The paper introduces a logical framework for negotiation among dishonest agents. The framework relies on the use of abductive logic programming as a knowledge representation language for agents to deal with incomplete information and preferences. The paper shows how intentionally false or inaccurate information of agents could be encoded in the agents' knowledge bases. Such disinformation can be effectively used in the process of negotiation to have desired outcomes by agents. The negotiation processes are formulated under the answer set semantics of abductive logic programming and enable the exploration of various strategies that agents can employ in their negotiation

We present a formal investigation of artifact-based systems, a relatively novel framework in service oriented computing, aimed at laying the foundations for verifying these systems through model checking. We present an infinite-state, computationally grounded semantics for these systems that allows us to reason about temporal-epistemic specifications. We present abstraction techniques for the semantics that guarantee transfer of satisfaction from the abstract system to the concrete one.

The environment is an essential component of multi-agent systems and is often used to coordinate the behaviour of individualagents. Recently many languages have been proposed to specify and implement multi-agent environments in terms of social and normative concepts. In this paper, we first introduce a formal setting of multi-agent environment which abstracts from concrete specification languages. We extend this formal setting with norms and sanctions and show how concepts from mechanism design can be used to formally analyse and verify whether specific normative behaviours can be enforced (or implemented) if agents follow their subjective preferences. We also consider complexity issues of associated problems.

As explained by Axelrod in his seminal work An Evolutionary Approach to Norms , punishment is a key mechanism to achieve the necessary social control and to impose social norms in a self-regulated society. In this paper, we distinguish between two enforcing mechanisms. i.e. punishment and sanction , focusing on the specific ways in which they favor the emergence and maintenance of cooperation. The key research question is to find more stable and cheaper mechanisms for norm compliance in hybrid social environments (populated by humans and computational agents). To achieve this task, we have developed a normative agent able to punish and sanction defectors and to dynamically choose the right amount of punishment and sanction to impose on them ( Dynamic Adaptation Heuristic ). The results obtained through agent-based simulation show us that sanction is more effective and less costly than punishment in the achievement and maintenance of cooperation and it makes the population more resilient to sudden changes than if it were enforced only by mere punishment.

Quantitative prediction problems involving both spatial and temporal components have appeared prominently in several disparate research areas including finance, supply chain management, and civil engineering. Unfortunately, either the spatial or temporal aspect tends to dominate the other in many prediction formulations. We briefly examine the underlying formulations used in spatial and temporal prediction. Then, we outline a method that combines these approaches and improves prediction results in high-dimensional economic domains by integrating multivariate and time series techniques which require minimal tuning but achieve superior performance compared to previous methods. We present preliminary results in the context of the Trading Agent Competition for Supply Chain Management.

One fundamental evaluation criteria of an AI technique is its performance in the worst-case. For static strategies in extensive games, this can be computed using a best response computation. Conventionally, this requires a full game tree traversal. For very large games, such as poker, that traversal is infeasible to perform on modern hardware. In this paper, we detail a general technique for best response computations that can often avoid a full game tree traversal. Additionally, our method is specifically well-suited for parallel environments. We apply this approach to computing the worst-case performance of a number of strategies in heads-up limit Texas hold'em, which, prior to this work, was not possible. We explore these results thoroughly as they provide insight into the effects of abstraction on worst-case performance in large imperfect information games. This is a topic that has received much attention, but could not previously be examined outside of toy domains.

In multi-issue automated negotiation against unknown opponents, a key part of effective negotiation is the choice of concession strategy. In this paper, we develop a principled concession strategy, based on Gaussian processes predicting the opponent's future behaviour. We then use this to set the agent's concession rate dynamically during a single negotiation session. We analyse the performance of our strategy and show that it outperforms the state-of-the-art negotiating agents from the 2010 Automated Negotiating Agents Competition, in both a tournament setting and in self-play, across a variety of negotiation domains.

Proving that one language is more succinct than another becomes harder when the underlying semantics is stronger. We propose to use Formula-Size Games (as put forward by Adler and Immerman, 2003), games that are played on two sets of models, and that directly link the length of play with the size of the formula. Using those games, we prove three succinctness results for m-dimensional modal logic: (1) In system K m , a notion of `everybody knows' makes the resulting language exponentially more succinct for m > 1, (2) In S5, the same language becomes more succinct for m > 3 and (3) Public Announcement Logic is exponentially more succinct than S5m, if m > 3. The latter settles an open problem raised by Lutz, 2006.

Agent-based negotiation teams are negotiation parties formed by more than a single individual. Individuals unite as a single negotiation party because they share a common goal that is related to a negotiation with one or several opponents. My research goal is providing agent-based computational models for negotiation teams in multi-agent systems.

We study distributed task-allocation problems wherecooperative agents need to perform some tasks simultaneously. Examples are multi-agent routing problems where several agents need to visit some targets simultaneously, for example, to move obstacles out of the way cooperatively. In this paper, we first generalize the concept of reaction functions proposed in the literature to characterize the agent costs of performing multiple complex tasks. Second, we show how agents can construct and approximate reaction functions in a distributed way. Third, we show how reaction functions can be used by an auction-like algorithm to allocate tasks to agents. Finally, we show empirically that the team costs of our algorithms are substantially smaller than those of an existing state-of-the-art allocation algorithm for complex tasks.