It is known that determinining whether a DEC-POMDP, namely, a cooperative partially observable stochastic game (POSG), has a cooperative strategy with positive expected reward is complete for NEXP. It was not known until now how cooperation affected that complexity. We show that, for competitive POSGs, the complexity of determining whether one team has a positive-expected-reward strategy is complete for the class NEXP with an oracle for NP.

The advent of the Semantic Web necessitates paradigm shifts away from centralized client/server architectures towards decentralization and peer-to-peer computation, making the existence of central authorities superfluous and even impossible. At the same time, recommender systems are gaining considerable impact in e-commerce, providing people with recommendations that are personalized and tailored to their very needs. These recommender systems have traditionally been deployed with stark centralized scenarios in mind, operating in closed communities detached from their host network's outer perimeter. We aim at marrying these two worlds, i.e., decentralized peer-to-peer computing and recommender systems, in one agent-based framework. Our architecture features an epidemic-style protocol maintaining neighborhoods of like-minded peers in a robust, selforganizing fashion. In order to demonstrate our architecture's ability to retain scalability, robustness and to allow for convergence towards high-quality recommendations, we conduct offline experiments on top of the popular MovieLens dataset.

Correlated equilibrium generalizes Nash equilibrium to allow correlation devices. Correlated equilibrium captures the idea that in many systems there exists a trusted administrator who can recommend behavior to a set of agents, but can not enforce such behavior. This makes this solution concept most appropriate to the study of multi-agent systems in AI. Aumann showed an example of a game, and of a correlated equilibrium in this game in which the agents' welfare (expected sum of players' utilities) is greater than their welfare in all mixed-strategy equilibria. Following the idea initiated by the price of anarchy literature this suggests the study of two major measures for the value of correlation in a game with nonnegative payoffs: 1. The ratio between the maximal welfare obtained in a correlated equilibrium to the maximal welfare obtained in a mixed-strategy equilibrium. We refer to this ratio as the mediation value. 2. The ratio between the maximal welfare to the maximal welfare obtained in a correlated equilibrium. We refer to this ratio as the enforcement value. In this work we initiate the study of the mediation and enforcement values, providing several general results on the value of correlation as captured by these concepts. We also present a set of results for the more specialized case of congestion games, a class of games that received a lot of attention in the recent literature.

It is well-known that acting in an individually rational manner, according to the principles of classical game theory, may lead to sub-optimal solutions in a class of problems named social dilemmas. In contrast, humans generally do not have much difficulty with social dilemmas, as they are able to balance personal benefit and group benefit. As agents in multi-agent systems are regularly confronted with social dilemmas, for instance in tasks such as resource allocation, these agents may benefit from the inclusion of mechanisms thought to facilitate human fairness. Although many of such mechanisms have already been implemented in a multi-agent systems context, their application is usually limited to rather abstract social dilemmas with a discrete set of available strategies (usually two). Given that many real-world examples of social dilemmas are actually continuous in nature, we extend this previous work to more general dilemmas, in which agents operate in a continuous strategy space. The social dilemma under study here is the well-known Ultimatum Game, in which an optimal solution is achieved if agents agree on a common strategy. We investigate whether a scale-free interaction network facilitates agents to reach agreement, especially in the presence of fixed-strategy agents that represent a desired (e.g. human) outcome. Moreover, we study the influence of rewiring in the interaction network. The agents are equipped with continuous-action learning automata and play a large number of random pairwise games in order to establish a common strategy. From our experiments, we may conclude that results obtained in discrete-strategy games can be generalized to continuous-strategy games to a certain extent: a scale-free interaction network structure allows agents to achieve agreement on a common strategy, and rewiring in the interaction network greatly enhances the agents' ability to reach agreement. However, it also becomes clear that some alternative mechanisms, such as reputation and volunteering, have many subtleties involved and do not have convincing beneficial effects in the continuous case.

Several multiagent reinforcement learning (MARL) algorithms have been proposed to optimize agents' decisions. Due to the complexity of the problem, the majority of the previously developed MARL algorithms assumed agents either had some knowledge of the underlying game (such as Nash equilibria) and/or observed other agents actions and the rewards they received. We introduce a new MARL algorithm called the Weighted Policy Learner (WPL), which allows agents to reach a Nash Equilibrium (NE) in benchmark 2-player-2-action games with minimum knowledge. Using WPL, the only feedback an agent needs is its own local reward (the agent does not observe other agents actions or rewards). Furthermore, WPL does not assume that agents know the underlying game or the corresponding Nash Equilibrium a priori. We experimentally show that our algorithm converges in benchmark two-player-two-action games. We also show that our algorithm converges in the challenging Shapley's game where previous MARL algorithms failed to converge without knowing the underlying game or the NE. Furthermore, we show that WPL outperforms the state-of-the-art algorithms in a more realistic setting of 100 agents interacting and learning concurrently. An important aspect of understanding the behavior of a MARL algorithm is analyzing the dynamics of the algorithm: how the policies of multiple learning agents evolve over time as agents interact with one another. Such an analysis not only verifies whether agents using a given MARL algorithm will eventually converge, but also reveals the behavior of the MARL algorithm prior to convergence. We analyze our algorithm in two-player-two-action games and show that symbolically proving WPL's convergence is difficult, because of the non-linear nature of WPL's dynamics, unlike previous MARL algorithms that had either linear or piece-wise-linear dynamics. Instead, we numerically solve WPL's dynamics differential equations and compare the solution to the dynamics of previous MARL algorithms.

