We introduce a symmetry reduction technique for model checking temporal-epistemic properties of multi-agent systems defined in the mainstream interpreted systems framework. The technique, based on counterpart semantics, aims to reduce the set of initial states that need to be considered in a model. We present theoretical results establishing that there are neither false positives nor false negatives in the reduced model. We evaluate the technique by presenting the results of an implementation tested against two well known applications of epistemic logic, the muddy children and the dining cryptographers. The experimental results obtained confirm that the reduction in model checking time can be dramatic, thereby allowing for the verification of hitherto intractable systems.

Recent work on Alternating-Time Temporal Logic and Coalition Logic has allowed the expression of many interesting properties of coalitions and strategies. However there is no natural way of expressing resource requirements in these logics. This paper presents a Resource-Bounded Coalition Logic (RBCL) which has explicit representation of resource bounds in the language, and gives a complete and sound axiomatisation of RBCL.

In this paper, we study distributed algorithms for cooperative agents that  allow them to exchange their assigned tasks in order to reduce their team  cost. We define a new type of contract, called K-swaps, that describes multiple task exchanges among multiple agents at a time, which generalizes the concept of single task exchanges. We design a distributed algorithm that constructs all possible K-swaps that reduce the team cost of a given task allocation and show that each agent typically only needs to communicate a small part of its local computation results to the other agents. We then demonstrate empirically that K-swaps can reduce the team costs of several existing task-allocation algorithms significantly even if K is small.

This paper presents an axiomatic analysis of negotiation problems within task-oriented domains (TOD). We start by applying three classical bargaining solutions of Nash, Kalai-Smorodinsky and Egalitarian to the domains of problems with a pre-process of randomization on possible agreements. We find out that these three solutions coincide within any TOD and can be characterized by the same set of axioms, which specify a solution of task oriented negotiation as an outcome of dual-process of maximizing cost reduction and minimizing workload imbalance. This axiomatic characterization is then used to produce an approximate solution to the domain of problems without randomization on possible agreements.

Resource allocation in computing clusters is traditionally centralized, which limits the cluster scale. Effective resource allocation in a network of computing clusters may enable building larger computing infrastructures. We consider this problem as a novel application for multiagent learning (MAL). We propose a MAL algorithm and apply it for optimizing online resource allocation in cluster networks. The learning is distributed to each cluster, using local information only and without access to the global system reward. Experimental results are encouraging: our multiagent learning approach performs reasonably well, compared to an optimal solution, and better than a centralized myopic allocation approach in some cases.

Voting is a simple mechanism to aggregate the preferences of agents. Many voting rules have been shown to be NP-hard to manipulate. However, a number of recent theoretical results suggest that this complexity may only be in the worst-case since manipulation is often easy in practice. In this paper, we show that empirical studies are useful in improving our understanding of this issue. We demonstrate that there is a smooth transition in the probability  that a coalition can elect a desired candidate using the veto rule as the size of  the manipulating coalition increases. We show that a rescaled probability curve displays a simple and universal form independent of the size of the problem. We argue that manipulation of the veto rule is asymptotically easy for many independent and identically distributed votes even when the coalition of manipulators is critical in size.  Based on this argument, we identify a situation in which manipulation is computationally hard. This is when votes are highly correlated and the election is "hung." We show, however, that even a single uncorrelated voter is enough to make manipulation easy again.

Building and using agent-based models is often impractical, in part due to the cost of including expensive subject matter experts (SMEs) in the development process. In this paper, we describe a method for "bootstrapping" model building to lower the cost of overall model development. The models we are interested in here capture dynamic phenomena related to international and subnational conflict. The method of acquiring these models begins with event data drawn from news reports about a conflict region, and infers model characteristics particular to a conflict modeling framework called the Power Structure Toolkit (PSTK). We describe the toolkit and how it has been used prior to this work. We then describe the current problem of modeling conflict and the empirical data available to learn models, and extensions to the PSTK for model generation from this data. We also describe a formative evaluation of the system that compares the performance and costs of models built entirely by an SME against models built with an SME aided by the automated model generation process. Early results indicate at least equivalent prediction rates with significant savings in model generation costs.

It is useful to impose organizational structure over multiagent coalitions.  Hierarchies, for instance, allow for compartmentalization of tasks: if organized correctly, tasks in disjoint subtrees of the hierarchy may be performed in parallel.  Given a notion of the way in which a group of agents need to interact, the Dynamic Distributed Multiagent Hierarchy Generation (DynDisMHG) problem is to determine the best hierarchy that might expedite the process of coordination. This paper introduces a distributed algorithm, called Mobed, for both constructing and maintaining organizational agent hierarchies, enabling exploitation of parallelism in distributed problem solving.  The algorithm is proved correct and it is shown that individual additions of agents to the hierarchy will run in an amortized linear number of rounds.  The hierarchies resulting after perturbations to the agent coalition have constant-bounded edit distance, making Mobed very well suited to highly dynamic problems.

In this paper, we introduce an on-line, decentralised coordination algorithm for monitoring and predicting the state of spatial phenomena by a team of mobile sensors. These sensors have their application domain in disaster response, where strict time constraints prohibit path planning in advance. The algorithm enables sensors to coordinate their movements with their direct neighbours to maximise the collective information gain, while predicting measurements at unobserved locations using a Gaussian process. It builds upon the max-sum message passing algorithm for decentralised coordination, for which we present two new generic pruning techniques that result in speed-up of up to 92% for 5 sensors. We empirically evaluate our algorithm against several on-line adaptive coordination mechanisms, and report a reduction in root mean squared error up to 50% compared to a greedy strategy.

Equilibrium or near-equilibrium solutions to very large extensive form games are often computed by using abstractions to reduce the game size. A common abstraction technique for games with a large number of available actions is to restrict the number of legal actions in every state. This method has been used to discover equilibrium solutions for the game of no-limit heads-up Texas Hold'em. When using a solution to an abstracted game to play one side in the un-abstracted (real) game, the real opponent actions may not correspond to actions in the abstracted game. The most popular method for handling this situation is to translate opponent actions in the real game to the closest legal actions in the abstracted game. We show that this approach can result in a very exploitable player and propose an alternative solution. We use probabilistic mapping to translate a real action into a probability distribution over actions, whose weights are determined by a similarity metric. We show that this approach significantly reduces the exploitability when using an abstract solution in the real game.