A systematic study on the abstract level is the first step towards algorithms that solve the problem. We show that different semantics of ability in ATL Ultimately, we show that what agents can achieve is more give rise to different validity sets. As a consequence, sensitive to the strategic model of an agent (and a precise notion different notions of ability induce different of achievement) than it was generally realized. No less strategic logics and different general properties importantly, our study reveals that some natural properties - of games. Moreover, the study can be seen as the usually taken for granted when reasoning about action - may first systematic step towards satisfiability-checking cease to be universally true if we change the strategic setting.

Slinko and White, (2008) have recently introduced a new model of coalitional manipulation of voting rules under limited communication, which they call safe strategic voting. The computational aspects of this model were first studied by Hazon and Elkind, (2010), who provide polynomial-time algorithms for finding a safe strategic vote under k-approval and the Bucklin rule. In this paper, we answer an open question of Hazon and Elkind, (2010) by presenting a polynomial-time algorithm for finding a safe strategic vote under the Borda rule. Our results for Borda generalize to several interesting classes of scoring rules.

In a pursuit-evasion game, one or more pursuers aim to discover the existence of, and then capture, an evader. The paper studies pursuit-evasion games in which players may have incomplete information concerning the game state. A methodology is presented for the application of a model checker for the logic of knowledge and time to verify epistemic properties in such games. Experimental results are provided from a number of case studies that validate the feasibility of the approach.

We propose a logical framework to represent and reason about agent interactions in normative systems. Our starting point is a dynamic logic of propositional assignments whose satisfiability problem is PSPACE-complete. We show that it embeds Coalition Logic of Propositional Control CL-PC and that various notions of ability and capability can be captured in it. We illustrate it on a water resource management case study. Finally, we show how the logic can be easily extended in order to represent constitutive rules which are also an essential component of the modelling of social reality.

We address the issue of manipulating games through communication. In the specific setting we consider (a variation of Boolean games), we assume there is some set of environment variables, the value of which is not directly accessible to players; each player has their own beliefs about these variables, and makes decisions about what actions to perform based on these beliefs. The communication we consider takes the form of (truthful) announcements about the value of some environment variables; the effect of an announcement about some variable is to modify the beliefs of the players who hear the announcement so that they accurately reflect the value of the announced variables. By choosing announcements appropriately, it is possible to perturb the game away from certain rational outcomes and towards others. We specifically focus on the issue of stabilisation: making announcements that transform a game from having no stable states to one that has stable configurations.

We report on results from experiments where human traders interact with software-agent traders in a real-time asynchronous continuous double auction (CDA) experimental economics system. Our experiments are inspired by the seminal work reported by IBM at IJCAI 2001, where it was demonstrated that software-agent traders could consistently outperform human traders in real-time CDA markets. IBM tested two trading-agent strategies, ZIP and a modified version of GD, and in a subsequent paper they reported on a new strategy called GDX that was demonstrated to outperform GD and ZIP in agent vs. agent CDA competitions, on which basis it was claimed that GDX "...may offer the best performance of any published CDA bidding strategy.". In this paper, we employ experiment methods similar to those pioneered by IBM to test the performance of "Adaptive Aggressive" (AA) algorithmic traders. The results presented here confirm Vytelingum's claim that AA outperforms ZIP, GD, and GDX in agent vs. agent experiments. We then present the first results from testing AA against human traders in human vs. agent CDA experiments, and demonstrate that AA's performance against human traders is superior to that of ZIP, GD, and GDX. We therefore claim that, on the basis of the available evidence, AA may offer the best performance of any published bidding strategy.

We consider scenarios where several agents must aggregate their preferences over a large set of candidates with a combinatorial structure. That is, each candidate is an element of the Cartesian product of the domains of some variables. We assume agents compactly express their preferences over the candidates via soft constraints. We consider a sequential procedure that chooses one candidate by asking the agents to vote on one variable at a time. While some properties of this procedure have been already studied, here we focus on independence of irrelevant alternatives, non-dictatorship, and strategy-proofness. Also, we perform an experimental study that shows that the proposed sequential procedure yields a considerable saving in time with respect to a non-sequential approach, while the winners satisfy the agents just as well, independently of the variable ordering and of the presence of coalitions of agents.

We address the issue, in cognitive agents, of possible loss of previous information, which later might turn out to be correct when new information becomes available. To this aim, we propose a framework for changing the agent's mind without erasing forever previous information, thus allowing its recovery in case the change turns out to be wrong. In this new framework, a piece of information is represented as an argument which can be more or less accepted depending on the trustworthiness of the agent who proposes it. We adopt possibility theory to represent uncertainty about the information, and to model the fact that information sources can be only partially trusted. The originality of the proposed framework lies in the following two points: (i) argument reinstatement is mirrored in belief reinstatement in order to avoid the loss of previous information; (ii) new incoming information is represented under the form of arguments and it is associated with a plausibility degree depending on the trustworthiness of the information source.

Gjerstad and Dickhaut, 1998; Nicolaisen et al., 2001] and a market selection strategy which is mainly based on the history This paper describes the strategies used by of the trader's profit made with each specialist. AstonCAT-Plus, the post-tournament version of A CAT game lasts a number of days (500 days in CATthe specialist designed for the TAC Market Design 2010). Each day consists of a number of trading rounds, Tournament 2010. It details how AstonCATwhich each lasts for a known constant length of time. The Plus accepts shouts, clears market, sets transaction daily evaluation of the specialists is based on three metrics: prices and charges fees. Through empirical evaluation, (1) market share, which is the percentage of the total traders' we show that AstonCAT-Plus not only outperforms population registered in the market; (2) profit share, which is AstonCAT (tournament version) significantly the ratio of the daily profit a specialist obtains to the profit of but also achieves the second best overall all specialists and (3) transaction success rate (TSR), which score against some top entrants of the competition.

In this paper we propose a mechanism that encourages agents, participating in an open MAS, to follow a desirable behaviour, by introducing modifications in the environment. This mechanism is deployed by using an infrastructure based on institutional agents called incentivators. Each external agent is assigned to an incentivator that is able to discover its preferences, and to learn the suitable modifications in the environment, in order to improve the global utility of a system in response to inadequate design or changes in the population of participating agents. The mechanism is evaluated in a p2p scenario.