The way in which social conventions emerge in communities has been of interest to social scientists for decades. Here we report on the emergence of a particular social convention on Twitter—the way to indicate a tweet is being reposted and to attribute the content to its source. Initially, different variations were invented and spread through the Twitter network. The inventors and early adopters were well-connected, active, core members of the Twitter community. The diffusion networks of these conventions were dense and highly clustered, so no single user was critical to the adoption of the conventions. Despite being invented at different times and having different adoption rates, only two variations came to be widely adopted. In this paper we describe this process in detail, highlighting insights and raising questions about how social conventions emerge.

Bots are, for many Web and social media users, the source of many dangerous attacks or the carrier of unwanted messages, such as spam. Nevertheless, crawlers and software agents are a precious tool for analysts, and they are continuously executed to collect data or to test distributed applications. However, no one knows which is the real potential of a bot whose purpose is to control a community, to manipulate consensus, or to influence user behavior. It is commonly believed that the better an agent simulates human behavior in a social network, the more it can succeed to generate an impact in that community. We contribute to shed light on this issue through an online social experiment aimed to study to what extent a bot with no trust, no profile, and no aims to reproduce human behavior, can become popular and influential in a social media. Results show that a basic social probing activity can be used to acquire social relevance on the network and that the so-acquired popularity can be effectively leveraged to drive users in their social connectivity choices. We also register that our bot activity unveiled hidden social polarization patterns in the community and triggered an emotional response of individuals that brings to light subtle privacy hazards perceived by the user base.

Cooperative games model the allocation of profit from joint actions, following considerations such as stability and fairness. We propose the reliability extension of such games, where agents may fail to participate in the game. In the reliability extension, each agent only "survives" with a certain probability, and a coalition's value is the probability that its surviving members would be a winning coalition in the base game. We study prominent solution concepts in such games, showing how to approximate the Shapley value and how to compute the core in games with few agent types. We also show that applying the reliability extension may stabilize the game, making the core non-empty even when the base game has an empty core.

The assignment of tasks to multiple resources becomes an interesting game theoretic problem, when both the task owner and the resources are strategic. In the classical, nonstrategic setting, where the states of the tasks and resources are observable by the controller, this problem is that of finding an optimal policy for a Markov decision process (MDP). When the states are held by strategic agents, the problem of an efficient task allocation extends beyond that of solving an MDP and becomes that of designing a mechanism. Motivated by this fact, we propose a general mechanism which decides on an allocation rule for the tasks and resources and a payment rule to incentivize agents' participation and truthful reports. In contrast to related dynamic strategic control problems studied in recent literature, the problem studied here has interdependent values: the benefit of an allocation to the task owner is not simply a function of the characteristics of the task itself and the allocation, but also of the state of the resources. We introduce a dynamic extension of Mezzetti's two phase mechanism for interdependent valuations. In this changed setting, the proposed dynamic mechanism is efficient, within period ex-post incentive compatible, and within period ex-post individually rational.

To deal with the prohibitive complexity of calculating policies in Decentralized MDPs, researchers have proposed models that exploit structured agent interactions. Settings where most agent actions are independent except for few actions that affect the transitions and/or rewards of other agents can be modeled using Event-Driven Interactions with Complex Rewards (EDI-CR). Finding the optimal joint policy can be formulated as an optimization problem. However, existing formulations are too verbose and/or lack optimality guarantees. We propose a compact Mixed Integer Linear Program formulation of EDI-CR instances. The key insight is that most action sequences of a group of agents have the same effect on a given agent. This allows us to treat these sequences similarly and use fewer variables. Experiments show that our formulation is more compact and leads to faster solution times and better solutions than existing formulations.

Traditional economic models typically treat private information, or signals, as generated from some underlying state. Recent work has explicated alternative models, where signals correspond to interpretations of available information. We show that the difference between these formulations can be sharply cast in terms of causal dependence structure, and employ graphical models to illustrate the distinguishing characteristics. The graphical representation supports inferences about signal patterns in the interpreted framework, and suggests how results based on the generated model can be extended to more general situations. Specific insights about bidding games in classical auction mechanisms derive from qualitative graphical models.

Potential games and decentralised partially observable MDPs (Dec-POMDPs) are two commonly used models of multi-agent interaction, for static optimisation and sequential decisionmaking settings, respectively. In this paper we introduce filtered fictitious play for solving repeated potential games in which each player's observations of others' actions are perturbed by random noise, and use this algorithm to construct an online learning method for solving Dec-POMDPs. Specifically, we prove that noise in observations prevents standard fictitious play from converging to Nash equilibrium in potential games, which also makes fictitious play impractical for solving Dec-POMDPs. To combat this, we derive filtered fictitious play, and provide conditions under which it converges to a Nash equilibrium in potential games with noisy observations. We then use filtered fictitious play to construct a solver for Dec-POMDPs, and demonstrate our new algorithm's performance in a box pushing problem. Our results show that we consistently outperform the state-of-the-art Dec-POMDP solver by an average of 100% across the range of noise in the observation function.

Achieving joint objectives by teams of cooperative planning agents requires significant coordination and communication efforts. For a single-agent system facing a plan failure in a dynamic environment, arguably, attempts to repair the failed plan in general do not straightforwardly bring any benefit in terms of time complexity. However, in multi-agent settings the communication complexity might be of a much higher importance, possibly a high communication overhead might be even prohibitive in certain domains. We hypothesize that in decentralized systems, where coordination is enforced to achieve joint objectives, attempts to repair failed multi-agent plans should lead to lower communication overhead than replanning from scratch. The contribution of the presented paper is threefold. Firstly, we formally introduce the multi-agent plan repair problem and formally present the core hypothesis underlying our work. Secondly, we propose three algorithms for multi-agent plan repair reducing the problem to specialized instances of the multi-agent planning problem. Finally, we present results of experimental validation confirming the core hypothesis of the paper.

Data Mining techniques plays a vital role like extraction of required knowledge, finding unsuspected information to make strategic decision in a novel way which in term understandable by domain experts. A generalized frame work is proposed by considering non - domain experts during mining process for better understanding, making better decision and better finding new patters in case of selecting suitable data mining techniques based on the user profile by means of intelligent agents. KEYWORDS: Data Mining Techniques, Intelligent Agents, User Profile, Multidimensional Visualization, Knowledge Discovery.

We explore the paradigm of artifact-centric systems from a knowledge-based perspective. We provide a semantics based on interpreted-systems to interpret a first-order temporal- epistemic language with identity in a multi-agent setting. We consider the model checking problem for this language and provide abstraction results. We isolate a natural subclass of artifact-systems for which the model checking problem is decidable. We give an upper bound on the complexity of the model checking problem.