Calendar of all the AAAI sponsored conferences, conferences presented by AAAI Affiliates, and conferences held in cooperation with AAAI to be held in 2009.

The International Environments conference has been held four times now. The first meeting was held in 2005 at the University of Essex, the second in 2006 at the National Technical University of Athens, and the third in 2007 at the University of Ulm. The conference is unique in its field, providing a leading edge forum for the international community to present the latest academic research and commercial developments. The realization of intelligent environments requires the convergence of different prominent disciplines. As a result, the conference has relevance to individuals working in the fields of information and computer science, material engineering, artificial intelligence, architecture, health care, sociology, design, networking, and intelligent agents.

On a technical chaired by Sibley Verbeck (CEO of algorithmics hugely, for instance level, the work involved using a Electric Sheep Company); and the session we can now solve Boolean satisfaction logic-based AI system to control a humanoid on neural nets was chaired by problems with hundreds of virtual agent in the Second Randal Koene (a neuroscientist from thousands of variables. We can use automated Life virtual world, which interacted Boston University).

AAAI was pleased to present the AAAI-08 Workshop Program, held Sunday and Monday, July 13–14, in Chicago, Illinois, USA. The program included the following 15 workshops: Advancements in POMDP Solvers; AI Education Workshop Colloquium; Coordination, Organizations, Institutions, and Norms in Agent Systems, Enhanced Messaging; Human Implications of Human-Robot Interaction; Intelligent Techniques for Web Personalization and Recommender Systems; Metareasoning: Thinking about Thinking; Multidisciplinary Workshop on Advances in Preference Handling; Search in Artificial Intelligence and Robotics; Spatial and Temporal Reasoning; Trading Agent Design and Analysis; Transfer Learning for Complex Tasks; What Went Wrong and Why: Lessons from AI Research and Applications; and Wikipedia and Artificial Intelligence: An Evolving Synergy.

Security at major locations of economic or political importance is a key concern around the world, particularly given the threat of terrorism. Limited security resources prevent full security coverage at all times, which allows adversaries to observe and exploit patterns in selective patrolling or monitoring, e.g. they can plan an attack avoiding existing patrols. Hence, randomized patrolling or monitoring is important, but randomization must provide distinct weights to different actions based on their complex costs and benefits. To this end, this paper describes a promising transition of the latest in multi-agent algorithms into a deployed application. In particular, it describes a software assistant agent called ARMOR (Assistant for Randomized Monitoring over Routes) that casts this patrolling/monitoring problem as a Bayesian Stackelberg game, allowing the agent to appropriately weigh the different actions in randomization, as well as uncertainty over adversary types. ARMOR combines two key features: (i) It uses the fastest known solver for Bayesian Stackelberg games called DOBSS, where the dominant mixed strategies enable randomization; (ii) Its mixed-initiative based interface allows users to occasionally adjust or override the automated schedule based on their local constraints. ARMOR has been successfully deployed since August 2007 at the Los Angeles International Airport (LAX) to randomize checkpoints on the roadways entering the airport and canine patrol routes within the airport terminals. This paper examines the information, design choices, challenges, and evaluation that went into designing ARMOR.

We consider schemes for obtaining truthful reports on a common but hidden signal from large groups of rational, self-interested agents. One example are online feedback mechanisms, where users provide observations about the quality of a product or service so that other users can have an accurate idea of what quality they can expect. However, (i) providing such feedback is costly, and (ii) there are many motivations for providing incorrect feedback. Both problems can be addressed by reward schemes which (i) cover the cost of obtaining and reporting feedback, and (ii) maximize the expected reward of a rational agent who reports truthfully. We address the design of such incentive-compatible rewards for feedback generated in environments with pure adverse selection. Here, the correlation between the true knowledge of an agent and her beliefs regarding the likelihoods of reports of other agents can be exploited to make honest reporting a Nash equilibrium. In this paper we extend existing methods for designing incentive-compatible rewards by also considering collusion. We analyze different scenarios, where, for example, some or all of the agents collude. For each scenario we investigate whether a collusion-resistant, incentive-compatible reward scheme exists, and use automated mechanism design to specify an algorithm for deriving an efficient reward mechanism.

In this paper, we explore methods for comparing agent behavior with human behavior to assist with validation. Our exploration begins by considering a simple method of behavior comparison. Motivated by shortcomings in this initial approach, we introduce behavior bounding, an automated model-based approach for comparing behavior that is inspired, in part, by Mitchell's Version Spaces. We show that behavior bounding can be used to compactly represent both human and agent behavior. We argue that relatively low amounts of human effort are required to build, maintain, and use the data structures that underlie behavior bounding, and we provide a theoretical basis for these arguments using notions of PAC Learnability. Next, we show empirical results indicating that this approach is effective at identifying differences in certain types of behaviors and that it performs well when compared against our initial benchmark methods. Finally, we demonstrate that behavior bounding can produce information that allows developers to identify and fix problems in an agent's behavior much more efficiently than standard debugging techniques.

Complexity theory is a useful tool to study computational issues surrounding the elicitation of preferences, as well as the strategic manipulation of elections aggregating together preferences of multiple agents. We study here the complexity of determining when we can terminate eliciting preferences, and prove that the complexity depends on the elicitation strategy. We show, for instance, that it may be better from a computational perspective to elicit all preferences from one agent at a time than to elicit individual preferences from multiple agents. We also study the connection between the strategic manipulation of an election and preference elicitation. We show that what we can manipulate affects the computational complexity of manipulation. In particular, we prove that there are voting rules which are easy to manipulate if we can change all of an agent's vote, but computationally intractable if we can change only some of their preferences. This suggests that, as with preference elicitation, a fine-grained view of manipulation may be informative. Finally, we study the connection between predicting the winner of an election and preference elicitation. Based on this connection, we identify a voting rule where it is computationally difficult to decide the probability of a candidate winning given a probability distribution over the votes.

Affective computing has proven to be a viable field of research comprised of a large number of multidisciplinary researchers resulting in work that is widely published. The majority of this work consists of computational models of emotion recognition, computational modeling of causal factors of emotion and emotion expression through rendered and robotic faces. A smaller part is concerned with modeling the effects of emotion, formal modeling of cognitive appraisal theory and models of emergent emotions. Part of the motivation for affective computing as a field is to better understand emotional processes through computational modeling. One of the four major topics in affective computing is computers that have emotions (the others are recognizing, expressing and understanding emotions). A critical and neglected aspect of having emotions is the experience of emotion (Barrett, Mesquita, Ochsner, and Gross, 2007): what does the content of an emotional episode look like, how does this content change over time and when do we call the episode emotional. Few modeling efforts have these topics as primary focus. The launch of a journal on synthetic emotions should motivate research initiatives in this direction, and this research should have a measurable impact on emotion research in psychology. I show that a good way to do so is to investigate the psychological core of what an emotion is: an experience. I present ideas on how the experience of emotion could be modeled and provide evidence that several computational models of emotion are already addressing the issue.

Agents and agent systems are becoming more and more important in the development of a variety of fields such as ubiquitous computing, ambient intelligence, autonomous computing, intelligent systems and intelligent robotics. The need for improvement of our basic knowledge on agents is very essential. We take a systematic approach and present extended classification of artificial agents which can be useful for understanding of what artificial agents are and what they can be in the future. The aim of this classification is to give us insights in what kind of agents can be created and what type of problems demand a specific kind of agents for their solution.