EVOC (for EVOlution of Culture) is a computer model of culture that enables us to investigate how various factors such as barriers to cultural diffusion, the presence and choice of leaders, or changes in the ratio of innovation to imitation affect the diversity and effectiveness of ideas. It consists of neural network based agents that invent ideas for actions, and imitate neighbors' actions. The model is based on a theory of culture according to which what evolves through culture is not memes or artifacts, but the internal models of the world that give rise to them, and they evolve not through a Darwinian process of competitive exclusion but a Lamarckian process involving exchange of innovation protocols. EVOC shows an increase in mean fitness of actions over time, and an increase and then decrease in the diversity of actions. Diversity of actions is positively correlated with population size and density, and with barriers between populations. Slowly eroding borders increase fitness without sacrificing diversity by fostering specialization followed by sharing of fit actions. Introducing a leader that broadcasts its actions throughout the population increases the fitness of actions but reduces diversity of actions. Increasing the number of leaders reduces this effect. Efforts are underway to simulate the conditions under which an agent immigrating from one culture to another contributes new ideas while still'fitting in'.

Due to complexity and interdisciplinarity of affective phenomena, attempts to define them have often been unsatisfactory. This article provides a simple logical structure, in which affective concepts can be defined. The set of affects defined is similar to the set of emotions covered in the OCC model [1], but the model presented in this article is fully computationally defined, whereas the OCC model depends on undefined concepts. Following Matthis [2], affects are seen as unconscious, emotions as preconscious and feelings as conscious. Affects are thus a superclass of emotions and feelings with regards to consciousness.

This paper presents the computational logic foundations of a model of agency called the KGP (Knowledge, Goals and Plan model. This model allows the specification of heterogeneous agents that can interact with each other, and can exhibit both proactive and reactive behaviour allowing them to function in dynamic environments by adjusting their goals and plans when changes happen in such environments. KGP provides a highly modular agent architecture that integrates a collection of reasoning and physical capabilities, synthesised within transitions that update the agent's state in response to reasoning, sensing and acting. Transitions are orchestrated by cycle theories that specify the order in which transitions are executed while taking into account the dynamic context and agent preferences, as well as selection operators for providing inputs to transitions.

After presenting the broad context of authority sharing, we outline how introducing more natural interaction in the design of the ground operator interface of UV systems should help in allowing a single operator to manage the complexity of his/her task. Introducing new modalities is one one of the means in the realization of our vision of next- generation GOI. A more fundamental aspect resides in the interaction manager which should help balance the workload of the operator between mission and interaction, notably by applying a multi-strategy approach to generation and interpretation. We intend to apply these principles to the context of the Smaart prototype, and in this perspective, we illustrate how to characterize the workload associated with a particular operational situation.

In this paper, we elucidate the equivalence between inference in game theory and machine learning. Our aim in so doing is to establish an equivalent vocabulary between the two domains so as to facilitate developments at the intersection of both fields, and as proof of the usefulness of this approach, we use recent developments in each field to make useful improvements to the other. More specifically, we consider the analogies between smooth best responses in fictitious play and Bayesian inference methods. Initially, we use these insights to develop and demonstrate an improved algorithm for learning in games based on probabilistic moderation. That is, by integrating over the distribution of opponent strategies (a Bayesian approach within machine learning) rather than taking a simple empirical average (the approach used in standard fictitious play) we derive a novel moderated fictitious play algorithm and show that it is more likely than standard fictitious play to converge to a payoff-dominant but risk-dominated Nash equilibrium in a simple coordination game. Furthermore we consider the converse case, and show how insights from game theory can be used to derive two improved mean field variational learning algorithms. We first show that the standard update rule of mean field variational learning is analogous to a Cournot adjustment within game theory. By analogy with fictitious play, we then suggest an improved update rule, and show that this results in fictitious variational play, an improved mean field variational learning algorithm that exhibits better convergence in highly or strongly connected graphical models. Second, we use a recent advance in fictitious play, namely dynamic fictitious play, to derive a derivative action variational learning algorithm, that exhibits superior convergence properties on a canonical machine learning problem (clustering a mixture distribution).