In order for agents to be able to act intelligently in an environment, a first necessary step is to become aware of the current situation in the environment. Forming such awareness is not a trivial matter. Appropriate observations should be selected by the agent, and the observation results should be interpreted and combined into one coherent picture. Humans use dedicated mental models which represent the relationships between various observations and the formation of beliefs about the environment, which then again direct the further observations to be performed. In this paper, a generic agent model for situation awareness is proposed that is able to take a mental model as input, and utilize this model to create a picture of the current situation. In order to show the suitability of the approach, it has been applied within the domain of F-16 fighter pilot training for which a dedicated mental model has been specified, and simulations experiments have been conducted.

The VCG mechanism is the gold standard for combinatorial auctions (CAs), and it maximizes social welfare. In contrast, the revenue-maximizing (aka optimal) CA is unknown, and designing one is NP-hard. Therefore, research on optimal CAs has progressed into special settings. Notably, Levin [1997] derived the optimal CA for complements when each agent's private type is one-dimensional. We introduce a new research avenue for increasing revenue where we poke holes in the allocation space — based on the bids — and then use a welfare-maximizing allocation rule within the remaining allocation set. In this paper, the first step down this avenue, we introduce a new form of "reserve pricing" into CAs. We show that Levin's optimal revenue can be 2-approximated by using "monopoly reserve prices" to curtail the allocation set, followed by welfare-maximizing allocation and Levin's payment rule. A key lemma of potential independent interest is that the expected revenue from any truthful allocation-monotonic mechanism equals the expected virtual valuation; this generalizes Myerson's lemma [1981] from the single-parameter environment. Our mechanism is close to the gold standard and thus easier to adopt than Levin's. It also requires less information about the prior over the bidders' types, and is always more efficient. Finally, we show that the optimal revenue can be 6-approximated even if the "reserve pricing" is required to be symmetric across bidders.

Predicting trust among the agents is of great importance to various open distributed settings (e.g., e-market, peer-to-peer networks, etc.) in that dishonest agents can easily join the system and achieve their goals by circumventing agreed rules, or gaining unfair advantages, etc. Most existing trust mechanisms derive trust by statistically investigating the target agent's historical information. However, even if rich historical information is available, it is challenging to model an agent's behavior since an intelligent agent may strategically change its behavior to maximize its profits. We therefore propose a trust prediction approach to capture dynamic behavior of the target agent. Specifically, we first identify features which are capable of describing/representing context of a transaction. Then we use these features to measure similarity between context of the potential transaction and that of previous transactions to estimate trustworthiness of the potential transaction based on previous similar transactions' outcomes. Evaluation using real auction data and synthetic data demonstrates efficacy of our approach in comparison with an existing representative trust mechanism.

Algorithms for finding game-theoretic solutions are now used in several real-world security applications. This work has generally assumed a Stackelberg model where the defender commits to a mixed strategy first. In general two-player normal-form games, Stackelberg strategies are easier to compute than Nash equilibria, though it has recently been shown that in many security games, Stackelberg strategies are also Nash strategies for the defender. However, the work on security games so far assumes that the attacker attacks only a single target. In this paper, we generalize to the case where the attacker attacks multiple targets simultaneously. Here, Stackelberg and Nash strategies for the defender can be truly different. We provide a polynomial-time algorithm for finding a Nash equilibrium. The algorithm gradually increases the number of defender resources and maintains an equilibrium throughout this process. Moreover, we prove that Nash equilibria in security games with multiple attackers satisfy the interchange property, which resolves the problem of equilibrium selection in such games. On the other hand, we show that Stackelberg strategies are actually NP-hard to compute in this context. Finally, we provide experimental results.

