemes achieves 97% winning rate against an unmodified agent.

In cooperative multiagent systems an alternative that maximizes the social welfare — the sum of utilities — can only be selected if each agent reports its full utility function. This may be infeasible in environments where communication is restricted. Employing a voting rule to choose an alternative greatly reduces the communication burden, but leads to a possible gap between the social welfare of the optimal alternative and the social welfare of the one that is ultimately elected. Procaccia and Rosenschein have introduced the concept of distortion to quantify this gap. In this paper, we present the notion of embeddings into voting rules: functions that receive an agent's utility function and return the agent's vote. We establish that very low distortion can be obtained using randomized embeddings, especially when the number of agents is large compared to the number of alternatives. We investigate our ideas in the context of three prominent voting rules with low communication costs: Plurality, Approval, and Veto. Our results arguably provide a compelling reason for employing voting in cooperative multiagent systems.