The Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence presented the 2007 Fall Symposium Series on Friday through Sunday, November 9–11, at the Westin Arlington Gateway, Arlington, Virginia. The titles of the seven symposia were (1) AI and Consciousness: Theoretical Foundations and Current Approaches, (2) Artificial Intelligence for Prognostics, (3) Cognitive Approaches to Natural Language Processing, (4) Computational Approaches to Representation Change during Learning and Development, (5) Emergent Agents and Socialities: Social and Organizational Aspects of Intelligence, (6) Intelligent Narrative Technologies, and (7) Regarding the “Intelligence” in Distributed Intelligent Systems.

The Kiva warehouse-management system creates a new paradigm for pick-pack-and-ship warehouses that significantly improves worker productivity. The Kiva system uses movable storage shelves that can be lifted by small, autonomous robots. By bringing the product to the worker, productivity is increased by a factor of two or more, while simultaneously improving accountability and flexibility. A Kiva installation for a large distribution center may require 500 or more vehicles. As such, the Kiva system represents the first commercially available, large-scale autonomous robot system. The first permanent installation of a Kiva system was deployed in the summer of 2006.

It is well known that perspective alignment plays a major role in the planning and interpretation of spatial language. In order to understand the role of perspective alignment and the cognitive processes involved, we have made precise complete cognitive models of situated embodied agents that self-organise a communication system for dialoging about the position and movement of real world objects in their immediate surroundings. We show in a series of robotic experiments which cognitive mechanisms are necessary and sufficient to achieve successful spatial language and why and how perspective alignment can take place, either implicitly or based on explicit marking.

We proposed in previous papers an extension and an implementation of the STROBE model, which regards the Agents as Scheme interpreters. These Agents are able to interpret messages in a dedicated environment including an interpreter that learns from the current conversation therefore representing evolving meta-level Agent's knowledge. When the Agent's interpreter is a nondeterministic one, the dialogues may consist of subsequent refinements of specifications in the form of constraint sets. The paper presents a worked out example of dynamic service generation - such as necessary on Grids - by exploiting STROBE Agents equipped with a nondeterministic interpreter. It shows how enabling dynamic specification of a problem. Then it illustrates how these principles could be effective for other applications. Details of the implementation are not provided here, but are available.

This paper presents experiments on common knowledge logic, conducted with the help of the proof assistant Coq. The main feature of common knowledge logic is the eponymous modality that says that a group of agents shares a knowledge about a certain proposition in a inductive way. This modality is specified by using a fixpoint approach. Furthermore, from these experiments, we discuss and compare the structure of theorems that can be proved in specific theories that use common knowledge logic. Those structures manifests the interplay between the theory (as implemented in the proof assistant Coq) and the metatheory.

In real-world planning problems, we must reason not only about our own goals, but about the goals of other agents with which we may interact. Often these agents' goals are neither completely aligned with our own nor directly opposed to them. Instead there are opportunities for cooperation: by joining forces, the agents can all achieve higher utility than they could separately. But, in order to cooperate, the agents must negotiate a mutually acceptable plan from among the many possible ones, and each agent must trust that the others will follow their parts of the deal. Research in multi-agent planning has often avoided the problem of making sure that all agents have an incentive to follow a proposed joint plan. On the other hand, while game theoretic algorithms handle incentives correctly, they often don't scale to large planning problems. In this paper we attempt to bridge the gap between these two lines of research: we present an efficient game-theoretic approximate planning algorithm, along with a negotiation protocol which encourages agents to compute and agree on joint plans that are fair and optimal in a sense defined below. We demonstrate our algorithm and protocol on two simple robotic planning problems.

In real-world planning problems, we must reason not only about our own goals, but about the goals of other agents with which we may interact. Often these agents' goals are neither completely aligned with our own nor directly opposed to them. Instead there are opportunities for cooperation: by joining forces, the agents can all achieve higher utility than they could separately. But, in order to cooperate, the agents must negotiate a mutually acceptable plan from among the many possible ones, and each agent must trust that the others will follow their parts of the deal. Research in multi-agent planning has often avoided the problem of making sure that all agents have an incentive to follow a proposed joint plan. On the other hand, while game theoretic algorithms handle incentives correctly, they often don't scale to large planning problems. In this paper we attempt to bridge the gap between these two lines of research: we present an efficient game-theoretic approximate planning algorithm, along with a negotiation protocol which encourages agents to compute and agree on joint plans that are fair and optimal in a sense defined below. We demonstrate our algorithm and protocol on two simple robotic planning problems.

In real-world planning problems, we must reason not only about our own goals, but about the goals of other agents with which we may interact. Often these agents' goals are neither completely aligned with our own nor directly opposed to them. Instead there are opportunities for cooperation: by joining forces, the agents can all achieve higher utility than they could separately. But, in order to cooperate, the agents must negotiate a mutually acceptableplan from among the many possible ones, and each agent must trust that the others will follow their parts of the deal. Research in multi-agent planning has often avoided the problem of making sure that all agents have an incentive to follow a proposed joint plan. On the other hand, while game theoretic algorithms handle incentives correctly, they often don'tscale to large planning problems. In this paper we attempt to bridge the gap between these two lines of research: we present an efficient game-theoretic approximate planning algorithm, along with a negotiation protocol which encourages agents to compute and agree on joint plans that are fair and optimal in a sense defined below. We demonstrate our algorithm andprotocol on two simple robotic planning problems.

Multiagent systems is an expanding field that blends classical fields like game theory and decentralized control with modern fields like computer science and machine learning. This monograph provides a concise introduction to the subject, covering the theoretical foundations as well as more recent developments in a coherent and readable manner. The text is centered on the concept of an agent as decision maker. Chapter 1 is a short introduction to the field of multiagent systems. Chapter 2 covers the basic theory of singleagent decision making under uncertainty.

A fundamental problem in artificial intelligence is that nobody really knows what intelligence is. The problem is especially acute when we need to consider artificial systems which are significantly different to humans. In this paper we approach this problem in the following way: We take a number of well known informal definitions of human intelligence that have been given by experts, and extract their essential features. These are then mathematically formalised to produce a general measure of intelligence for arbitrary machines. We believe that this equation formally captures the concept of machine intelligence in the broadest reasonable sense. We then show how this formal definition is related to the theory of universal optimal learning agents. Finally, we survey the many other tests and definitions of intelligence that have been proposed for machines.