Given its ubiquity, scale and complexity, few problems have created the combined interest of so many unrelated areas as the evolution of cooperation. Using the tools of evolutionary game theory, here we address, for the first time, the role played by intention recognition in the final outcome of cooperation in large populations of self-regarding individuals. By equipping individuals with the capacity of assessing intentions of others in the course of repeated Prisoner's Dilemma interactions, we show how intention recognition opens a window of opportunity for cooperation to thrive, as it precludes the invasion of pure cooperators by random drift while remaining robust against defective strategies. Intention recognizers are able to assign an intention to the action of their opponents based on an acquired corpus of possible intentions. We show how intention recognizers can prevail against most famous strategies of repeated dilemmas of cooperation, even in the presence of errors. Our approach invites the adoption of other classification and pattern recognition mechanisms common among Humans, to unveil the evolution of complex cognitive processes in the context of social dilemmas.

Alternating-time temporal logic (ATL) is a well-known logic for reasoning about strategic abilities of agents. An important feature that distinguishes variants of ATL for imperfect information scenarios is that the standard fixed point characterizations of temporal modalities do not hold anymore. In this paper, we show that adding explicit fixed point operators to the "next-time" fragment of ATL already allows to capture abilities that could not be expressed in ATL. We also illustrate that the new language allows to specify important kinds of abilities, namely ones where the agents can always recompute their strategy while executing it. Thus, the agents are not assumed to remember their strategy by definition, like in the existing variants of ATL. Last but not least, we show that verification of such abilities can be cheaper than for all the variants of `"ATL with imperfect information" considered so far.

We consider scenarios where several agents must aggregate their preferences over a large set of candidates with a combinatorial structure. That is, each candidate is an element of the Cartesian product of the domains of some variables. We assume agents compactly express their preferences over the candidates via soft constraints. We consider a sequential procedure that chooses one candidate by asking the agents to vote on one variable at a time. While some properties of this procedure have been already studied, here we focus on independence of irrelevant alternatives, non-dictatorship, and strategy-proofness. Also, we perform an experimental study that shows that the proposed sequential procedure yields a considerable saving in time with respect to a non-sequential approach, while the winners satisfy the agents just as well, independently of the variable ordering and of the presence of coalitions of agents.

Envy-freeness is a well-known fairness concept for analyzing mechanisms. Its traditional definition requires that no individual envies another individual. However, an individual (or a group of agents) may envy another group, even if she (or they) does not envy another individual. In mechanisms with monetary transfer, such as combinatorial auctions, considering such fairness requirements, which are refinements of traditional envy-freeness, is meaningful and brings up a new interesting research direction in mechanism design. In this paper, we introduce two new concepts of fairness called envy-freeness of an individual toward a group, and envy-freeness of a group toward a group. They are natural extensions of traditional envy-freeness. We discuss combinatorial auction mechanisms that satisfy these concepts. First, we characterize such mechanisms by focusing on their allocation rules. Then we clarify the connections between these concepts and three other properties: the core, strategy-proofness, and false-name-proofness.

Cooperative path-finding can be abstracted as computing non-colliding paths for multiple agents between their start and goal locations on a graph. This paper proposes a fast algorithm that can provide completeness guarantees for a general class of problems without any assumptions about the graph's topology. Specifically, the approach can address any solvable instance where there are at most n -2 agents in a graph of size n . The algorithm employs two primitives: a "push" operation where agents move towards their goals up to the point that no progress can be made, and a "swap" operation that allows two agents to swap positions without altering the configuration of other agents. Simulated experiments are provided on hard instances of cooperative path-finding, including comparisons against alternative methods. The results are favorable for the proposed algorithm and show that the technique scales to problems that require high levels of coordination, involving hundreds of agents.

We introduce a game-theoretic framework to address the community detection problem based on the social networks’ structure. The dynamics of community formation is framed as a strategic game called community formation game: Given a social network, each node is selfish and selects communities to join or leave based on her own utility measurement. A community structure can be interpreted as an equilibrium of this game. We formulate the agents’ utility by the combination of a gain function and a loss function. Each agent can select multiple communities, which naturally captures the concept of “overlapping communities”. We propose a gain function based on Newman’s modularity function and a simple loss function that reflects the intrinsic costs incurred when people join the communities. We conduct extensive experiments under this framework; our results show that our algorithm is effective in identifying overlapping communities, and is often better than other algorithms we evaluated especially when many people belong to multiple communities.